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ERRATUM
Several years ago I published Holding Women's Psyches Hostage:An Interpretive Analogy on the Thomas/Hill Hearings, 69 DENV. U. L. REv. 171 (1992).
This article began with a short narrative describing the experiences and
death of a sexually harassed woman named Betty. The article notes that
Betty's death occurred in conjunction with and was partially motivated by
the Thomas/Hill hearings. In writing the narrative, I relied on several
knowledgeable sources and Betty's unemployment benefits case file. Nevertheless, a year later I received information indicating Betty's death occurred before, rather than concurrent with, the Thomas/Hill hearings. I
write to acknowledge my mistake and to express regret for the error.
Penelope E. Bryan

EDITOR'S NOTE
In our modem administrative state, where government increasingly attempts to attach "strings" to the benefits we receive, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions appears on its face to be an effective tool to constrain government attempts to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Instances of unconstitutional government conditions, to which the doctrine might
properly be applied, arise in numerous and diverse contexts. And yet, despite
its ubiquitous nature, no consensus has emerged for a coherent analytical
framework or unifying theory that would explain and predict the courts' utilization of the doctrine. Thus, as evidenced by its limited and inconsistent application by the courts, and the frustrated writings of legal scholars, including
those participating in this symposium, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions remains an enigma.
In light of the far reaching effects of the doctrine, we designed the symposium to bring together a small group of scholars from different areas of
legal study to consider and compare its application within various contexts.
This symposium issue is therefore divided into four distinct sections, each
representing a particular discipline or point of view. The first section offers
unique perspectives on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the context of property. The second section provides one commentator's view of the
doctrine as it relates to religion. The third section contains intriguing thoughts
on the doctrine within the contexts of welfare and reproductive rights. The
fourth and final section entertains the pessimistic but perhaps realistic view
that the doctrine is "too hard," and therefore deserves no consideration at all.
Although the symposium provided no solutions to the unconstitutional conditions conundrum, it did allow for provocative ideas, a lively debate, and insightful commentary, all of which is (hopefully) reflected in this issue.
I thank Dean Dennis Lynch and the participating faculty at the University
of Denver College of Law, particularly Alan Chen, Roberto Corrada, Nancy
Ehrenreich, Martha Ertman, and Julie Nice. Their energy and commitment to
this symposium prompted what I hope to be a long tradition of inspired intellectual debate at the University of Denver and in the pages of the Law Review.
I also thank Bart Johnson, Kelly Elefant, Brent Warkentine, and the editors
and staff of the Denver University Law Review. Finally, I would like to thank
Sue Chrisman, without whom my law school career might never have ended.
Lisa J. Banks, Editor
THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE

DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AS PUBLIC GOODS
THOMAS W. MERRILL*

When may the government require that citizens waive their constitutional
rights in order to obtain benefits the government has no obligation to provide
them? The answer, given by the so-called "doctrine" of unconstitutional conditions, is that sometimes the government may condition discretionary benefits
on the waiver of rights, and sometimes it may not. The Supreme Court has
never offered a satisfactory rationale for this doctrine, or why it "roams about
constitutional law like Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, but not in
others."'
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine directs courts not to enforce
certain contracts that waive constitutional rights. Perhaps it is only natural,
therefore, that the dominant tradition in seeking to justify the doctrine focuses
on possible defects in the bargaining process. The assumption is that contracts
waiving constitutional rights should not be enforced because no genuine consent was given to this contract in the first place. There are, however, several
serious problems with the consent theory of unconstitutional conditions.
The most commonly cited reason for finding a lack of consent is that the
waiver of rights was "coerced" by the government.2 As others have observed,
however, application of the concept of coercion in this context is problematic. 3 To note just one difficulty,4 the ordinary understanding of what constitutes government coercion refers to the imposition of some sanction (imprisonment, fine, or forfeiture) for doing X, with the consequence that the individual
is left with a less attractive set of options after the government announces the
sanction than existed before.5 This, however, does not describe what is at

* John Paul Stevens Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A., Grinnell
College, 1971; B.A., Oxford University, 1973; J.D., University of Chicago, 1977. I would like to
thank the other panelists and participants in the symposium for their helpful comments and suggestions. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Richard Epstein for his thoughtful comments, to Art
Travers for pointing out an error in an earlier draft, and to Bob Nagel for relaying his observations
to me.
1. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 9 (1993).
2. For a review of authorities that rely on some version of the coercion argument, see
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1428-50 (1989).
3. For a sustained critique, see id. at 1450-56.
4. There is, in addition, a difficult conceptual problem in distinguishing between government coercion ("threats") and legitimate preliminaries to formation of a consensual agreement
("offers"). Attaching one label or another requires the identification of an appropriate "baseline,"
and it turns out this is contestable. The seminal account here is Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984).
5. For a comprehensive analysis of the concept of coercion in the private and international
law contexts, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). Wertheimer concludes that "coercion" in
these contexts requires the posing of a choice in which one option is wrongful or illegal. Id. at
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issue in the typical unconstitutional conditions case. Rather, in the typical
case the government has offered a discretionary benefit (i.e., a benefit that the
government is not legally obligated to provide) in return for a waiver of rights.
The government intervention creates a set of options that is more, rather than
less, attractive (at least relative to the status quo ante with no possibility of
obtaining the benefit). In terms of doctrines of contract formation, therefore,
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not concern the problem of coercion-at least as conventionally understood.6
A variant on the coercion theme is the idea that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine can be explained by the government's exercise of monopoly
powers.7 If the government is the sole supplier of a particular kind of benefit,
then it is in a position to dictate the terms for acquiring the benefit, including
a waiver of rights that might not be consented to in a competitive market.
Again, however, this notion cannot account for the full range of the doctrine.
Perhaps the largest single category of decisions striking down waivers of
rights concerns conditions attached to government employment.' It is usually
not plausible, however, to say that the government wields monopoly power in
the employment market.9
A further problem is that one would predict, based on the consent theory,
that the harder the choice put by the government to an individual, the more
likely it would be that the doctrine would apply. Thus, the more important the
constitutional right to an individual's well being, and the more vital the discretionary benefit to basic subsistence and survival, the more likely it would be
that courts would find no consent to the waiver. But in fact, these patterns are
not observed." When we examine the full run of decided cases, we discover
a fairly robust version of the doctrine in connection with First Amendment
rights" and certain separation of powers controversies; 2 a much weaker
version prevails with respect to reproductive rights 3 and criminal procedural
rights. 4 It would be difficult, however, to argue that the first types of rights

170-75, 202-21. Whatever its merits in the private law context, however, this analysis does not
appear to carry over to the public law arena, where, for example, we refer to government "coercion" in imposing imprisonment or fines for breaking the law. The government here is said to be
acting coercively, but it is not posing a wrongful or illegal choice. Robert Nozick's classic analysis of coercion, as the posing of any choice that necessarily leaves the individual worse off than
they were before, would appear to capture more accurately what is meant by coercion, at least
when we speak of government acting coercively. See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in SIDNEY
MORGENBESSER El AL., PHiLOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD (1969).
6. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1988).
7. Epstein, supra note 6; Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 3 (1983).
8. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (collecting cases).
9. Williams, supra note 7.

10. For the same reason, one cannot explain the doctrine based on a straightforward balanc-

ing of the individual interests versus the governmental interests. Cf Peter Westen, Credible Dilem-

inas: Conditioning One ConstitutionalRight on the Forfeitureof Another, 66 IOWA L. REv. 741,
748-49 (1981) (adopting the balancing hypothesis).
11. See infra text accompanying note 33.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 66-69.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 79-82.
14. See infra text accompanying note 95.
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are systematically more important to individuals than are the second. Moreover, Lynn Baker, in the most comprehensive study of waivers of rights in the
context of public assistance programs, has concluded that "the seriousness or
intrusiveness of the burden that the condition imposes on the potential beneficiary does not seem persuasively to distinguish the permitted from the prohibited conditions."'" All this suggests that the doctrine may have less to do with
lack of consent than with some kind of unstated hierarchy of rights grounded
in other concerns.
A final anomaly with the consent theory is that the cases applying the
doctrine sometimes require that there be a nexus between the waiver of the
right and some governmental interest arising out of the program creating the
benefits that the government offers in return for the waiver. 6 Again, however, this makes little sense if the doctrine is grounded in concerns about
consent. The government can act coercively or monopolistically just as easily
when it has an interest related to the rights waived as when there is no nexus
between government interests and waived rights. The nexus requirement,
therefore, again suggests that the doctrine is more concerned with the nature
and value of the right, and the government's rationale for requiring the citizen
to give it up, than it is with problems of consent.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard7 offers
a propitious occasion to reconsider some of the puzzles surrounding the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. In Dolan, the Court expressly extended the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the Takings Clause; in particular, to
attempts by local zoning authorities to avoid the just compensation requirement by conditioning the grant of a discretionary building permit on the donation of property to the government. Because this practice is common in many
jurisdictions, 8 the decision will have important practical implications for land
use regulation. But perhaps of greater significance for present purposes, Dolan
offers some important clues about the underlying rationale for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Not that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
majority is especially helpful in this regard: the opinion studiously avoids any
theorizing about the doctrine. Instead, the clues must be gathered from scattered comments in the decision and from the silence of the majority opinion
about certain matters ordinarily thought to be relevant in unconstitutional
conditions cases. Once these clues are teased out, however, they may help us
resolve some of the puzzles associated with the doctrine.
In Part I, I will briefly discuss the Dolan decision, concentrating on its
implications for the anomalies mentioned above: the apparent irrelevance of
coercion and monopoly in many of the unconstitutional conditions cases, the

15. Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1185, 1201 (1990).
16. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1015-18
(1995); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
17. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
18.

See ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEz-IBAREZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE

PoLmcAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACnONS 36 (1993) (reporting survey evidence that nine
out of ten local communities use some form of exactions).
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importance of an implicit hierarchy of rights, and the function and significance
of the nexus requirement.
In Part II, I will offer a theory of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
that, while not exactly new, 9 has so far lacked an enthusiastic proponent.
This is the idea that some constitutional rights are not just private entitlements
but also have aspects of public goods. In other words, the exercise of the right
not only produces a private benefit for the rights-holder, but also generates
positive externalities that benefit third parties or society more generally.
The theory posits that when constitutional rights are perceived by courts
as having a large public goods dimension, courts will be reluctant to enforce
contracts in which individuals waive the exercise of the right in exchange for
some discretionary benefit. This is because the individual valuation of the right
will fail to take into account the positive externalities generated by exercise of
the right, and thus routine enforcement of such waivers-especially on a mass
scale as when conditions are attached to entitlements programs or all forms of
government employment--could result in a suboptimal supply of these external benefits. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine solves this problem
(somewhat crudely to be sure) by conferring a windfall-the rights holder gets
to keep both the discretionary benefit and the constitutional right. I will argue
that this theory avoids the major anomalies associated with the consent theory,
and also accounts for some of the broad patterns we can perceive in the case
law.
In Part III, I will apply the proposed theory to the situation presented in
the Dolan case. At first, the Takings Clause would seem like a very implausible candidate for a right thought to have a large public goods component. The
Clause is usually justified in terms of the protection of purely private rights: it
reflects considerations of fairness to isolated individuals who have had the
misfortune of having their property taken for the public good. However, when
local governments impose exactions in the form of donations of specific assets
like land, this may encourage a misallocation of resources. The private cost of
the exaction to the developer may be less than the value of the benefits that
the developer receives in return from the government. If the government can
acquire property without paying for it, however, it may engage in excess acquisitions of property, and/or may devote the property to inefficient uses.
Forcing the government to pay just compensation for the land it acquires creates an incentive for public officials to consider the opportunity costs of devoting the land to particular uses. I will argue that the Dolan case, including its
new "rough proportionality" standard of review, can be justified under the
public goods approach.
I. THE DOLAN

DECISION

Dolan involved a challenge under the Takings Clause to what are called
"exactions"-quid pro quo arrangements whereby a local zoning authority
requires that a developer transfer money or tangible assets to the government

19.

See infra note 70.
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in return for permission to develop land.2 ° Florence Dolan owned a plumbing
and electrical supply store in downtown Tigard, Oregon, a suburb of Portland.
The west side of the property abutted Fanno Creek. Dolan applied to the city
for permission to build a larger store closer to the creek, and to pave over
what had been a gravel parking lot. The city responded that it would permit
this development only if Dolan agreed to transfer to the city a permanent
easement in a strip of land running along the creek, equal in area to about
10% of the total lot size, to be maintained thereafter by the city as a
"greenway."
The city cited two reasons in support of its desire to acquire this
greenway. First, the proposed development would generate additional water
runoff into Fanno Creek, which was subject to periodic flooding, and the
greenway was part of a comprehensive flood control plan designed to remove
all development from the creek's 100-year floodplain. Second, the proposed
development would generate additional customers for the store and hence
traffic in Tigard; the greenway would also serve as the site of a pedestrian/bicycle path designed to alleviate congestion in the downtown area.
Dolan challenged the proposed exaction as an unconstitutional taking of
her property. In assessing this contention, the Court acknowledged that prior
decisions gave local governments broad authority to engage in zoning and land
use regulation. 2' The Court implied that if the city had allowed Dolan to retain title to the property but merely required by regulation that she maintain
the portion of the parcel along the creek as a private greenway, the only question would be whether this regulation was reasonably related to a legitimate
government interest. 2' The case fell outside this rule, however, because the
city had requested Dolan to deed a permanent easement in the property to the
city.23 Ordinarily, an attempt by the city to compel the transfer of a permanent interest in land would trigger the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment: the city would have to exercise its power of eminent domain and
pay Dolan just compensation for the value of the land taken.24 Dolan claimed
that the city was seeking to evade this rule by making her voluntarily convey
the property free of charge in return for the building permit.'
The Court agreed that the proposed exaction was governed by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine:
Under the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is

20. See generally ALTSHtJLER & GOMEZ-IBAREz, supra note 18; Vicki Been, "Exit" as a
Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91
COLuM. L. REv. 473, 478-83 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977).
21. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
25. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
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taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit where
the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit.26
This statement, supported by the citation of two First Amendment cases,27 is
the sum total of the Court's discussion of the elements of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.28
Note, first of all, what the Court does not say. There is no suggestion that
the doctrine turns on any finding of coercion by the government. Nor did the
Court make any attempt to suggest that the proposed deal-10% of Dolan's
land in exchange for a building permit-was coerced. Indeed, any such a
suggestion in the context of the facts presented would be hard to justify. The
government was proposing a straightforward commercial proposition: Dolan
was being asked to compare the value of 90% of her land with an enlarged
store and paved parking lot to the value of 100% of the land with the existing
improvements. Both options can be easily translated into dollar figures, and
there was nothing in the facts to suggest that Dolan viewed the property as
anything other than a commercial venture for profit.
Moreover, Dolan was apparently earning a positive return on the property
in its current use; 29 thus, it would be hard to maintain that she had no practical choice but to accept the government's terms. At least at the level of rhetorical justification, therefore, the Dolan decision must be counted against the
proposition that government coercion is the key to understanding the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Nor is there any discussion in the opinion of the city's status as a monopoly supplier of development rights. One could argue that because Dolan's
property is immovable, and because the city has exclusive authority to permit
development of that property, the city is in a position to extract a higher price
from Dolan (i.e., to extract a higher share of the value added by her proposed
development) than would be true if there were a competitive market in development rights.3" Arguably, therefore, the city had forced Dolan into accepting
a deal on terms she would not have agreed to if the city did not possess this
power. In theory, one could rely on this monopoly power over development

26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) and Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
28. This result was clearly foreshadowed in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987), where the Court invalidated an exaction under the Takings Clause on the ground that
there was no nexus between the property interest that the government wanted to acquire by donation and any cited police power justification implicated by the new construction for which the
owner sought a building permit. Nollan, however, made no mention of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as such, perhaps because cases decided before Nollan had implicitly rejected the
application of the doctrine under the Takings Clause. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986 (1984) (noting that government could condition access to benefit of pesticide registration on
forfeiture of property right to trade secrets).
29. Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2316 n.6.
30. The same is not necessarily true of developers, assuming they negotiate a package of
exactions before they acquire property or construct fixed improvements. See Been, supra note 20.
Dolan, however, was seeking to improve land she already owned and hence, was vulnerable to the
city's efforts to extract economic rents. See Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities
as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REv. 831, 844-53 (1992).
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rights to construct an argument in favor of constitutional limitations on exactions." But, as in the case of the coercion thesis, no hint of such an argument
appears in the Court's opinion.
Another interesting aspect of the decision is the byplay between the Chief
Justice and Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, over whether the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should apply at all to claims arising under the Takings
Clause. Justice Stevens directly attacked this aspect of the majority's decision.
He noted that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has "long suffered from
notoriously inconsistent application" and "has never been an overarching principle of constitutional law that operates with equal force regardless of the
nature of the rights and powers in question.32
Justice Stevens further observed that the doctrine has been applied most
frequently in First Amendment contexts,33 implying, if not quite endorsing,
the conclusion that it should not be extended beyond that context. Moreover,
even if the doctrine were extended to takings issues, he maintained this was no
reason why the standard of review should be the same as would apply "if the
city had insisted on a surrender of Dolan's First Amendment rights in exchange for a building permit."34 Justice Stevens worried that the Court's decision, and its insistence on closely examining the degree of nexus between the
waiver of private property rights and asserted government interests, might
"signify a reassertion of the kind of superlegislative power the Court exercised
during the Lochner era."35
The Chief Justice responded to this critique somewhat obliquely. He tackled the suggestion that this was a revival of Lochner-style substantive due
process in a footnote. The Takings Clause, he observed, has long been held to
apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.36 This response, however, failed to meet Justice Stevens' point, which was not that the Court lacked a
foundation in the text of the Constitution for its conclusion that Dolan's rights
were implicated, but that the style of review mandated by the decision was
functionally very similar to, and would operate in the same general area as,
Lochner-style review.
Later in the opinion, however, the Chief Justice took up more directly the
challenge that a deferential standard of review should apply because "the
city's conditional demands for part of petitioner's property was 'a species of
business regulation."' 37 The Chief Justice responded that "simply denominating a governmental measure as a 'business regulation' does not immunize it
from constitutional challenge on the grounds that it violates a provision of the

31. Cf.Thomas W. Merrill, ConstitutionalLimits on Physician Price Controls, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 635, 639-51 (1994) (arguing that price controls should be subject to scrutiny under
the Takings Clause when the controlled activity has no access to a non-price controlled market).
32. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2328 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2316 n.5.
37. Id. at 2320.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

Bill of Rights."3 After citing cases holding that business establishments are
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the First Amendment, he concluded:
"We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much
a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment,
should be relegated
to the status of a poor relation in these comparable cir39
cumstances.
With this response, the Chief Justice acknowledged, at least implicitly,
that the Court was in effect promoting the Takings Clause from the status of a
second class constitutional right (a "poor relation") to a first class right. Restated, the argument appears to be as follows: (1) first class constitutional
rights (like the First and Fourth Amendments) enjoy the protections associated
with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; (2) the Takings Clause is as
much a part of the Bill of Rights as are the First and Fourth Amendments; and
(3) the Takings Clause, therefore, should also enjoy the protections associated
with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Even as restated, however, the argument contains an important ambiguity.
Specifically, it is unclear whether all provisions of the Bill of Rights (including, for example, the Second and Seventh Amendments) are entitled to equal
status for purposes of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, or, more narrowly, whether it is only the Takings Clause that must be elevated to a condition of parity with these other rights. Either reading is problematic, 4' but
the Court's opinion runs out of intellectual gas at this point and offers no
further illumination of this important question.
By far the most extensive discussion in Dolan, however, concerned the
nexus or germaneness requirement sometimes associated with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Recall that the Court's general statement of the
doctrine in Dolan expressly incorporates this element: "the government may
not require a person to give up a constitutional right ... in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the property sought
has little or no relationship to the benefit."' In stressing this aspect of the
doctrine, the Court was building upon its prior encounter with exactions in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,42 decided in 1987. Although Nollan
did not expressly frame its analysis in terms of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, the Court held that there must be an "essential nexus" between an
exaction and the projected impact of the development in order to avoid a
taking.43 Dolan elaborated upon the nexus discussion contained in Nollan, not
only by expressly linking the nexus requirement to the unconstitutional condi-

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The second reading (that just the Takings Clause is being promoted) is unsettling, for it
suggests that the Court can pick and choose among constitutional rights, elevating and demoting
rights according to the preferences of a majority of the justices. But the first reading (all rights are
created equal) is also unsatisfactory, for it is manifestly inconsistent with the Court's past practice
in this area, which has been to treat different rights differently for unconstitutional conditions purposes.
41. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 (emphasis added).
42. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
43. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839.
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tions doctrine, but also by clarifying the degree of "fit" between the exaction
and the proposed development necessary to avoid the conclusion that the exaction is unconstitutional."
In Nollan, the Court had held only that there must be some nexus between
an exaction and an identified social cost of a proposed development. The
Court concluded that California could not require a property owner to donate a
lateral easement of access across beachfront property in order to obtain a
permit to build a larger house, because any problems created by building a
larger house were unrelated to the "solution" of providing free lateral access
along the beachfront 5
Significantly, in Dolan, the Court acknowledged that Nollan's requirement
of an "essential nexus" was satisfied by the city's proposed exaction. The
prevention of flooding along Fanno Creek was a legitimate public purpose,
and Dolan's building and parking lot plans would increase the amount of
storm water runoff into the creek.' Similarly, the proposed development
would increase traffic in the downtown area, and a bicycle/pedestrian path was
an appropriate means for trying to alleviate downtown congestion.47 Thus, the
Chief Justice acknowledged that the exaction proposed by the city could not
be characterized as an attempt "to obtain an easement through gimmickry."
But this was only the beginning of the nexus inquiry. As the Court explained, not only must there be some nexus, there must be enough nexus.'
To formulate a standard for how much is enough, the Court did a brief survey
of state court decisions regarding exactions. Like Goldilocks and the porridge,
the Court found some state court statements too "lax," others too "exacting,"
and concluded that the middle position, the "reasonable relationship" test, was
just right.50 But even here the Court decided not to adopt this formulation "as
such, partly because the term 'reasonable relationship' seems confusingly
similar to the term 'rational basis' which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'"
To make clear that it regarded the required standard of fit to be more
demanding than that of mere rationality, the Court coined a new term-"rough
proportionality"--to describe what was required. The Court indicated that the

44.

Dolan, 114 S. Ct at 2317.

45. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39. As the Court stated, "[it is quite impossible to understand
how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans'
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house." Id. at 838.
46.

Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 2317.
49. Id. at 2318 ("The second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree
of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bear the required relationship to the
projected impact of petitioner's proposed development.").
50. Id. at 2319. The Chief Justice has on other occasions used the conventionalist technique
of surveying state court decisions in order to establish a median or consensus view about the
content of federal constitutional rights. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 270-77 (1990) (surveying state court decisions to show broad diversity of opinion about contours of possible constitutional fight of incompetent persons to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
51.

Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

burden of proof would be on the zoning authority to establish rough proportionality. It further stated that although no "precise mathematical calculation is
required," nevertheless "the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development."52
Even these verbal formulations would hardly seem to compel a judgment
in favor of Dolan. Nevertheless, perhaps to underscore that it meant business,
the Court did not remand to the Oregon courts for application of the new
rough proportionality test.53 Instead, the Court itself applied the test to the
city's stated justifications, and found them wanting based on the existing record. The flood control rationale failed, according to the Court, because the
city did not explain why dedication of a permanent easement to the city, as
opposed to merely a regulatory requirement that Dolan preserve the area as a
private greenway, was necessary.54 In addition, the traffic control rationale
was rejected because no effort had been made to quantify how much motor
vehicle traffic would increase because of the proposed development.
As applied by the Court, therefore, the new rough proportionality standard
appears to incorporate elements of both less restrictive means analysis and
cost-benefit analysis. Less restrictive means analysis is implied by the conclusion that an exaction should be avoided when a land use regulation will do.
And cost-benefit analysis is implied by the requirement that the city "quantify"
the costs associated with increased traffic attributable to Dolan's development,
and to further show they are commensurate in some fashion with the proposed
exaction.
The question left unanswered by the Court's discussion of the required
degree of nexus is why it was necessary to go beyond the bare essential nexus
requirement of Nollan. The Court's concession that the Nollan requirement
was satisfied, and hence that the city's exaction was not "gimmickry," suggests that a bare nexus requirement may be sufficient if the object is to smoke
out cases where the exaction is a pretext to evade the just compensation requirement. Justice Stevens in dissent argued that this was indeed the proper
purpose of any nexus requirement.' By going further and indicating that exactions must also be both necessary to achievement of a government purpose
and cost justified, the Court intimated that the nexus test serves an additional
purpose. But it failed to state what that purpose might be.
Judged by conventional standards of judicial craftsmanship, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Dolan would have to be deemed a rather mediocre
effort. His failure to provide a theoretical foundation for the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is, of course, both understandable and forgivable-no one

52. Id.
53. Typically when the Court formulates a new standard of review, it remands to the lower
courts for initial application of that standard to the facts presented. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995) (remanding to lower courts for initial application
of "strict scrutiny" to federal minority set aside program).
54. Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2321.
55. Id. at 2321-22.
56. Id. at 2325 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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else has done this either. More troubling, however, were his failures to supply
a cogent explanation for why it was appropriate to extend the doctrine to the
Takings Clause, and why it was necessary to go beyond a mere requirement of
essential nexus and demand a showing of rough proportionality between a
waiver of rights and stated government purposes. Precedent required neither of
these innovations, and the discussion of each element has the quality of an
ipse dixit. This is not to say the Chief Justice was wrong to take these steps.
But to attempt to determine whether he was right or wrong, we will have to
attempt to reconstruct the analysis from the ground up.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS PUBLIC GOODS
Our constitutional culture has a strong liberal individualist bent, and we
tend to think of constitutional rights as valuable entitlements belonging to
individuals." From this perspective, a doctrine that prohibits individuals from
trading their rights for other, more highly valued benefits seems strange, if not
perverse. If rights belong to individuals, why shouldn't we allow individuals to
determine how much those rights are worth? Indeed, a doctrine that forbids
individuals to sell their constitutional rights smacks of paternalism, and seems
to deny the moral autonomy of the individual.58
One possible reason for not enforcing contracts waiving individual rights,
of course, is concern about whether individuals have truly consented to such a
waiver. This perspective leads to concerns about coercion and government
monopoly. It may well be that any government action that is coercive in the
ordinary sense-i.e., any government action that poses a choice that leaves the
individual worse off than they were before the government intervened-should
give rise to the same constitutional scrutiny as a criminal prohibition. But as
suggested earlier, most of the cases striking down government action under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine do not involve coercion in this ordinary
sense. If we expand the idea of coercion to include government monopoly,
then a larger fraction of the doctrine can be accounted for.59 This, however,

57. See generally MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991).

58. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) seems to evoke this kind of response. Frank
Snepp was a former CIA employee who refused to submit a book about the agency for pre-publication review, as required by an agreement he had signed as a condition of employment. He argued that the pre-publication review requirement was void as an unconstitutional condition violating his First Amendment rights. The Court summarily rejected this claim. Id. at 509 n.3. And indeed, if we assume that what is at stake is Snepp's individual First Amendment right to freedom
of expression, it seems intuitively correct to say that he made a deliberate choice to waive this

right in return for what he must have regarded as the greater benefit of employment with the CIA,
and should have to live with his bargain. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 309.

Easterbrook observed:
So long as [Snepp] enters into the agreement without fraud or coercion, he has made a
judgment that he is better off with the agreement (and all its restraints) than without; he
can hardly complain that his rights have been reduced. He has simply decided to exercise them in a particular way.
Id. at 345.
59. Even so, the cases are far from uniform in their treatment of the "unequal bargaining
power" posed by the fact that one party to the agreement-the government-has monopoly pow-
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still leaves out a large segment of the decisions, such as those involving government employment' and conditions on public speech attached to government grants.6
A. The Public Goods Model
An alternative approach to explaining the doctrine would focus not on
lack of consent but rather on effects on third parties. This approach would in
effect start by questioning the premise that constitutional rights are purely
individual, and would instead view them as having broader public interest
ramifications. In economic terms, some constitutional rights are not simply
private goods, but also have aspects of public goods. That is to say, the exercise of some constitutional rights produces external benefits-benefits that
redound to the advantage of third parties-and that cannot be confined to the
individual who exercises the right.
The classic example of a right having a public goods dimension is free
speech. As Professor Dan Farber has explained in an important article,62 information is a public good: once information has been supplied to one person,
it is difficult to exclude others from taking full advantage of it. Thus, the
market economy will tend to supply inadequate amounts of information.63 For
similar reasons, the democratic political process will tend to overregulate
information: it will be difficult to organize the consumers of information to
fight proposed regulations limiting its dissemination because of the tendency
of individual consumers to free ride on the efforts of others.' Farber suggests
that many aspects of the law of free speech, such as the obligation to provide
public forums for speech, the distinction between political speech and commercial speech, and restrictions on libel actions that might "chill" the producers of information, can be explained on the understanding that the production
of information is a public good that must be, in effect, subsidized by the government if it is to be produced in adequate quantities.65

ers. Compare United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 805-06 (1995) ("gross disparity" in
bargaining power between government and individual does not justify invalidating waivers procured as part of plea bargaining process) with Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 510 n.8 (1989) (suggesting that a ban on state funding of abortions might be unconstitutional
"ifa particular State had socialized medicine and all of its hospitals and physicians were publicly
funded").
60. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
61. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 466 U.S. 364 (1984).
62. Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the FirstAmendment, 105 HARv. L. REv. 554 (1991).
63. Id. at 558-59.
64. Id. at 560.
65. Id. at 558-62. The Court's recent decision in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S.Ct. 1003 (1995) is strikingly consistent with this analysis. The Court invalidated
a ban on receipt of honoraria by government officials below grade GS-16 for making an appearance or speech or writing an article. The Court noted that the ban "deters an enormous quantity of
speech before it is uttered," id. at 1013 n. 11, and therefore "imposes a significant burden on the
public's right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said." Id. at
1015. The Court observed:
Federal employees who write for publication in their spare time have made significant
contributions to the marketplace of ideas. They include literary giants like Nathaniel
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The right of free speech, however, is not the only constitutional right that
can be seen as having public good aspects. Separations of powers provisions,
for example, can similarly be seen not only as protecting specific institutional
actors, but also as serving broader public purposes in promoting public deliberation and protecting the system of checks and balances. This may explain
why the Court has generally held that separation of powers provisions of the
Constitution, ranging from the Appointments Clause,' to the Presidential veto," to the terms and limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts," cannot be
waived by individual beneficiaries of these constitutional limitations.'
Consideration of the external benefits associated with the exercise of
certain constitutional rights may not be necessary where these rights are raised
as a defense to a criminal prosecution. The strong incentive of the individual
to avoid criminal sanctions may be enough to insure an adequate supply of
both the private and public benefits associated with the exercise of the right.
But the same cannot be said with confidence where the government seeks to
purchase a waiver of constitutional rights by ex ante agreement. Here, the
individual decision whether to waive the right will be based solely on a comparison of the expected private value of the exercise of the right, compared to
the expected private value of the discretionary benefits offered by the government. Any public or external benefits associated with the exercise of the right
will be ignored.
Moreover, individuals are likely to be unmoved by the thought that their
waiver of rights will reduce by a small amount the overall production of the
public good associated with exercise of the right. Here, as in the case of other
public goods, individuals will be tempted to free ride on the efforts of others.
The cumulative effect of individual decisions in response to a government
offer to waive rights in return for benefits will therefore be a suboptimal supply of the external benefits associated with the exercise of those rights.' °

Hawthorne and Herman Melville, who were employed by the Customs Service; Walt
Whitman, who worked for the Departments of Justice and Interior;, and Bret Harte, an
employee of the mint.
Id. at 1012.
66. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (neither a private party nor the
Executive can waive the restrictions of the Appointments Clause).
67. See Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens For Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1991) (Congress may not condition disposal of federal property
on provision that permits an end run on presidential veto).
- 68. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1978) (structural protections of Article mInot subject to waiver).
69. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490-94 (1979) (assuming arguendo that
speech or debate clause privilege can be waived either by an individual member of Congress or
Congress as a body, but finding no waiver under a strict standard of proof). The Court has not
been totally consistent in maintaining that separation of powers provisions cannot be waived. See
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982) (plurality opinion) (dictum) (government may condition receipt of discretionary benefits on waiver of right to
adjudicate disputes with the government over those benefits in an Article Ill court).
70. The connection between the public good aspect of rights and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been directly anticipated by Professor Farber, writing about waivers of free
speech rights by public employees:
Why should the [government] employee not be allowed to contract away his speech
rights freely? The answer, again, is that speech about government is a public good. In
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The idea that certain contracts are void, not because of lack of consent,
but because of external effects on third parties, is not unknown to the common
law. The usual example involves negative external effects, as in the case of a
contract for murder.7' Nevertheless, we also find examples of promises that
are not enforced in order to assure the provision of what might be characterized as positive externalities. Consider in this light the common law rule
against restraints on alienation.72 In the paradigmatic case, A devises or donates property to B, subject to the condition that B may not sell it. B is usually quite happy to accept the property on these terms, because the private value
to B of obtaining the property with the restraint is greater than not getting the
property at all. But the arrangement deprives society of the external benefits
that flow from allowing the property to be transferred to its highest and best
use. The solution is strikingly similar to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine: the gift to B is upheld, but B's waiver of the right to alienate the property is deemed void as contrary to public policy. 73 In both cases, the law confers a windfall on the recipient of the largesse. And in both cases, the justification is the same-the waiver of rights is invalidated in order to preserve
the external benefits associated with the exercise of the right, which would be
lost if we relied solely on the individual's private valuation of the right.
B. Avoiding the Anomalies of the Consent Theory
The theory of rights as public goods avoids the anomalous features of the
consent theory mentioned at the beginning of this article. Specifically, the
public goods approach can explain: (1) why certain agreements waiving rights

other words, the foregone book royalties of a government employee do not accurately
measure the social value of the publication; government employees will sign waivers
relinquishing speech rights even when the cost to society is greater than the contractual
incentive to the employees. Thus, employees should not be allowed to contract away
their speech rights, particularly if the employees' speech concerns matters of public
significance.
Farber, supra note 62, at 574-75. Other commentators have also anticipated the public goods
argument, but for one reason or another, have not endorsed it as the basis for a general theory of
unconstitutional conditions. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Understanding ConstitutionalRights in a
World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175, 177, 183 n.16 (1989) (listing "six major
approaches" to the problem of unconstitutional conditions, not including the public goods theory,
but mentioning it as a possibility in a footnote); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional FederalSpending as a Regulatory Device, 26 SAN DrEO L. REv. 277, 283-84 (1989) (mentioning the theory in
passing); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1482-83, 1487-88.
Richard Epstein clearly anticipates the public goods model, especially in his discussion of
"collective action problems" as a circumstance warranting interference with individual waivers of
rights. EPSTIN, supra note 1, at 79. Epstein, however, does not limit his analysis to collective
action situations, but also discusses government monopoly and the imposition of external costs on
third parties as circumstances warranting invocation of the doctrine. See generally id. at 50-74.
The final version of his argument appears to rest on identifying as "coercive" any government
action that yields deviations from a normative baseline of governmental action that seeks both to
make everyone better off, while also preserving, pro rata, the preexisting shares of wealth. Id. at
98-103. Epstein's theory thus partakes of elements of both the public goods theory and the consent theory.
71. See 2 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNswoRTI ON CONTRACTS 5 (1990) (contract to commit crime void as against public policy).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 (1983).
73. Id.
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should not be enforced, even in the absence of any evidence of coercion or
government monopoly; (2) why some rights are more likely to be protected by
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine than other rights; and (3) why the
degree of nexus between the rights waived and the government benefits extended in return for the waiver of rights is relevant in determining whether the
waiver is permissible.
Consider first why some agreements waiving rights should not be enforced no matter how confident we are that consent to the waiver was freely
given. Imagine the following hypothetical. The government adopts a program
to purchase from individuals their right to vote. To implement the program,
the government installs a combination voting booth/ATM machine in every
polling place. When an individual enters the booth, he or she can either mark
a ballot and put it in a slot where it will be tabulated as part of the vote, or
can insert the ballot in another slot where it will be shredded and, in return,
the machine will dispense a new $10 bill. The procedure is completely anonymous, so no official or snooping neighbor can witness which choice is made.
It would be extremely difficult to argue that the choice offered by the
government in this example is coercive in any literal or metaphoric sense. The
choice entails no threat of force or retribution, and is not of the form that
necessarily makes the individual worse off whichever option is taken. Ten
dollars is not such a large sum of money that most people would be unable to
resist the temptation to take the money. And the government has no monopoly
on the provision of $10 bills in return for services; one can obtain cash income from a whole host of private and public sources.
Nevertheless, I am confident the courts would not hesitate to strike down
the proposed scheme as an unconstitutional condition. The reason, I submit, is
that the right to vote has a very large public goods component. Indeed, the
individual benefit associated with exercise of the right to vote is probably
quite small.74 But the collective value of having large numbers of people go
to the polls and cast ballots is very large: this is how we organize governments and try to insure that it reflects as closely as possible public sentiment.
Given that the private value attached to the right is probably small, it is plausible to imagine that a large percentage of the electorate would agree to take the
$10 rather than cast their vote.75 Moreover, even if all community leaders denounced the program as an attempt to subvert democracy, and urged people to
cast their ballots rather than shred them, each individual voter would be
strongly tempted to take the $10 rather than cast a vote, on the assumption
that enough other voters would cast their ballots to insure a fair election. In

74. The chance that any particular vote will change the outcome of an election is infititesimally small, and so the primary benefit from voting is apparently the gratification derived from
participation in civic affairs. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 24 (1991) (likening the importance of individual votes to
"about the same as being run over by a car in the process of going to or from the polls").
75. This is confirmed by evidence that poll taxes, when they were legal, did in fact discourage significant numbers of persons from voting. See Orley Ashenfelter & Stanley Kelley, Jr., Determinants of Participationin Presidential Elections, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 695 (1975). Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 172 ("Voting rights ... may be of little value to any given individual, who
would surrender them gladly for a right to do business on public highways.").
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effect, each individual's decision would be rational from an individual perspective, but collectively the program would undermine the representativeness
and, hence, the legitimacy of the electoral system.
Although this example may seem far fetched, it vividly illustrates why we
would want an unconstitutional conditions doctrine even in a world where
there are no problems with bargaining breakdown. The right to vote may lie at
the extreme edge of those rights that have a high public value and a small
private benefit, but free speech rights and separation of powers based rights
may not be far behind, and the same analysis applies to those rights as well.
For example, a particular President might agree to waive his right to appoint
officers of the United States or to veto future congressional legislation in a
particular area in return for Congress's adoption of a bill he favors. He might
execute such a waiver freely and without reservation, and indeed without any
regret or concern at all. He might even be happy to be rid of the appointments
power and the veto power. But such waivers would be disregarded by the
courts in the interest of preserving our constitutional system of government.76
In addition, the public goods model can also explain why some constitutional rights are protected by a more robust version of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine than are other rights. The explanation here is simply that
the level of public benefits associated with the exercise of a right differs with
different constitutional rights, or, to put it more accurately, that the judicial
perception of the level of public benefits varies from right to right.' The
higher the perceived quantum of public value, the more vigorously courts will
apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
This also accounts for the apparent paradox that the value of the right to
the individual is not closely correlated to the vigor with which courts will
enforce the unconstitutional conditions doctrines. Most individuals probably
attach little private value to separations of powers provisions, such as whether
their case is heard by an Article III or an Article I judge, or whether the judge
was properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. Yet these rights are
given robust protection under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. On the
other hand, the right to trial by jury may be valued very highly by individuals

76. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. On the invocation of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine by the Office of Legal Counsel to resist congressional encroachments on presidential authority through appropriations riders, see John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by
the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 312 (1993).
77. Because of this feature, this section of the article leans more in the direction of a positive or descriptive analysis (explaining what courts do) rather than normative analysis (prescribing
what they ought to do). As I have described the public goods theory in this section, a constitutional right eligible for protection under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is any right that the
judiciary, at any particular moment in time, perceives as conferring external benefits on society
through its exercise. The set of rights that fits this description will vary from judge to judge, and
will change over time. In Part HI, I depart from this purely descriptive stance, and ask, in the
narrow context of the Takings Clause, whether there is a plausible normative basis for regarding
the right to just compensation as having public good aspects. Outside the context of the Takings
Clause, however, I do not in this article offer any general theory for identifying what rights
should, as a normative matter, qualify for the protections of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
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accused of a crime. Yet this right is freely waived all the time though plea
bargaining, without a second thought being given to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.78 The explanation in both cases resides not in the individual
valuation of the right, but in the judicial perception of the public benefits
associated with exercise and protection of the right.
Consider in this connection the abortion funding cases,79 which have
been regarded by most commentators as unjustified departures from the unconstitutional conditions doctrine."0 In Roe v. Wade,8 the Court recognized a
woman's right to abortion, grounded in the right to privacy identified as part
of the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. But in the abortion
funding cases, the Court ruled that it was permissible for the government to
pay the medical expenses of poor women who agree to carry their pregnancies
to term, while declining to pay the medical expenses of women who decide to
have an abortion. In effect, poor women receive a government benefit (funding
for medical expenses) only if they agree not to exercise the right recognized in
Roe to obtain an abortion.
Most commentators have denounced the abortion funding cases as a product of judicial insensitivity to the importance of the rights at stake for poor
women.82 But it is also possible that the judiciary views the right to abortion,
which after all is grounded in the "right to privacy," as a uniquely private
right whose primary significance is to the individual exercising the right. This
is not to say that one cannot imagine arguments about possible external benefits flowing from decisions to have abortions: benefits in the form of population control, reduced numbers of single parent families, and so forth. But
given the widespread perception that abortion also imposes large external costs
(certainly to the fetus, which the Court has acknowledged the states have a
compelling interest in protecting), the external benefits and external costs of
abortion might be perceived as largely cancelling each other out, or as at best
debatable.
The conclusion would then be that there is no justification for interfering
judicially with government efforts to influence individual decisions regarding
abortion by conditioning payment of medical expenses on a waiver of abortion
rights. A decision either to have the abortion or take the money and not have
an abortion can be presumed to reflect an accurate individual balancing of the
competing private interests at stake, the incidence of which are largely internal
to the individual making the choice.
Other, less controversial distinctions regarding the waivability of rights
can also be explained in terms of the model. In the law of jurisdiction, for
example, the Supreme Court has long distinguished between limits on personal

78. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909 (1992).
79. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
80. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 587 (1993); Sullivan, supra note 2.
81. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
82. See Baker, supra note 15, at 1228-29 (collecting authorities).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. The former are regarded as "an
individual right" being grounded in concerns of fairness and convenience to
litigants, and can "be waived."83 The latter involve limits designed to preserve the structure and integrity of the federal court system. Because of the
importance to the judicial system of preserving this structure-in other words,
because preservation of this structure is regarded as a public good-limits on
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by parties.84
Finally, the public goods model can also help account for the focus on
nexus in the unconstitutional conditions cases. The nexus requirement performs two functions in cases where rights have a high public goods component. First and most obviously, the requirement can be seen as limiting the
scope of waivers in order to minimize the impact on the production of external
benefits associated with the exercise of a right. The requirement functions in
this sense like the less restrictive alternatives doctrine of constitutional law.
Consider in this regard the distinction in public employment cases between
general waivers of the right to speak freely on any subject and waivers that
deal solely with issues having a nexus to the employment relationship.85 If
the government could condition employment on a blanket waiver of speech
rights, this would eliminate a large percentage of the population from the pool
of potential suppliers of valuable information. Requiring a nexus between the
waiver and some legitimate governmental interest arising out of the employment relationship vastly reduces the scope of the permissible waiver, and,
hence, prevents the government from suppressing a significant source of information valuable to the public.
Second and more subtly, the nexus requirement can be explained as a
device for singling out instances where external benefits associated with the
exercise of the right are likely to be offset by external costs. Under the public
goods model, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies in general only
to rights that produce external benefits. The nexus requirement can be seen as
a device for identifying a subset of these cases where exercise of the right is
also associated with a police power concern, i.e., where the exercise of the
right also produces external costs. The nexus requirement therefore provides,
in effect, that when the external benefits are offset, at least to a substantial
degree, by external costs, we permit a waiver to take place after all.
This idea can be expressed by formula. The key variable, the public goods
value of the exercise of a constitutional right (PGVc,), is a function of the
magnitude of the external benefits associated with the exercise of a constitutional right (EBcr), minus any external costs associated with exercise of the
right (EC,). Thus:

83. Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(1)
(defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person waived if not asserted in proper fashion).
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
85. Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (public employee may not be disciplined for speech on matters of public concern) with Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)
(public employee could be dismissed for distributing questionnaire to fellow employees about office policy).
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PGV = EB 0 - EC,

The higher PGVr the more vigorously courts will enforce the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. The nexus requirement, designed to identify cases where
high external costs negate external benefits, thus assists in fine tuning the
outcomes of the cases so that they more closely approximate the size of
PGV,. a6

The Court's recent decision in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union87 provides an illustration of this analysis. At issue was a statute
that banned all federal government employees below grade GS-16 from receiving honoraria for making a speech or writing an article on any subject. The
Court struck down this broad ban as an impermissible burden on the free
speech rights of these employees, employing an analysis consistent with the
public goods model proposed here. The Court also indicated that it would
uphold a more narrowly drawn ban that prohibited the receipt of honoraria, but
"if and only if a nexus exists between the author's employment and either the
subject matter of the expression or the identity of the payor."' A ban with
such a nexus requirement would single out speech where
a "corrupt bargain or
89
'
even an appearance of impropriety appears likely."
In terms of the analysis proposed here, the narrower ban hypothesized by
the Court would apply to speech having significant external costs--costs
which are sufficiently great so as to offset or nullify any external benefits that
would be generated by permitting such speech. When the statute is not limited
by such a nexus requirement, EBc. - EC. is high, primarily because the speech
covered by the ban-and hence the EB., lost to the public-is high. Hence,
PGV,, is also presumably high, and the government's demand for a waiver of
rights as a condition of employment should be struck down. With the nexus
limitation added, however, EBc, - EC,, is much lower, because EB., is now
confined to the area where ECr is also likely to be high. Thus PGVC is much
smaller, justifying a government program than requires a waiver of rights as a
condition of employment.
C. Other Explanatory Payoffs
In addition to accounting for the main puzzles associated with the consent
theory, the public goods model can also explain other aspects of the unconsti-

86. One could perhaps go further and posit a class of cases where EC., exceeds EB_, making
PGV, negative. In such cases, courts would presumably adopt rules designed to encourage or even
impute waivers of constitutional rights, rather than adopting ordinary rules of contract formation
(where PGV,

-

10) or striking waivers down (where PGV, > 10). William Stuntz has offered an

analysis of waivers of rights in the criminal procedure context that is consistent with this prediction. See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761 (1989).

These rights exist primarily to protect the innocent, but when invoked by the guilty, there is a
very high EC,--the guilty go free. The "solution" adopted by the courts, according to Stuntz, is to
recognize a broad version of the right, but then to bend the rules in favor of finding that the right
has been waived when invoked by someone who is obviously guilty.
87. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
88.

National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016.

89. Id. at 1017.
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tutional conditions doctrine. One promising line of inquiry here concerns the
distinction, urged by commentators" and adopted in some decisions,9 between government "subsidies" of rights and "penalties" on the exercise of
rights. Like the distinction between threats and offers, this distinction has been
regarded as problematic because of the difficulty in identifying an appropriate
"baseline" for distinguishing between subsidies and penalties. But if we start
with the public goods model, the distinction may become, at least in principle,
less troublesome. The general point is that, where a right has a large public
goods component, the government should encourage the exercise of the
right.92 Thus, a program adopted by the government that "subsidizes" the exercise of such a right, i.e., is likely to increase the incidence of the exercise of
the right, should be upheld. But a program adopted by the government that
"penalizes" the exercise of such a right, i.e., is likely to diminish the incidence
of the exercise of the right, should be struck down.
Whether a condition attached to a program will likely increase or diminish
the incidence of exercise of a right will be highly dependent on context. A
program that subsidizes the arts, subject to a contractual condition that grant
recipients not offend "general standards of decency," '3 could either increase
the flow of valuable works of art or decrease it. It would increase the flow if
Congress would not have enacted the subsidy unless the decency condition
was attached. But it would decrease the flow if Congress would have enacted
the subsidy in any event, whether or not it has the power to attach the proviso.
Needless to say, courts will have to exercise rather finely tuned instincts about
political realities in order to differentiate between the two situations. It is not
too fanciful to suggest, however, that just this sort of differentiation may account for the meandering course of recent decisions about the constitutionality
of conditions attached to grants for the production of speech plausibly identified as providing public goods.94

90. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 4.
91. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197-98 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-46 (1983).
92. See Farber, supra note 62.
93. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring that the National Endowment for the
Arts ensure that all works of art funded by the agency comport with "general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American Public"). For a thoughtful discussion of the constitutional problems presented by government subsidies of speech and a review of
the literature, see Martin H. Redish & Daryl Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression:
An Analytical Model (unpublished manuscript).
94. I will run through some of the major funding cases very briefly in terms of this analysis.
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), holds that family planning clinics receiving federal grants
can be prohibited from providing advice about abortions. Under the public goods model, this
outcome would be justified, provided the Court concluded that Congress would not have appropriated any funds for such counseling services absent the ability to insulate the program from the
abortion controversy.
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), holds that Congress cannot condition grants to public broadcasting stations on an agreement not to broadcast editorials. This
outcome would be justified under the model, provided the Court concluded that Congress would
continue to fund public broadcasting even if the ban on editorials was struck down.
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), holds that Congress can
condition tax-exempt status for nonprofit organizations on their agreement to forego substantial
lobbying activity. This holding would be justified under the model, provided the Court believed
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The public goods model would also predict that waivers of rights will be
viewed more critically as the number of persons subject to the condition increases. The more sweeping the coverage of the waiver in terms of persons
affected, the greater the collective impact on the provision of public goods
associated with exercise of the right. This may explain, in part, why waivers
of rights are viewed so tolerantly in the criminal justice context."' Such waivers are negotiated by police or prosecutors and individual criminal defendants,
and a waiver by one defendant is seldom binding on another.
In contrast, in the public employment and public benefits context, waivers
are often sought on a wholesale, rather than a retail, level. One would expect
such waivers to be scrutinized more closely, and to be struck down more often
even if voluntarily agreed to. The Court's recent decision in United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union" is consistent with this prediction. The
Court in that case stressed the fact that the ban on honoraria affected nearly
1.7 million federal employees, thus affecting "massive numbers" of potential
speakers." The broad sweep of the ban therefore appropriately increased the
government's burden of justification. However, the pre-employment contract in
Snepp v. United States," which apparently applied only to employees of the
CIA and required only preclearance by the agency of future publications, had
a far narrower impact on the generation of valuable information, and received
a much more favorable reception from the Court."

that Congress might deny or cut back on tax-exempt status for charitable organizations if these
organizations could use their tax exempt status to underwrite lobbying activities.
Obviously, the Court did not expressly undertake the posited inquiry in any of these cases.
But the outcomes seem at least plausible when viewed from this perspective.
The public goods model may also suggest that courts should generally give great deference
to decisions by administrators over which competing applicants should be given limited available
subsidies for speech-related activities. If we assume that administrators always seek to expand
their budgets, see WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971), then administrators will generally exercise their discretion in such a way as to expand,
rather than jeopardize, the total pool of funding available to subsidize speech. Thus, if an administrator decides not to fund "indecent" art (or Nazi art or art that portrays women in servile roles),
this will generally reflect an informed judgment that takes into account the impact on future budgetary decisions by Congress.
95. See generally United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. CL 797, 801 (1995) (adopting general
presumption that constitutional and statutory rights of criminal defendants are waivable).
96. 115 S. CL 1003 (1995).
97. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
98. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
99. A final explanatory payoff of the public goods theory is that it can explain why waivers
of rights might be scrutinized more closely in areas where the government acts as monopolist, as
where conditions are attached to the use of public highways. Monopolies are a problem only
because transaction costs prevent the customers of the monopolist from banding together to pay
the monopolist to release an onerous or unwanted condition. More careful scrutiny of conditions
attached to the receipt of services from a government monopolist therefore helps secure a collective or public good among numerous customers of the monopolist, just as in other cases conditions should be scrutinized more carefully because of their effect on the public benefits supplied to
third parties to the transaction. (I am indebted to Richard Epstein for this point).
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IIL. THE THEORY APPLIED TO DOLAN
Can the public goods theory explain or justify the Court's decision in
Dolan? The key question from the public goods perspective is whether invocation of the constitutional right to just compensation for takings of property
generates external benefits for third parties, such that permitting unrestricted
waivers of the right, in return for other discretionary government benefits,
could result in a suboptimal supply of a public good. From the vantage of
most of the traditional justifications for the Takings Clause, it seems odd or
implausible that the exercise of the right to just compensation would generate
these kind of public benefits.
The Supreme Court's most often-repeated justification for the Takings
Clause characterizes the right in quintessentially individual terms. The Court
has said that the purpose of the Clause is "to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."'" The idea seems to be that the
Clause prohibits "spot" redistribution: government measures that disproportionately burden one or a very small number of individuals when other persons
similarly situated are not subject to equivalent burdens. This kind of redistribution is prohibited, the Court's statement further suggests, because it is unfair
or unjust to the small group of individuals involved.
However appealing as a general statement of purpose, it is difficult to see
why a prohibition against spot redistribution, grounded in concerns of justice
and fairness to individuals, should not be waivable. Florence Dolan, for example, could have avoided any uncompensated transfer of property to the government simply by withdrawing her request for a building permit. Her choice was
between (1) no redistribution (relative to the status quo ante), and (2) waiver
of the right to just compensation in return for a discretionary building permit.
Someone in Dolan's position will choose option (2) over option (1)only if it
makes them better off relative to the status quo ante. This would seem to
render any discussion of adverse redistribution (the evil the Court says the
Clause is designed to prevent) moot.
Commentators have suggested several possible third party effects that the
Takings Clause may also protect. Perhaps the best known third party argument
is contained in Frank Michelman's discussion of "demoralization costs."'0 '
Michelman defined those costs as the "disutilities which accrue to losers and
their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation is offered ''""e for a taking. Thus, Michelman saw uncompensated takings as im-

100. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). This statement has taken on the
quality of a canonical recitation in recent decisions, Dolan being no exception. See, e.g., Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988);
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 835 n.4 (1987); First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19
(1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
101. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1214 (1967).
102. Id.
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posing disutilities not only on the owner of the property, but also on third
party "sympathizers" who were distressed by the injustice of the uncompensated taking, or by the thought that they too might become victims of future
uncompensated takings.
Whatever the merits of this argument in other contexts," 3 it too would
seem not to justify a rule forbidding waivers of the right to just compensation
in return for government benefits. Once the element of voluntary waiver is
introduced, third party sympathizers should realize that the owner will waive
the right to compensation only if the owner concludes he or she is better off
by doing so. Similarly, third party sympathizers should realize that, in any
analogous proceeding involving them in the future, they too will be allowed to
choose whether or not to waive the right to compensation in return for potentially greater benefits. Since the sympathizers should perceive no situation in
which a property owner is made worse off because of an exaction, no demoralization should result.
A very different argument for third party effects has been advanced by
Richard Epstein, who sees the Takings Clause as a prophylaxis against rent
seeking." In simplified outline, Epstein's argument is as follows. The purpose of the compensation requirement is to insure that, when the government
embarks on forced exchanges of property (in order to overcome various collective action problems), it does not thereby change the preexisting distribution
of wealth. If the government could change the pattern of wealth distribution,
this would give rise to rent seeking behavior, as various factional interests vied
for transfers of wealth from other factional interests. The resulting struggle
over control of this government power would waste resources, leaving everyone worse off. Thus, Epstein posits, in effect, that the right to compensation
confers external benefits on third parties in the form of reduced incentives for
rent seeking and, hence, leaves a larger social pie to be divided among all.
The anti-rent seeking theory offers a valid argument for applying the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the Takings Clause-but only in a
world that has already embraced Epstein's substantive theory of the Takings
Clause. In such a world, any abrogation of the compensation requirement,
even through voluntary waiver by the owner of the property taken, would open
a breach in the barrier against rent seeking. As these breaches multiplied, the
incentives to engage in rent seeking would multiply, and soon we would see a
general loss of social wealth that could be said to pose a general harm to third
parties.
For better or worse, however, we do not have a Constitution that forbids
all redistribution of wealth through forced exchanges, and will not have such a

103. Michelman's reliance on demoralization costs has been criticized on the ground that
individuals could insure against uncompensated takings, or, alternatively, that once the practice of
uncompensated takings became established and known, the risk would be fully discounted in
future property values. See Louis Kaplow, Economic Analysis of Legal Transistions, 99 HARv. L.
REv. 509 (1986).
104. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIvATE PRoPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle,80 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1561 (1986).
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Constitution in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the Takings Clause already
contains so many loopholes (from the perspective of Epstein's ideal Constitution) that massive rent seeking will occur whether or not we go the extra step
and forbid waivers of the right of just compensation in return for other discretionary government benefits. That being the case, the desire to curb rent seeking cannot supply a valid explanation for prohibiting waivers of the Takings
Clause.
An example may help clarify the point. As long as the power to tax and
spend is regarded as being beyond the purview of the Takings Clause (as it
is), 5 applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to exactions will not
eliminate incentives for rent seeking. The government can always tax away
gains associated with development of property and transfer the benefits to a
favored faction or activity. The possibility of this happening will provide a
stimulus to rent seeking behavior. In the context of the Dolan case, the government can require an owner to pay cash as a condition of obtaining a discretionary building permit; the payment of cash can be called a "tax" or "impact
fee"; and because taxes and user fees are deemed to fall outside the purview
of the Takings Clause, the predicate for applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine will collapse. From the perspective of Epstein's anti-rent seeking
theory, therefore, Dolan simply transfers rent seeking activity from exactions
of real property to exactions of cash. It is doubtful that such a shift would
meaningfully reduce the total volume of rent seeking behavior associated with
real estate development."
There is, however, yet another argument for third party effects that I think
does work as a justification for applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the Takings Clause. This is based on what Judge Posner calls the
"straightforward economic explanation for the requirement of just compensation,' " or what other commentators have called the argument from "fiscal
illusion.""'8 Simply put, the idea is that the government should be forced to
pay for resources it takes, rather than being allowed to seize resources without
paying,
in order to "prevent[] the government from overusing the taking pow,,Io9

er.

Of course, as the rent seeking literature suggests, the government does not
always acquire and dispose of resources in the most efficient fashion. But it
stands to reason that if the government could acquire land or fuel for the mo-

105. See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 59-64 (1989); Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (dictum). Cf Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (statute appropriating interest on interpleader fund held to be a
taking where the state charged a separate user fee to cover its costs of operating the fund).
106. It might help a little if local governments are deterred from adopting crude exactions of
cash payments by state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity in taxation. Acting in tandem
with Dolan's crimp on the taking of tangible property, this might result in some decline in the
overall use of exactions.
107. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51 (3d ed. 1986).
108. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 620-22 (1984); Lawrence Blume etal., The Taking of Land: When
Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q. J. ECON. 71, 88-90 (1984); see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-67 (1964) (offering a similar theory).
109. POSNER, supra note 107, at 51.
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tor pool or paper clips without paying for these things, the government would
acquire more land, fuel, or paper clips than if it had to pay for them. It also
stands to reason that the government would very likely acquire an inefficiently
large stockpile of land, fuel, or paper clips if these things could be had for
free.
The fiscal illusion argument suggests that exercise of the rights protected
by the Takings Clause supplies a public good in the form of incentives for a
more efficient overall allocation of resources. Without the compensation requirement, the government would acquire inefficiently large stockpiles of land,
fuel, and paper clips-resources that could be put to better use in other applications. If the government has to pay fair market value for these resources,
perfect efficiency may not result, but scarce and valuable resources will be
deployed in a more efficient fashion overall-hence there will be more wealth
in society for all to enjoy-than will be the case without a compensation requirement. The fiscal illusion argument also suggests why courts might want
to prohibit at least some waivers of the right to just compensation."' A simple numerical example keyed to the facts of Dolan helps make the point.
Suppose the fair market value of the strip of Dolan's land the government
wants to acquire for a greenway is $1,500. Suppose further that the increase in
the fair market value of the remaining 90% of the land, if the proposed development takes place, is (net of costs) $2,000. Obviously, on these supposed
facts, Ms. Dolan would agree to waive her right to compensation for the
greenway strip-she is $500 better off.
Assume further, however, that the only purpose of the greenway is to
build a bicycle path, and that the net social benefits to the public of the bicycle path are only $100. If the government goes ahead with the project, it will
be using a parcel of land with a fair market value of $1,500 for a use that
generates only $100 in social benefits. Indeed, the fact that the government
has acquired the greenway free of charge makes it more rather than less likely
that it would go forward with such a project. The fiscal illusion argument
therefore suggests that the Court was justified in subjecting the use of exactions to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, in order to preserve the function of the Takings Clause in promoting a more efficient pattern of government procurement decisions."'

110.

Epstein expressly recognizes the force of the fiscal illusion argument in this context See

EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 182-83; see also Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae at

18-19, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (making a similar point with a numerical
example analogous to the one in the text).
111. Vicki Been, in a provocative article, has argued there is no need for a constitutional rule
limiting the use of exactions because competition among local jurisdictions to attract developers
will force the adoption of efficient exaction practices. Been, supra note 20. Been's argument fails
on the facts of Dolan, however, because the developer (Florence Dolan) already owned the property subject to the exaction, and was in no position to pull up her land and move to another jurisdiction. Land is an immovable asset, and the local jurisdiction has the power to exact all the economic rents that the owner of the land (or the owner of any other immovable asset like streets that
have already been laid out or buildings that have already been built) can obtain from development.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 184-87; Sterk, supra note 30, at 844-53.
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Notice, interestingly, that the fiscal illusion argument would not support
applying the unconstitutional conditions argument to exactions that take the
form of cash payments. Cash is a perfectly fungible asset, and it is unlikely
that government officials will ignore the opportunity costs of devoting cash to
any particular public project. To revert to the example, suppose that instead of
demanding 10% of Dolan's land (having a fair market value of $1,500), the
city demands $1,500 in cash (denominated an "impact fee"). Dolan will still
accept the deal, since she is $500 better off. But it is unlikely that the city
officials will turn around and spend the $1,500 on acquiring a bicycle path
that has net social benefits of $100. Even assuming purely self-interested
behavior by city officials, they can obtain greater benefits (if only in terms of
public satisfaction and maximizing their chances of reelection) by using the
money for another project with a higher social payoff. Thus, the fiscal illusion
theory confirms the result that should obtain under existing Takings Clause
doctrine, which treats taxes and fees as outside the purview of the Clause, and,
hence, as not triggering the unconstitutional conditions doctrine when an exaction takes the form of a tax or a fee.
The fiscal illusion argument also supplies a justification for the nexus
requirement of Nollan, as well as for the "rough proportionality" test of
Dolan, with its elements of less restrictive alternatives analysis and quantitative cost-benefit analysis. The fiscal illusion theory suggests that property
acquired through waiver of the right to compensation is uniquely susceptible to
misallocation by the government. As a protection against this danger, it makes
sense to ask whether the government's interests could be satisfied by less
restrictive exactions or regulations.
For example, in Dolan, the city of Tigard sought a permanent easement in
Dolan's land and asserted, in part, that the reason for doing so was to preserve
the area as a greenway to help prevent periodic flooding. As the Court pointed
out, however, this objective could also be satisfied by an open spaces regulation that simply required Dolan to preserve the area as a private greenway." 2
The permanent easement sought by the city went beyond the stated justification of flood control, and effected a transfer of an additional interest in land:
the "ability to exclude others."" 3 In effect, the permanent easement transferred not only control over development of the land, but also control over
"recreational" use of the greenway from Dolan to the city." 4
The Court suggested that this additional transfer of rights could entail a
significant loss in value. As the Court seemed to recognize, the problem was
not so much that Dolan might want to rent out access to the greenway for
higher valued recreational uses than those selected by the city (although this is
a possibility); of greater concern is the possibility that public recreational use
of the greenway might reduce the value of the residual property retained by
Dolan."' By insisting that the government exact only the least restrictive

112.
113.
114.
115.

Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
Id.
Id. at 2320-21.
Id. at 2321.
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fraction of the bundle of rights it needs to realize its objectives, the Court's
rough proportionality rule therefore helps minimize the potential for government mandated inefficiency in the use of property.
The cost-benefit aspect of the rough proportionality test can also be justified as a response to fiscal illusion, provided the cost-benefit inquiry is focussed properly. The proper comparison is not between the external costs of
the development and the external benefits flowing from the proposed exaction.
Rather, it is between the reduction in external costs of the development flowing from the exaction and the opportunity costs of the proposed exaction-the
fair market value of the exaction in its highest and best use. Recall that under
the public goods theory, the public goods value of exercise of the right is a
function of the external benefits produced through exercise of the right minus
any external costs associated with exercise of the right (PGVC, = EB,, - ECc).
The fiscal illusion argument suggests that the external benefits from demanding the payment of just compensation are preserving an efficient allocation of
resources. This is best approximated by the opportunity costs of the property
subject to exaction-its fair market value. The external costs from demanding
just compensation are the loss of any public benefits that would flow from the
government's proposed use of the property obtained through the exaction.
The Dolan case again provides an illustration. The city's demand for a
permanent easement was justified in part by its proposal to use the greenway
for a pedestrian/bicycle path, which would help alleviate traffic congestion in
downtown Tigard. The Court refused to credit this justification, because "on
the record before us, the city has not met its burden of demonstrating that the
additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the petitioner's
development reasonably relate to the city's requirement for a dedication of the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement.""' 6 As written, this is potentially misleading, since it seems to suggest that the key variable to be quantified is the
"additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by" Dolan's proposed development. But what is truly relevant is not quantifying the external
costs of the proposed development; it is quantifying the expected reduction in
these costs generated by the proposed exaction. And the critical comparison is
not between the external costs of the proposed development and the reduction
in external costs generated by the exaction, but rather, it is between the reduction in external costs generated by the exaction and the foregone opportunity
costs of the exaction.
Some numbers may help clarify the point. Suppose, as before, that the fair
market value of the strip of Dolan's land that the government wants to acquire
for a greenway is $1,500, and that the social benefits of the exaction in terms
of reduced vehicle trips is $100. Suppose further that the city does a study and
determines that the external costs of the development, in terms of additional
vehicle trips, is $75. It would make no sense to compare the external costs of
the development ($75) to the benefits of the exaction ($100), and approve the
exaction on the ground that the benefits exceed the costs by $25. Even though

116.

Id.
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the exaction saves $25 in vehicle miles, it creates a $1,400 social loss by tying
up property worth $1,500 in a use that generates only $100 of benefits.
Conversely, even if the external costs of the development exceed the
benefits of the exaction, we might still want the exaction to go forward. Suppose the development is projected to generate $500 in external costs in the
form of additional vehicle miles, and the exaction (as before) will produce
benefits of only $100 in terms of reduced vehicle miles. Assume now, however, that the fair market value of the greenway for any other purpose besides a
pedestrian/bicycle path is not $1,500 but only $50. On these assumptions, the
exaction makes sense from a fiscal illusion/cost-benefit perspective, since the
social benefits of the exaction exceed the social costs ($100 > $50). Again, we
see that the correct comparison is not between the costs of the development
and the benefits of the exaction, but between the reduction in the costs of
development associated with the exaction and the opportunity costs of the
exaction. Nothing in Justice Rehnquist's opinion is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with this understanding, but his language may point lower courts in the
wrong direction."7
In sum, the public goods theory is capable of justifying Dolan's extension
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the Takings Clause, once we
introduce the idea of fiscal illusion as a rationale for the Clause. The theory
can even explain the Court's decision to adopt the rough proportionality standard of review, with its elements of less restrictive alternatives analysis and
cost-benefit analysis.
Still, some large questions remain. The discussion in this Part of the article may only demonstrate that virtually any constitutional right can plausibly
be described as generating external benefits, such that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine arguably should apply to waivers of that right. " ' The
possibility of making such a demonstration is therefore only a necessary condition of applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to waivers of a
fight, not a sufficient condition. In particular, two further questions of institutional choice would have to be confronted before deciding that the Takings
Clause is an appropriate subject for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
One concerns judicial competence. Courts may be able to figure out in a
roughly satisfactory way which waivers of speech rights by public employees
should be permitted and which should be struck down. But will they be
equally adept in overseeing cost-benefit analyses designed to identify land use
exactions that satisfy the nexus requirement of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine? A second question concerns the allocation of scarce judicial resources. Even if courts can develop satisfactory guidelines for monitoring land use

117. Justice Souter's dissenting opinion explicitly suggests that the required comparison is
between the costs of the development and the benefits of the exaction. See id. at 2331 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
118. The waiver of jury trial rights through plea bargaining, for example, could be criticized
as denying the public the external benefits of public trials, such as the provision of additional
information about the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and the arrest of the
defendant, etc. Cf Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (criticizing settlement of litigation on the ground that it vitiates the "public values" associated with public trials).
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exactions, do we want them spending their time on this task as opposed to
other pressing issues like speech rights and race relations?
I do not have the space or time to consider these questions in this article,
even if I had ready answers. The point is that one would have to tackle these
questions before developing a complete normative defense of the decision in
Dolan. I have suggested the possibility that Dolan can be justified on a public
goods theory of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. But further questions
of comparative institutional choice would have to be confronted and resolved
in favor of judicial intervention before deciding to act on such a justification.'
CONCLUSION

As this symposium confirms, there are two general schools of thought
about the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. One, which can be called the
essentialist school, believes the doctrine partakes of a common logic that spans
each of the various areas of constitutional law in which it applies.'2 ° The
other, which can be called the nominalist school, believes the doctrine has no
common core of meaning, and can be understood only in conjunction with the
different values and traditions associated with different provisions of the
Constitution.' 2'
The public goods theory explored in this article suggests that both approaches are correct. With the essentialists, the public goods approach posits
that it is possible to describe the unconstitutional conditions problem in all
areas of law using a single vocabulary of analysis. The vocabulary employed
by the public goods theory is different from that urged by the Court and by
other commentators. Nevertheless, it shares the assumption that a unitary approach is both possible and desirable-if only as a means of promoting clarity
as to what factors are important in deciding whether to permit waivers of any
particular constitutional rights.
With the nominalists, however, the public goods theory also posits that
one cannot understand or apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine without comprehending the judicial attitude toward each individual constitutional
right. The key variable under the public goods approach is the judicial perception that the exercise of a particular right confers external benefits on third
parties or, more colloquially, promotes the "public interest.' 21 It should
come as no great shock to learn that each generation of justices has a different
set of values and attitudes about what kinds of rights have aspects of public
goods. For Lochner-era justices, the right of out-of-state corporations to gain

119. For an excellent discussion of the necessity of making these types of comparative institutional choice judgments in any normative analysis of law, see NEEL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
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See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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access to courts and highways was of paramount importance.' 23 For the Warren Court, the First Amendment surged to the fore.' 24 Lo and behold, we
now find that the Rehnquist Court believes the Takings Clause warrants protection under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Thus, within the framework of a common vocabulary of analysis, the public goods approach supports
a basic nominalism of results: one cannot know which rights will be favored
under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine without knowing the justices and
their attitudes about the right in question.
Whether this way of looking at the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
an improvement over more conventional approaches, I leave for others to
judge. Certainly, in my opinion, it goes further to rationalize the outcome in
the Dolan case than does any competing theory. It also seems to account for
more features of the general doctrine than does its principal rival, the consent
theory, which has dominated thinking about the doctrine for a long time-as
long as everyone has been saying that it is all very puzzling.

123. For a review of the case law of this era, see EPSTEIN, supra note 1.
124. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).

A COMMENT ON
"CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS PUBLIC GOODS"
ROBERT

F.

NAGEL*

I want to focus on a paradox that arises from Professor Merrill's very
interesting analysis. He says that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
should be used when the exercise of a right has high positive externalities that
are unlikely to be taken into account either by the individual right-holder or
the government. For instance, the right to vote, even though it matters little to
any particular voter's private interests, has high public value because it helps
achieve accountability and legitimacy. Courts should not permit the government to induce waiver of the right to vote (even if the incentive is a mere ten
dollar bribe) because collectively we all have such a strong interest in voting
as a form of political participation. Putting the point more generally: the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should be invoked when the ratio of the
right's public value is high relative to its total value. As the voting-bribe hypothetical illustrates, this will tend to be true the more trivial a right is for the
private interests of individuals.
The paradox that emerges from this analysis is that the more crucial a
right is to you as an individual, the more free the government should be to
induce you not to exercise it. This result is a corollary of the principle that
utilization of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should depend on the
ratio of public value to total value. The "total value" of the exercise of a right
includes the private value to the individual right-holders; hence, if public value
is held constant, the higher the private value, the lower the ratio of public
value to total value will tend to be. This helps to explain why it is constitutional to use draconian criminal sentences (including the death penalty) to
discourage defendants from exercising their right to a trial. While the public
has an interest in fair trials (such as maintenance of faith in the justice system), individual criminal defendants have such strong incentives to use procedures that will minimize their punishment that plea bargains can be permitted.
That is to say, again, because due process is crucial to individual lives, the
government may induce waiver.
As applied to the abortion funding issue, this paradox would mean that the
current law, which permits the government to provide financial incentive for
live births,' may be based, oddly enough, on the assumption that the right to

* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Constitutional Law Professor, University of Colorado School of
Law. B.A., Swarthmore College, 1968; J.D., Yale School of Law, 1972. This is a written version
of a contribution to a symposium on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine held at the University
of Denver College of Law on March 17-18, 1995.
1. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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privacy (like the right not to be punished without due process) is terribly important to the right-holder. Although he doesn't say this, under Professor
Merrill's analysis, the courts should be more inclined to reverse the current
law-that is, to require payments for abortion-to the extent that judges are
convinced that abortion (like voting) does not matter much to individuals'
lives.
This may sound perverse but it makes a certain sense. To say that a woman should be permitted to accept a bribe from the government in return for
foregoing her right to abortion might as well reflect the unsentimental view
that her private interests-her future-will be sufficiently important to her that
the bribe will make little difference. If, however, women are viewed as having
little at stake (since, for example, both childlessness and child-rearing have
their problems and their joys), the bribe becomes very powerful and should be
prohibited if the right to abortion has positive externalities.
You may doubt that any pro-choice advocate's opposition to discriminatory subsidies for live births actually is (or realistically could be) based on such
a view, but I am not so sure. Certainly Justice Blackmun's extremely harsh
and even paternalistic condemnations of so-called "informed consent" laws
have depicted the decision to have an abortion as extremely precarious.2 That
depiction is consistent with the view that some females, at least, will not see
the exercise of the right to abortion as crucial to their lives. Thus, a low assessment of the private interest in abortion is one rather surprising explanation
for the fear that women will too easily be talked (or bribed) out of the decision to abort. This would be especially unacceptable to those pro-choice advocates who believe that free use of abortion will achieve large political and
social benefits, such as the equalization of power relationships between men
and women.'
I want now to depart from Professor Merrill's analysis and suggest a
different justification for the paradoxical conclusion that I have been describing. It seems possible to me that, when the exercise of a right is of plain and
tangible importance to individuals, high positive externalities are more likely
to be taken into account both by the individual, who must decide whether to
waive the right, and by the legislature that must decide whether to try to encourage waiver. Such rights-which in my own opinion would include freedom of speech, property, and abortion-are likely to matter to many organized
groups precisely because groups will be organized around rights that matter to
individuals. To the extent that the right is crucial in the lives of its membership, such groups-think of the ACLU, the National Federation of Independent Business, the Abortion Rights League-will have both the resources and
the incentive to influence the perception in popular culture of the right they
favor. They may even be successful in imparting a mythic cast to that

2. The Court once described negative, but truthful, information as creating "tie antithesis of
informed consent." Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 764 (1986).
The information, "no matter how objective ... may serve only to confuse ... [the patient] and to
heighten her anxiety." Id. at 762.
3. See, e.g., Ruth B. Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 383-86 (1985).
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right-consider how journalists have been able to characterize their function as
being the heroic watchdog of government or think of the power of adages like
"a man's home is his castle" and slogans such as "get your government off
my body." Not only will groups have strong incentives to put out such messages, but individuals will have incentives to be persuaded by them to the
extent that they want to justify or dignify self-interest. In short, it seems possible to me that rights which are important in the lives of individuals are relatively advantaged in the general culture.
Thus, at least in comparison to those rather abstract rights that have a
high ratio of public value in comparison to total value, both individuals and
the government will be inclined to perceive positive externalities in privately
valued rights. Since, in these circumstances, the government is comparatively
unlikely to try to induce waiver unless strong public costs offset the public
good, it would follow that courts should tend not to apply the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine to rights that matter to individuals.
The possibility that relative political advantage attaches to rights with high
private values thus reinforces Professor Merrill's general position. This possibility also supports the implications of his analysis in more complicated settings. Consider, for instance, two rights that have different values in all respects (private, public, and total) but nevertheless have the same ratio of public value to total value. 4 Should, for instance, the same waiver rule be applied
to a right that is relatively trivial both for the right-holder and for society as is
applied to a right that is crucial to both the individual and society?
Taken at face value, Professor Merrill's analysis seems to me to suggest
that-as long as the ratio is the same-the applicability of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine would be the same. It is easy to see that waiver should be
permitted if the right-holder thinks the right is trivial and if society has no
great stake in the matter. But why should waiver be permitted when, although
the private stake is great, the external benefits are also large? Assuming it is
correct that high private value will help assure that large public benefit is
appreciated in collective decisionmaking, waiver of the high-value right will
tend to be permitted only if there are important costs connected with the exercise of the right in particular social circumstances. Waiver, therefore, should
be permitted. The implications of Professor Merrill's analysis, while apparently paradoxical in this situation, seem justified.

4.

1 am indebted to Arthur Travers for raising this issue.

CAUSATION AND THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS

DOCTRINE:
WHY THE CITY OF TIGARD'S EXACTION

WAS A TAKING
JAN G. LArros*

In Dolan v. City of Tigard,' the Supreme Court concluded that it was an
uncompensated and therefore unconstitutional taking for the city of Tigard to
require a landowner, Ms. Dolan, to dedicate a portion of her property in a
floodplain as a public greenway as a condition for a building permit allowing
expansion of her commercial property. 2 The city required that Ms. Dolan
waive her Fifth Amendment constitutional guarantee of just compensation for
the private property dedicated to the city. This waiver had to occur for Ms.
Dolan to obtain a benefit (the building permit) that the city had no obligation
to provide her.
This requirement, said the Dolan majority, implicated the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. According to the Court, it is "well-settled" under
the doctrine that "the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is
taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by
the government." 3
The Court is twice wrong. First, the Dolan case does not ground its analysis in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Its central focus is whether the
exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bear a required relationship to the projected impact of Ms. Dolan's proposed new commercial development.4 This inquiry involves causation: does the exaction relate to the harm
"caused" by the new development? Causation is a critical element inherent in
the Takings Clause;5 however, it does not necessarily entail application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Second, the Court is wrong when it categorizes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as being "well-settled." It is a doctrine that has been inconsistently applied over time, varying with the nature of the right the government

* John A. Carver, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Yale
University, 1968; J.D., University of Colorado, 1971; SJ.D., University of Wisconsin Law School,
1975.
1. 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
2. Another condition imposed by the city was that she dedicate a portion of her property
adjacent to the floodplain as a bicycle/pedestrian pathway. This article will not consider this second condition, although the underlying analysis is the same for both.
3. Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2317.
4. Id. at 2318.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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wants the private party to waive.6 Dolan is grossly misleading when it flatly
states that "the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right... in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government."7 Only in certain cases, where particular constitutional rights are at
stake, does the Court's statement ring true.
Professor Thomas Merrill's article addresses these two difficulties with
the Dolan case and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. He concurs that
the doctrine, as currently understood, is so unclear and muddled that its explanatory power is worthless when used to consider waivers of constitutional
rights in exchange for discretionary governmental benefits.8 Rather than giving up on the doctrine, however, Merrill sees in Dolan some important scattered clues about its underlying rationale. From these slim pickings he constructs a theory of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that is based on the
assumption that the doctrine has primary applicability in one situation: when
the private exercise of a constitutional right (that would have to be waived in
order to receive the discretionary government benefit) generates positive
externalities benefitting third parties, making it a "public good."
As a public good, the right is valuable to persons outside the government/right-holder relationship, while it is simultaneously undervalued by the
right-holder." As a result of this latter consequence, when the right-holder is
considering whether to waive the right, the right-holder will fail to take into
account the positive externalities produced by the exercise of the right." Under Merrill's theory, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a direct response to this tendency of private parties. By making the condition-the waiver of the right-unconstitutional, courts protect the "public goods" component
of the exercise of the right.
Merrill's argument is a major contribution to a theoretical understanding
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. He makes an impressive case that
the presence or absence of external benefits associated with the exercise of a
constitutional right will explain why courts have vigorously enforced the doctrine in some situations, while ignoring it in others. Merrill convincingly demonstrates that property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment are a category
of rights for which the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is particularly
relevant. When the exercise of property rights is at stake, Merrill shows that
there are external benefits associated with the non-waiver of the right to just

6. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2327 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1416 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein,
Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with ParticularReference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593, 620 (1990). As Professor Thomas Merrill
points out, there is a "fairly robust version of the doctrine in connection with First Amendment
rights and certain separation of powers controversies; a much weaker version prevails with respect
to reproductive rights and criminal procedural rights." Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of
Tigard: ConstitutionalRights as Public Goods, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 859, 860-61 (1995).
7. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
8. Merrill, supra note 6, at 859.
9. Id. at 862, 870.
10. Id. at 870, 875.
11. Id. at 871.
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compensation when property is threatened with a "taking" by the government.
Since the Takings Clause, and its just compensation requirement, supply a
pubic good in situations where government is pressuring property owners,
Merrill argues that the Court was correct in Dolan. When it prohibited Ms.
Dolan from having to waive the right to compensation in order to receive her
building permit from the city of Tigard, the Court was protecting a valuable
public good.
This article considers Professor Merrill's "public goods" model as an
explanation for the Court's Fifth Amendment defense of private property
rights in the Dolan case. Part I first summarizes Merrill's thesis. Part I then
suggests that the notion of public goods does far more than provide a coherent
rationale for many unconstitutional conditions cases where property is not
involved. When the police power is exercised to affect property uses, the
public goods idea is an explanation for why private property should be relatively free of regulation, more so than simply a justification for why just compensation should be paid when regulations take property. In other words, in a
private property case, the public goods model is better suited to explaining
why there should be more vigorous constitutional protection of the private
exercise of property rights before just compensation is required, when the
property owner is facing the prospect of excessive government regulation.
Part I further suggests that the real positive externality brought about by
the Takings Clause is not primarily the external benefit produced by the just
compensation requirement. According to Merrill, this is the benefit that flows
from making government pay for property it takes, as opposed to simply permitting government to acquire property without any payment. 2 Part I argues
that the main public good that emerges from the Takings Clause is the positive
market consequence that results when government is deterred by the Takings
Clause, and private parties use and develop property free from unreasonable
government interference.
Part II offers an explanation for the Court's decision in Dolan that is
different from Merrill's read on the case. If the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is implicated at all in Dolan, it is not Merrill's public goods model
that the Court uses, but rather it is the government "coercion" theory that
undergirds the majority opinion. This theory holds that a private party
agreement with the government to waive constitutional rights should not be
acceptable when there is no legitimate consent by the private party.' 3 To the
extent the doctrine has applicability in Dolan, it is Ms. Dolan's inability to
give voluntary consent to the waiver of the Fifth Amendment right that is
most troublesome to the Court, and not some protection of public goods inherent in just compensation.
But the Dolan case is not, in fact, an unconstitutional conditions case. It is
a takings case. And as a takings case, its importance lies in the Court's explicit adoption of an element of takings analysis first articulated by Justice Scalia

12.
13.

See id. at 882-83.
Sullivan, supra note 6, at 1450-56.
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in his dissent in Pennell v. City of San Jose: 14 causation. Justice Scalia argued that there may be a taking if a land use restriction imposes a public
burden on a private party who did not cause the burden. 5 This is what the
city of Tigard tried to do with Ms. Dolan when it demanded that she give
property to the city in exchange for a building permit, even though there was
no evidence that her expanded use of her property under the building permit
would cause the degree of harm necessitating the dedication. It is the absence
of the necessary causative connection between dedication requirements and her
proposed use of her property that explains why the Supreme Court concluded
the city had violated the Takings Clause.
The city of Tigard did not necessarily violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Its error was to act inconsistently with the central purpose of
the Takings Clause. As one Supreme Court case declared, the Takings Clause
is intended "to bar the government [the city of Tigard] from forcing some people alone [Ms. Dolan] to bear public burdens [the dedication] which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public [the taxpayers of Tigard] as
a whole."'"
I. PUBLIC GOODS AND POsITIVE EXTERNALITEs INHERENT IN BOTH THE
RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION AND THE PRIVATE EXERCISE OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS

A. Unconstitutional Conditions and the Merrill Public Goods Model
One of the great difficulties with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is that it is inconsistent with one basic tenet of a free market society: Individuals should be able to enter into arrangements with others where they trade
their rights, to receive in return, some valuable benefit. The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prevents this exchange by invalidating some transactions
involving the relinquishment of constitutional rights in exchange for a discretionary governmental benefit. For example, in the case of Ms. Dolan, she had
to give up her right of just compensation for dedicating land to the city in
exchange for a building permit. Professor Merrill takes issue with the two
most commonly cited grounds for not enforcing such agreements, which in
turn have become rationales for explaining the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.
First, it has been argued that agreements which call for an individual to
waive a constitutional right should not stand because the individual waiver
must somehow have been coerced, thereby making the consent involuntary. 7
Merrill believes this rationale is problematic because when an individual
waives a constitutional right, it is because that individual believes the
government's discretionary benefit obtained in exchange for the waiver will be

14.
15.
16.
17.
Sullivan,

485 U.S. 1 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Pennell, 485 U.S. at 20-22.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
See generally RIcHARD A. EPsTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993); see also
supra note 6, at 1428-50.
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more valuable than the right that is given up.' Otherwise, the individual
would never release the right. This is not coercion; this is precisely why individuals enter into contracts, which is to be better off after the exchange than
before.
Second, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine also has been justified as
a response to the unequal bargaining power held by the government when it
alone is able to supply the benefit sought by the private individual. If government is the only supplier of a particular benefit, then its monopoly position
prevents individuals from seeking alternative offers in a normally competitive
market. As a result, the government is in a position to dictate the terms for
acquiring the benefit, which may include requiring the individual to give up a
right otherwise available under the Constitution. 9
Merrill, however, does not believe this "government monopoly" theory is
a satisfactory explanation. This is in part because (1) the government does not
always wield monopoly power with respect to the benefit sought (e.g., in the
employment market), 0 and (2) gross disparity in bargaining power, even between the government and a private party, should not necessarily justify invalidating waivers of constitutional
rights procured in exchange for the granting
2
of a nondiscretionary benefit. '
Professor Merrill's alternative explanation for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is based on the assumption that some constitutional rights are,
2
when exercised by private parties, public goodsY.
A public good is an
economist's term for the consequence that follows when a private party's
action benefits not only the private party, but also third parties. Merrill theorizes that some constitutional rights are like public goods because the exercise
of that right by private parties advantages the right-holder and generates positive externalities that benefit parties who are not directly involved with a
party's exercise of the right. For example, the First Amendment right of free
speech may be considered a public good, since its exercise by even one person
will eventually supply information to other persons, who will benefit there3
2

by.

When a constitutional right is a public good, any external benefits associated with the exercise of the right will tend to be overlooked by the individual
right-holder. The individual owning the right will not be interested in the
public benefits that are incidentally supplied if the right is exercised. Such
external benefits are usually irrelevant to the right-holder, who will ofily be
concerned about whether the exercise of the right will be of benefit to that

18. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 859-60.
19. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1988).
20. Merrill, supra note 6, at 860.
21. Id. at 869-70 n.59; see also United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 805-06 (1995)
("gross disparity" in bargaining power between government and individual does not justify invalidating waivers procured as part of plea bargaining process).
22. Merrill, supra note 6, at 870-72.
23. Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REV. 554, 558-60 (1991).
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right-holder. As a result, if the right-holder believes that the costs of waiving a
constitutional right are outweighed by the advantages of receiving a
nondiscretionary governmental benefit in return, the right-holder will waive the
right, even if the public is made worse off by the non-exercise of the right.
Professor Merrill argues that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a
direct response to this tendency on the part of private parties to undervalue the
exercise of some constitutional rights. The doctrine prevents the individual
waiver of the right, even when the right-holder is better off, if the waiver
could result in a suboptimal supply of the external, third-party benefits that
would follow if the right were exercised.24
Professor Merrill goes on to make a persuasive case that the public goods
theory helps to explain why courts vigorously apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine with respect to some rights, but not to others. The reason for
this varying application is due to a judicial perception that the level of public
benefits differs from right to right. When a right has an obvious public goods
dimension (e.g., the right to free speech), the doctrine will be enforced and
waivers of the right voided. When the right is thought to provide fewer public
benefits (e.g., the right to trial by jury), the doctrine will be less vigorously
enforced, regardless of how highly valued the right is to the individual.'
When Merrill's theory is applied to the Dolan case, the question is whether the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for takings of private property has a public goods component. This would be so if unrestricted private
party waivers of the right, in return for a discretionary government benefit
(e.g., a building permit), could result in a suboptimal supply of some public
benefit. Concern about this negative consequence would then explain the
Dolan result, which found the city of Tigard's condition (Ms. Dolan's dedication of land without just compensation) to be unconstitutional. The task for
Professor Merrill is identifying the public benefit realized by the just compensation requirement.
He rejects as unsuitable to his public goods model an array of theories
that take into account third-party effects. Among the arguments he discards
are: (1) the idea that government action should not disproportionately burden
some individuals with no compensation;26 (2) the fear that demoralization
costs will be incurred when private parties witness other private parties who
are not offered compensation for the taking of their property;" and (3) the
need to prevent uncompensated takings that, in effect, change the preexisting
pattern of wealth distribution and give rise to rent seeking behavior.28

24. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 871. Professor Merrill acknowledges that while other commentators have recognized the public goods argument, they have not accepted it as a general
theory of unconstitutional conditions. Id. at 871-72 n.70.
25. Id. at 874-75.
26. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
27. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
28.

See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 306-24 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80
Nw. U. L. REV. 1561 (1986).
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There is, however, a third-party effect that he does accept as a justification for applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the Takings
Clause-the argument from "fiscal illusion." 9 This argument assumes that if
government seizes property without paying, it will overuse its taking power
and acquire more property than it needs (or is economically efficient to have
under government control). This will lead to the fiscal illusion that the government is saving taxpayer dollars that it otherwise would have to spend to compensate private property owners, when, in fact, the government will have
acquired excessively large stockpiles of property, which could have been deployed in a more efficient way if the property had remained in private hands.
The public good that comes from the right of just compensation is the more
efficient allocation of resources and property that will occur if government has
to pay for private property, which will tend to keep property in private hands
until it is worth the market price to government officials. Conversely, if private property is acquired through waiver of the right to compensation, this
property will become susceptible to misallocation by the new government
owners.
Professor Merrill posits that application of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine simultaneously helps ensure that resources are put to the best uses
through normal market forces and prevents the threat of possible government
misallocation of resources." The doctrine accomplishes these dual goods by
imposing limits on when waivers of the just compensation right will be acceptable. Merrill sees the Dolan case as establishing one such limit-after
Dolan, government exactions demanding waivers of the right to just compensation must bear a required relationship, or nexus, to the projected impact of
the property use that will be permitted after the property owner receives the
government benefit."1
B. Public Goods and the Exercise of Private Property Rights
Professor Merrill's public goods model certainly advances our understanding of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. His model serves as a more
satisfactory explanation of how and why the doctrine has been used by courts
than many of the competing theories that have been advanced by commentators.32 However, a public goods rationale for when the Takings Clause is
applicable to property development exactions may simultaneously explain not
enough and too much.
This section of Part I considers why his argument does not go far enough.
The thesis advanced below is that Merrill's public goods theory should be

29. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51 (3d ed. 1986); Lawrence
Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L.
REV.569, 620-22 (1984).
30. Merrill, supra note 6,at 883.
31.

Id.

32. See, for example, the theories described in Larry Alexander, UnderstandingConstitutional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175 (1989); Lynn A. Baker,
The Price of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1185 (1990); Epstein, supra note 19; Sullivan, supra note 6.
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extended beyond the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to act as a check on
all police power exercises, even those not utilizing exactions, that interfere
with the development of private property rights. Part II considers how his
theory goes too far, particularly with respect to the Dolan case. Dolan is best
understood not as an unconstitutional conditions case employing a public
goods theory, but as a takings case, the significance of which lies in its explicit adoption of causation as a critical factor when exactions are imposed in
private uses of property.
1. Positive Externalities Associated with Private Property Use
Professor Merrill correctly points out that when a private action becomes
a public good, four consequences follow. 3 While he discusses these effects
in the context of the constitutional right to just compensation, the same effects
are present before just compensation is awarded, when private parties use and
develop property largely free from government interference.
The first characteristic of a public good is that a private party's behavior
will have a positive effect on third parties. In the case of property owned by a
private party, sales or transfers of that property to others may not only beneficially affect the seller and the purchaser, but may also positively impact on
others. For example, the new owner might use the property in such a way that
permits consumers to enjoy a necessary commodity (e.g., an oil and gas lessee
in a lease relationship with the lessor-owner develops an energy resource that
is available to third parties to heat homes or drive cars). Even when there is
no conveyance, the development of property by an owner has repercussions
beyond the owner when the use makes the property productive, not static. For
example, water in a river owned by a party who never uses the water may be
far less valuable than water in a river diverted by the owner in order to transform a desert into a city.
Second, the democratic political process will tend to overregulate private
property uses. Overregulation of private property may occur for two reasons.
The political process wishes to curb any social costs or negative externalities
associated with the property use. For example, if wildlife is valued by a society, uses of property that adversely affect wildlife will be perceived as a cost,
and these uses of property may be restricted. If such regulation becomes overly zealous, however, it becomes difficult to organize those who benefit from
the adverse use to fight the regulations. This is because those beneficiaries will
assume that the property owner will do battle with the government, and they
will be able to prevail on the owner's effort, rather than mounting their own
attack.
Third, if property use does create a public good and the property owner
contemplates a challenge to the overregulation of the property, that owner will
ignore any external benefits associated with the use of the property. This is
because property owners are generally individuals who seek to maximize their
own interest. If an owner's use of property will have private value, it is only

33.

Merrill, supra note 6, at 870-72.
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that private value that will be weighed against the costs of resisting regulations
of property. It will be irrelevant to the decision that there may be other, more
public values present if the property is freed from regulatory restrictions.
Fourth, property owners adversely affected by regulation may choose not
to resist regulatory restrictions in court. This will occur quite often whenever
the cost of such a challenge exceeds the benefits of using the property freely.
Such benefits will not include the public goods component of the property use
because such external benefits will be ignored by property owners concerned
only with their own interests. The cumulative effect of individual decisions by
property owners not to resist overregulation will be a suboptimal supply of the
external benefits associated with the exercise of property rights.
The law has not been insensitive to these four realities of private property.
One legal response, which Professor Merrill correctly cites, is the common law
rule against restraints on alienation.34 This rule is intended to prevent third
parties from being deprived of the external benefits that flow from allowing
property to be transferred to its highest and best use.3" The constitutional law
response was the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although its text
suggests that the Takings Clause was designed to ensure that government paid
owners for private property it took, its more important role is to threaten the
just compensation sanction, and thereby discourage unnecessary regulation of
private uses of property.
The regulatory takings doctrine can thus be seen as preserving the external
benefits for third parties that result from reducing regulation of private property. When regulatory excesses are deterred by the credible threat of a vigorously enforced Takings Clause, the public benefits of private uses of property are
maximized. When regulation of property is unchecked, which occurs if Takings Clause challenges do not succeed, and excessive use of the police power
is thereby not deterred, the result is a suboptimal supply of a public good-the
third party benefits associated with property made productive by private enterprise.
2.

The Role of the Takings Clause in Protecting the Public Goods
Component of the Property Use

When the relevant public good is the private exercise of property rights,
and not, as Professor Merrill suggests, the governmental payment of just compensation to private parties after their property has been taken, then the three
justifications for the Takings Clause discounted under Merrill's public goods
model appear more persuasive.'
The first of these justifications, cited prominently in the Dolan opinion,
prevents the government from disproportionately burdening one party or a
very small number of individuals, when others are not subject to equivalent

34. Id. at 872.
35. Many 19th Century statutes similarly sought to protect private property rights from regulations that did not serve the goal of economic growth. See JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDmoNs OF FREEDOM: IN THE NINEEENTH-CENTURY Ut=rTE STATES 7 (1956).
36. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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burdens.37 This rationale assumes that when the action of one party (e.g., the
owner of private property) generates positive benefits enjoyed by third parties
(e.g., those who benefit from the productive use of property), it is wrong, if
not stupid, to saddle the generator of the public good with a regulatory burden.
It is preferable instead to share the cost of the regulation with others (including those who benefit from the public good). Under this rationale, Ms. Dolan
should not have to bear the entire burden of providing, free of charge, a public
greenway to recreational visitors trampling along the city of Tigard's floodplain.
A second justification for the Takings Clause is that it reduces what Professor Frank Michelman calls the "demoralization costs" which arise from the
realization that no compensation is offered for a taking.38 Michelman is commenting on the effect that excessive regulation of property has on other property owners who witness, but not directly experience, the regulatory impact.
When property owner A (Ms. Dolan's neighbor) sees that property owner B
(Ms. Dolan) cannot develop B's property because of regulatory hurdles (an
exaction requirement), A may be less inclined to develop A's property (A will
be "demoralized"). This means that third parties will be denied the public
goods component not just of B's property, but also of A's.
A third justification for the Takings Clause is to prevent the government
from changing the preexisting distribution of wealth.39 Governmental action
can bring about this result if it forces or authorizes exchanges of property
between property owners without compensating the losers for their loss. For
example, if a county authorizes a surface owner to build a subdivision above a
subsurface owner's underground coal estate, thereby preventing the subsurface
owner from removing the coal, the county will have taken from the subsurface
owner and given to the surface owner. Since the subsurface owner's use of the
coal would have benefitted third parties (e.g., consumers of electricity, where
the electricity is generated at coal-fired power plants), government action that
causes the coal to remain in the ground will have caused an undersupply of a
public good. The Takings Clause is intended both to discourage such government-caused exchanges and, if the exchange does occur, to compensate those
whose property has been sacrificed in order to benefit others.
The public goods model thus works well to describe how and why the
Takings Clause operates to encourage productive uses of private property-for
example, by discouraging the government from employing its police powers to
overregulate such uses. The public good at stake is the positive externality
associated with private land and property use. However, it is not, as Professor
Merrill suggests, the public benefit that follows from preventing the government from acquiring (without compensation) an inefficiently large quantity of
private property.

37.
38.
39.

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
See Michelman, supra note 27, at 1214.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 28.
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UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND CAUSATION IN THE DOLAN CASE

If Professor Merrill's public goods model is a persuasive explanation for
why private property uses should be constitutionally protected from overregulation, does his model also explain why the Court decided that the city of
Tigard's exactions were a taking? The initial section of Part H argues that, to
the extent the Dolan case involved the unconstitutional conditions doctrine at
all, it was the individual coercion/government monopoly theory that caused the
Court to activate the doctrine and not Merrill's public goods theory. The second section of Part II suggests that the Dolan case is not an unconstitutional
conditions case at all, but rather a case addressing the causation component of
the Takings Clause.
A. UnconstitutionalConditions and the Dolan Case
Professor Merrill's public goods model is based on the premise that the
two most commonly used justifications for the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine are unsound. These are, first, the coercion theory (i.e., waivers of
constitutional rights should not be enforced because the waiver was coerced),' and second, the government monopoly theory (i.e., since the government is the sole supplier of the discretionary benefit sought, and since the
private party cannot proceed with its plans without this benefit, the private
party's waiver is not voluntary)."
Both of these theories assume that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is appropriate when the waiver of the constitutional right is not consensual.
Contrary to what Merrill assumes, however, coercion, government monopoly,
and lack of genuine consent serve as important justifications for the takings
holding in Dolan. They also underlie the earlier Supreme Court case involving
exactions-Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.42 That the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has any relevance at all to these cases is due to the
Court's belief that in both Nollan and Dolan there was no true consent due to
defects in the private party/government bargaining process.
In Nollan, the Court considered whether a permit condition exacted by a
government agency was a taking. The Court implicitly relied on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine when it found that a land dedication exaction was
unconstitutional because the private party would have had to give up the right
to just compensation in order to receive the permit."3 The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine was enforced in Nollan when the Court realized that the
condition, which the Court characterized as "the yielding of a property interest" by the private party, "cannot be regarded as [a] voluntary 'exchange."'"
Since the permit-for-a-right exchange was involuntary, and since the government had a monopoly on the supply of permits, there was no real consent to

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Merrill, supra note 6, at 859-60, 869-70.
Id.
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831, 842.
Id. at 834 n.2.
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the waiver of the right. The Court later underscored the coercion element
when it called the exaction condition "not a valid regulation of land use but
'an out-and-out plan of extortion. '
Similarly, in Dolan, the Court viewed the conditions imposed on Ms.
Dolan as "not simply a limitation on the use [of the property], but a requirement that she deed portions of the property to the city." The city is not
merely negotiating with her as part of a voluntary exchange of her rights for a
government permit; the city's offer is seen as "exactions demanded by [its]
permit conditions."'47 That Ms. Dolan is being coerced is also suggested by
the Court's choice of language when it describes the position she is put in by
the city: "[T]he city has forced her to chose between the building permit and
her right under the Fifth Amendment. . . ."' If she waives this constitutional
right,49 her "right to exclude would not be regulated, it would be eviscerated.'
Such statements in Nollan and Dolan demonstrate that in these important
property rights cases, the Court is not interested in Professor Merrill's public
goods model. Rather, it is concerned with the degree of leverage and power
the relevant government actor has over the private property owner. This power
becomes coercive because (1) only the government can supply the permit that
is necessary for the intended private property use, and (2) the private party is
faced with a choice of evils--either the constitutional right is relinquished or
the property cannot be developed as planned. It is this aspect of the exactions
in Nollan and Dolan that was most troublesome to the Court, because it meant
that any waiver could not be truly consensual.
B. Causation: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was a Taking
Although the Dolan Court (and to a certain extent the Nollan Court) is
concerned with the coercive dimensions of the government's actions, the ultimate takings holding is not based on the fact that the condition, Ms. Dolan's
waiver, was coerced by the government. Nor does the Court in Dolan attempt
to ground its analysis in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. There is only
one sentence in the opinion that even mentions the doctrine."0 The case focuses on the Takings Clause and whether the city's exaction has caused a
taking of Ms. Dolan's property. What makes Dolan an important decision is
not that it advances our understanding of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, but that it contributes enormously to our understanding of how the Takings Clause operates.
The central argument in the Dolan case was that the city had not identified any special burdens that would be caused by Ms. Dolan's expansion of
her commercial property, and that would therefore justify the particular dedica-

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 837.
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2318 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2317.
Id. at 2321.
Id. at 2317.
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tions required from her but not the general public.5 The Dolan Court agreed,
and engrafted on the Takings Clause a requirement that there be a reasonable
and sufficient relation between the government condition and the harm the
development would cause. The Dolan rule, which should now be a component
of takings analysis (but not necessarily the unconstitutional conditions doctrine) is simply this: "The city [the government actor] must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication [the condition] is
related both in nature and extent to the impact [caused by] the proposed [private party] development."52
The essence of this Dolan rule is that there must be a "cause and effect"
relationship between the social evil that the exaction or regulation seeks to
remedy and the property use that is either (1) subject to an exaction requirement, or (2) restricted by a regulation. If this causative link is absent, as it was
in Dolan, the government action may be an unconstitutional taking.
There is a good reason for adding a causation requirement to the Takings
Clause. In one frequently cited case, Armstrong v. United States,53 the Court
opined that the primary purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 4 This principle prevents the government from disproportionately burdening or picking on one
person or a small number of individuals when other persons similarly situated
are not subject to similar burdens. This principle has been repeated in several
recent Supreme Court takings cases, including Dolan. Indeed, so often is it
recited by the Court that Professor Merrill correctly notes it has "taken on the
quality of a canonical recitation.""
The Armstrong anti-discrimination principle helps courts determine if a
government action (either a condition or a restriction) is a taking. On the one
hand, if an owner's use of property is the cause of a social problem, then
government action conditioning or restricting that owner's use of the property
will be linked to eradicating the problem, and it cannot be said that the property owner has been unfairly singled out. In such a situation, apart from a denial
of all economic use," or a physical occupation,57 there is no certain protection afforded by the Takings Clause. But if the condition or restriction is imposed on a property owner who has not caused the problem that the government action is designed to correct, then the owner is being singled out and the
Takings Clause might be violated.

51. Id. The other half of Ms. Dolan's argument was that the city had not identified special
benefits conferred on her that would justify the exaction.
52. Id. at 2319-20.
53. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
54. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. The Armstrong rationale is intended to skewer the assumption (sometimes known as the Robin Hood approach) that property owners can be made to bear
disproportionate costs because of their wealth. See James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Another Step in the Right Direction, 25 ENVrL. L. 143, 152 (1995).
55. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316; Merrill, supra note 6, at 880 n.lO0.
56. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
57. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 448 U.S. 419 (1982).
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The Dolan case is an example of how the Takings Clause becomes implicated when there is no demonstrable causative connection between a government action that has taken the form of a condition and the harm produced by
the use of private property. The harm that would be caused by the proposed
expansion of Ms. Dolan's commercial property was the resulting increase in
the amount of impervious surface, that in turn would increase the quantity and
rate of storm water flow from her property onto a floodplain. Given this harm,
the Court said that the city could require her to not build in the floodplain,
because if she had, it might have enhanced the prospects of flooding in the
city.
But the city demanded more: "[I]t not only wanted petitioner not to build
in the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's property along [a river] for its
greenway system."58 The Court reasoned that, while Ms. Dolan's proposed
expansion would cause more water to run off her property than before, it
would not cause a need for the city to acquire her property, free of charge,
along the river. If she kept her property in the floodplain in a natural state
(which she intended to do), then the city's legitimate interest in reducing
flooding would be accomplished. But, if she had to dedicate this property to
the city, the city would have gained ownership of a free recreational pathway
for its greenway system. She was being "singled out" to bear the burden of
providing private land for a public floodplain easement when she had not
caused the city's need for acquisition of the easement. This was a taking.
This causation rationale behind a takings holding had been previously
offered by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion Pennell v. City of San
Jose.59 The Pennell case involved a police power restriction on property, not
a condition. A city rent control ordinance permitted officials to deny landlords
otherwise reasonable rent increases when the increase would pose an economic
hardship to certain poor tenants. The majority opinion dismissed the landlords'
takings challenge as premature. Justice Scalia did not believe the claim to be
premature and addressed the merits.
He argued that the hardship provisions had worked a taking because there
was no "cause and effect" relationship between the property use subject to the
regulation (rent control imposed on landlords who rented their property to
tenants) and the social evil the regulation sought to remedy (renters too poor
to afford even reasonably priced housing).'
According to Justice Scalia, the rent control law was a taking because it
had singled out for a special burden a particular class of property owners,
landlords, who happened to rent to a "hardship" tenant. The tenant's hardship

58. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
59. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
60. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 21-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But that problem [poor renters] is no
more caused or exploited by landlords than it is by the grocers who sell needy renters their food,
or the department stores that sell them their clothes...."); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630,
1653 (1988) ("In a variation of the harm ... inquiry familiar to land-use practitioners confronting
subdivision exactions, Justice Scalia [in Pennell] writes that the taking question must be answered
in relation to whether the singled-out landowner has caused the particular social harm.").
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had not been caused by the landlords. That hardship had been caused by the
tenant, or society at large. The social problem of poor tenants should therefore
be addressed by the public at large through welfare payments or public housing, but not through a rent control law that denied landlords a reasonable rent
increase.
Similarly, since a need for additional public greenway along the river in
the city of Tigard had not been caused by Ms. Dolan's desire to expand her
commercial property,6' she should not be singled out to bear the burden of
dedicating her land to the city so that it could have additional open space for
its greenway system within the floodplain. If the city wanted the land owned
by Ms. Dolan in the floodplain, it would have to pay her for that land, not
"take" it through an exaction.
The Dolan opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent in Pennell are not the only
examples of courts using causation as a determinative factor in takings cases.
Several state courts, particularly in Washington and Oregon, have relied on a
causation test when considering facts similar to the Dolan case.62 The issue in
these cases (as in Dolan) was whether conditions imposed by government
agencies on property owners in exchange for a government benefit worked an
unconstitutional taking.
These conditions have taken the form of requirements for private dedications of land, construction of improvements, and the payment of fees. When
these state courts concluded that the proposed property use would not cause
the problem that the condition was meant to remedy, there was a taking.63
Conversely, when the property use would have a negative impact that the
condition would ameliorate, there was no taking.' In both situations, the
presence or absence of causation determined whether there was a taking.65

61. There was no evidence that Ms. Dolan's proposed development had encroached on existing greenway space. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321. Had that been the case, the city could have
required her to provide some alternative greenway space, because then she would have caused the
reduction in greenway area.
62. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., The Luxembourg Group, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 887 P.2d 446, 448 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1995) (a "dedication requirement [that] would not remedy any problem caused by
the ... subdivision ... requiring [the subdivider] to dedicate property ... amounts to an unconstitutional taking"); Castle Homes & Dev. v. Brier City, 882 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Wash. Ct. App.
1994) (holding a fee exaction invalid when the city did not show that the fee would pay for improvements necessary "as a direct result of the proposed development").
64. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(no taking when fees are "directly necessitated by the needs created by the new development");
J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clarksman County, 887 P.2d 360, 365 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (construction of
improvements); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (development
fee).
65. The causation issue can also work to deny a property owner just compensation if the
court concludes that any harm suffered by the property owner has not been caused by government
action. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 877 F. Supp. 628, 631 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (finding no taking
when government was only an indirect cause of the reduction in the amount of retired pay that an
individual could retain after his divorce); Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 911
(Cal. 1995) (finding no taking when government did not cause an armed felon attempting to avoid
capture to enter a property owner's store); Department of Transp. v. Hewett Profess'l, 895 P.2d
755, 763 (Or. 1995) (finding no taking when a private party, not the government, demolished a
building).
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What is exhibited in Dolan, in Scalia's dissent in Pennell, and in these
state cases is not a manifestation of Professor Merrill's public goods-positive
externalities model for unconstitutional conditions. Rather, these opinions
demand that government exactions, which take the form of conditions for
government benefits, must be designed to internalize only the negative
externalities generated by property owners. When a negative externality is
created, the harmful effects of property use will be borne by members of society who are "external" to the producer of the harm. For example, a subdivider
who does not construct for a subdivision a sewage treatment facility may harm
homeowners who live downstream of the subdivision. Such externalities are
internalized by requiring their producer, the property owner, to pay for them.
However, if the exaction does more, and requires the property owner to
correct a general social cost not caused by the owner's anticipated property
use (as was the case with Ms. Dolan and the city of Tigard's problem with
flooding), the exaction works as a taking. It is a taking because the exaction
will then have violated the Armstrong anti-discrimination principle that underlies the Takings Clause.'
Thus, Dolan is not an unconstitutional conditions case exemplifying the
public goods model, but a takings case requiring that conditions on property
use internalize only the negative impacts caused by the owner's new use of
the property.
II]. CONCLUSION
Professor Merrill's thesis is a major contribution to the general unconstitutional conditions doctrine. It does not, however, fully explain either the Dolan
decision, or the larger issue of why some exactions imposed on property owners seeking permission to develop property become takings. In these property
rights cases, the proper question is not whether the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine should be enforced, but whether the condition internalizes a negative
externality caused by the property owner's proposed land use. If the problem
addressed by the condition is not a societal cost caused by the new property
use, then the condition is not internalizing an externality produced by the
property owner. Instead, it is forcing the property owner to bear the sole burden of correcting a problem not attributable to the owner. If causation is absent, then the Armstrong anti-discrimination principle is violated, and the
condition becomes an unconstitutional taking.

On the other hand, if a court finds that the government action was the proximate cause of
the property owner's injury, particularly if the injury is in the nature of a physical invasion, then it
is more likely that a taking exists. See, e.g., State v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 738 (Alaska 1987)
(inverse condemnation when property diminished in value because of state's action); Hoover v.
Pierce County, 903 P.2d 464, 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (county's actions caused taking when

county construction funneled water onto private property).
66. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.

THE MEEK SHALL INHERIT THE EARTH:

A POWER-BASED THEORY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS ON RELIGION
JANE RUTHERFORD*

My mother used to tell me that it was easier to catch flies with honey
than with vinegar. The government long ago learned that lesson. It often tries
to influence behavior by offering benefits in exchange for the desired conduct.
Depending on the desired outcome, the Court variously describes these transactions as penalties,' subsidies,2 or non-subsidies.3 The way we describe
these practices carries persuasive force,4 so more vividly we might call these
deals threats, bribes, or offers. Some dispute exists over whether the unconstitutional conditions doctrine governs the allocation of benefits or burdens.'
However, benefits and burdens are merely different ways of describing the
same thing. Relieving a burden is a form of a benefit. Similarly, creating
benefits for one class necessarily creates burdens for others.
The practice becomes problematic when the government uses conditions
to divest constitutional rights. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds
that the government cannot make an individual choose between getting a state
conferred benefit and giving up a constitutional right. For example, individuals
qualified for unemployment compensation may not be forced to choose between unemployment benefits and the free exercise of their religion.6

* Associate Professor of Law at DePaul University College of Law. A.B., University of
Chicago, 1972; J.D., University of Michigan, 1975. I am grateful to Timothy O'Neill, Pamela
Karlan, and Martha Minow for their invaluable comments. I am also grateful for the research
assistance of Shery Buske, Vanessa Greenwood, and Lucia Flores.
1. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (holding that prohibiting a minister from elective office penalizes him for his religious vocation).
2. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (holding that state funded special education teachers in parochial schools subsidized religion).
3. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the refusal to permit Medicaid funds to be used for medically necessary abortions did not place obstacles in a woman's path
to exercise her rights of free choice, but merely refused to subsidize such a choice); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that the state could encourage women to choose not to have elective
abortions by refusing to subsidize them).
4. For a discussion on the impact of the choice of such terms, see generally Peter Westen,
"Freedom" and "Coercion"-VirtueWords and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE LJ. 541.
5. This distinction drives the debate over the use of the doctrine in the Takings Clause. See
Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); see also Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. CL 2309, 2317 (1994).
6. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). But see Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a state could condition unemployment benefits on complying with a criminal statute that prohibited peyote use even
in Native American religious ceremonies).
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Expressed in that form, the doctrine seems to focus on the issue of coercion. It may be tempting to simplify the definition of coercion to limit it to
force that leaves the victim with no choice at all. Such a narrow definition of
coercion fails to account for the real world of constrained choices. Contrary to
the classic liberal view of individuals as purely autonomous actors, most individuals have circumscribed power to exercise autonomy. As Professor Kathryn
Abrams explains, individuals possess partial agency in which actors can exert
some control, but are subject to limiting pressures.' This notion of partial
coercion recognizes the individual actor's choices, but also accounts for societal pressure to choose.
Some choices are more constrained than others. For example, public housing residents who must choose between homelessness and waiving their Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches are more constrained
than government contractors who agree to plant inspections. 8 Therefore, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions also recognizes the problem of undue
influence. Individuals can be pressured to relinquish constitutionally protected
freedoms with both penalties and benefits.
Some scholars like William Marshall and Cass Sunstein have suggested
that we don't really need to debate the nature of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.9 Marshall argues that the analysis collapses into a discussion of
the particular constitutional right impinged. For instance, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the context of religion boils down to whether the
government has violated either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment
Clause. That view is bolstered by the Supreme Court's decision in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia"° which overturned financial benefits conditioned on non-religious speech without mentioning the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Although the final result in unconstitutional conditions cases ultimately
may turn on the constitutionality of the underlying conduct, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions highlights three distinct elements of the debate.
First, it establishes the rule that the government cannot achieve indirectly what
it is forbidden to do directly." Thus, it refutes the argument that the greater

7. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 353 (1995) (arguing for a theory of partial agency in which women are
seen as oppressed, but still capable of making limited choices).
8. For a discussion of unconstitutional conditions in the context of public housing, see
William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains,Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 553 (1992); Jason S. Thaler, Note, Public Housing Consent Clauses: UnconstitutionalCondition or ConstitutionalNecessity?, 63 FoRIIAM L. REV. 1777 (1995); Steven Yarosh, Comment,
Operation Clean Sweep: Is the Chicago Housing Authority "Sweeping" Away the FourthAmendment?, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1103 (1992).
9. See William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of UnconstitutionalConditions:
The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with ParticularReference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).

10. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995)
11. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 619 (1918) ("The fact that the law does not
directly prohibit religious exercise but merely conditions eligibility for office on its abandonment

does not alter the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause."). But see South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that the federal government can indirectly regulate the
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power to dismantle the benefit program altogether includes the lesser power to
retract a benefit unless a constitutional right is relinquished. 2 Second, the
doctrine shifts the focus from individual entitlements to structural limits on
power.' 3 Third, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions introduces the notion that the government can intrude on a constitutional right without completely violating the right. Thus, it creates a sliding scale so that the more the
government infringes on the right, the more justification it needs. 4
When viewed through the lens of individual rights, unconstitutional conditions doctrine lends little to the basic constitutional analysis that would be
applied anyway. Once the Court has acknowledged that states cannot do indirectly what they are prohibited from doing directly, the only issue that remains
is whether the burden on the constitutional right amounts to a violation, and
whether it is justified by the appropriate level of scrutiny.
From a more structural perspective, however, it matters a great deal. It is
precisely because the state has far more power in the regulatory welfare state
than anticipated at the time of the founding, that we must be more concerned
with use of that unforeseen power. Therefore, one eminent scholar has argued
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should focus on limiting power."
As Kathleen Sullivan suggests, when the government places conditions on
benefits, it affects various balances of power. First, by getting individuals to
relinquish their rights, unconstitutional conditions augment government power
over individuals in general. Second, such conditions may affect the balance of
power between individuals. Those who gain benefits may have a competitive
advantage over those who are denied benefits.' 6 Third, the allocation of benefits may change how individuals relate to intermediate institutions like the
church. For example, granting religious institutions an exemption from employment discrimination laws gives religions more power to discriminate than
other employers and gives them more power over their employees. 7
drinking age by conditioning highway funding on compliance with an elevated age for drinking).
12. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is often described as the greatest proponent of this formalistic argument that the greater power to create a benefit or an institution includes the lesser
power to place conditions on it. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 597; Charles R. Bogle, Note,
"Unconscionable" Conditions: A ContractualAnalysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 193, 197 n.14 (1994). For a more complete discussion of the argument
that the greater includes the lesser, see generally Robert Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
ConstitutionalRights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the
Argument that the GreaterIncludes the Lesser, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227. Compare Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) (endorsing the greater includes
the lesser argument to uphold a statute that prohibited advertizing of casinos) with Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (rejecting the argument in a takings case).
13. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv.
1413 (1989).
14. See, e.g, Epstein, supra note 5 (arguing that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
most imperative when the risk of serious abuse is greatest).
15. See generally Sullivan, supra note 13.
16. For example, merchants whose religious practices coincide with Sunday closing laws are
permitted to keep their businesses open six days a week and still comply with their sabbath requirements. These merchants get a competitive advantage over Jewish merchants who cannot open
their stores on Saturday because of religious restrictions and are prohibited from opening their
stores on Sundays because of Sunday closing laws. This argument was rejected in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
17. See Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483
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My thesis is that whether a governmentally imposed condition is constitutional depends on the relative power of the individuals or groups affected by
the condition. Because the greatest risks arise from the largest power disparities, the more a condition entrenches or expands power disparities, the more
likely it is to be unconstitutional. 8 Such a sliding scale for unconstitutional
conditions helps avoid the formal and arguably false dichotomy between strict
scrutiny and the rational basis test. Because the sliding scale is based on some
measurement of relative power, we need to define power.
Power means "possession of control, authority, or influence over others."' 9 This definition includes two different kinds of power: (1) power
"over" people or things, a source of control or dominance; and (2) power "to"
do things, a source of energy or cooperative strength. 2' The famous sociologist Max Weber defined power solely in terms of hierarchial force. 2' Political
scientist Robert Dahl defined power a little more broadly to include the possibility of influence as well as control. 22 Coercive power "over" others is nec-

U.S. 327 (1987). In Amos, the church had fired a custodian who worked at a gymnasium because
he was not a Mormon. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Title VII exception that permits churches to discriminate on the basis of religion. The Court failed to focus on how that decision would affect individuals meant to be protected by Title VII. In a state like Utah, where the
church controls many of the available jobs, permitting such discrimination may seriously limit the
job prospects of non-Mormons. The Court never even considered whether the exception violated
the Equal Protection Clause. As a result, the Court lends state power to encourage individuals to
join the Mormon Church.
Although Amos is a troubling case, it does not raise the specter of dual discrimination. The
custodian only complained of religious discrimination. In contrast, some employment discrimination claimants complain of age, disability, sex, or race discrimination. See, e.g., Young v. Northern
Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 3201
(1994) (race and sex discrimination); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929
F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (age and sex discrimination). It is more reasonable to accommodate
religion by permitting it to prefer members of its own denomination, than to permit it to discriminate against members of its own denomination on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability.
18. For a similar argument, see Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV.
1 (1992) (arguing that government actions that entrench or expand power disparities violate due
process, while those that improve the balance of power provide due process).
19. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 922 (1984). For a similar comparative
definition of power, see Rutherford, supra note 18, at 78.
20. For discussions of the difference between the power "to" and power "over," see MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: ON WOMEN, MEN, AND MORALs 505 (1985); STEVEN LuKES,
POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 28-31 (1974); Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist Deconstruction, 33 B.C. L. REV. 481, 491 (1992) [hereinafter Crain, Images]; Marion Crain,
Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819, 1874 (1991); Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741, 773 (1994); Lynne Henderson, Getting to
Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 53 n.66 (1993); Linda
K. Kerber, A ConstitutionalRight to be Treated Like... Ladies: Women, Civic Obligation, and
Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 107 n.37 (1993); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, I Am.U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 28 (1993);
Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48 (1988).
21. "In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in
the action." 2 MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 926 (1968).
22. "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do." Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, in 2 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 201 (1957),
reprinted in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 79, 81 (Roderick Bell et
al.eds., 1969). For descriptions of the pluralist approach to political power, see Nelson W.
Polsby, How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative, 22 J.POL. 474 (1960), reprinted in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra, at 123.
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essarily hierarchial. Powerful individuals have the capacity to compel obedience of those below them in the social order. The liberal tradition sees power
as hierarchical and therefore emphasizes individual rights as necessary to
secure liberty defined in terms of autonomy.
Power need not be rooted in compulsion, however. It may also arise from
the ability to persuade others to act in concert for a common goal." As the
famous scholar Hannah Arendt noted, power
corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert.
Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group
and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together.
When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to
empowered by a certain number of people to act in their
his being
24
name.
This cooperative power "to" accomplish things reflects a civic republican
tradition that finds freedom through participation in a community in which the
public good is more important than individual interests.' Both traditions are
embedded in American constitutional history.26
The power to dominate may also arise from control of scarce resources.
Those who control rare goods can extract concessions from those who need
the resources. Dominance power is inherently hierarchial. Some necessarily
have more power than others. In contrast, cooperative power need not be
hierarchial. The power arises from the shared efforts of a group. It is the relationship between members of the group that creates the power. Those who
exercise the most power "over" others sit at the top of a pyramid. Those who
exercise the most power "to" get cooperation sit in the middle of a web con-

23. See
24.

DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES AND USES 21 (1979).
HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 48 (1970), quoted in LUKES, supra note 20, at 28.

25. For a discussion of the difference between power "to" and power "over," see supra note
20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of civic republicanism, see Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianismand the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379 (1991); Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MiCH. L. REv. 983 (1990); Frank I. Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539 (1988).
26. The liberal tradition emerges from John Locke's political philosophy that conceives of
liberty as an individual right to life and property secured from others by government. JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698). This
philosophy influenced the federalists who wrote the original Constitution and viewed the document as merely setting limits on government power. See Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION
IN AMERICA 9 (1955). In contrast, the civic republican tradition traces its roots to Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Aristotle who sought to define communal public virtue through participation in
government HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTi-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981). Republican
political theory influenced the anti-federalists who insisted that the original Constitution be amended with a bill of rights. See generally JOHN G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY (1971). For a description of these two traditions, cast
as "negative" and "positive" rights, see IsAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). For
analyses of the civic republican viewpoint, see Hirshman, supra note 25; Michelman, supra note
25; Sunstein, supra note 25.
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nected to many others.27 Because many webs can be interconnected, many
different individuals may share power in complex ways.
Sometimes these various kinds of power can be exchanged. Thus, those
who have cooperative power may be able to organize well to generate funding.
Funding, a scarce resource, enables them to exercise hierarchical power as
well. Similarly, those with hierarchical power may be able to use their scarce
resources to purchase the cooperative skills of an organizer. Both hierarchical
power and cooperative power are themselves scarce resources.
Therefore, power is a relative term. The definition of "power" establishes
a comparison. Some have more power to either dominate or to persuade others. For example, a religious institution might be fairly small and powerless
vis-A-vis the government, but quite powerful over an employee or a religious
adherent. Similarly, various individuals or groups hold differing amounts of financial and political power in particular contexts. In evaluating a particular
bargain the government offers to an individual or group, we need to evaluate
the relative power of those involved-those who are offered the condition,
those who sought to create the condition, and the government itself. Generally,
however, the government wields the most power because of its access to tax
dollars to fund benefits programs and its regulatory authority to control the
behavior of both individuals and institutions.
Religions also may be very powerful. They can offer both moral authority
and a committed block of voters to augment the power of government. The
government has enormous hierarchical power backed by resources of tax dollars and law enforcement. Therefore, we should be concerned about the combined power of church and state. When religion and government act in concert
either to benefit religion or to disadvantage a competitor, they jointly wield
considerable power.
Indeed, we favor religious pluralism to avoid the combined power of
church and state. That principle acknowledges the power of the church as well
as the power of the state. Because both governments and religions can be
powerful, we need both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses. The
Establishment Clause helps avoid the combined power of church and state,2"
while the Free Exercise Clause limits the power of the church by dividing that
power into many sources,29 and assuring individuals the right to follow their
consciences.
Literally, the Establishment Clause directs that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion . .,3 The founders feared an es-

27. Crain, Images, supra note 20, at 511. For a fuller development of these contrasting
views, see CAROL GILUGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S

DEVELOPMENT (1982).
28. William P. Marshall, The Inequality of Anti-Establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 6871.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Cf Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766,
774-75 (D. Ariz. 1963) ("[L]ack of violation of the 'establishment clause' does not ipso facto
preclude violation of the 'free exercise clause.' For the former looks to the majority's concept of
the term religion, the latter the minority's.").
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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tablished church for three reasons: (1) it would be corrupted by government; a' (2) it would repress competing views;32 and (3) it would promote
sectarian violence.13 Madison's solution was to limit religious power by creating a structure designed to encourage a multitude of sects.3 ' Hence, Madison
favored religious liberty, in part, because it helped balance power.
Thomas Jefferson seemed to espouse Roger William's view that the
church could be corrupted by interacting with government, noting that individuals could be "brib[ed] with a monopoly of worldly honours and emoluments. ' , 3' However, he thought the problem was limited to an established
church like the Church of England. The framers did not foresee the
development of the modern welfare state in which the government is a major
source of goods and benefits. Consequently, few structural limits were placed
in the Constitution to restrict the abuse of such power outside the context of
an established church.
This combination of church and state power is particularly ominous when
it targets a disfavored group. For our purposes, a disfavored group is one that
shares immutable qualities, was historically discriminated against, and has
diminished political clout.3 6 Some currently disfavored groups include
minority religions, Native Americans, racial groups, women, the disabled, and
the aged. When the combined power of church and state is amassed against a
disfavored group, the conditions imposed must be subject to the strictest
scrutiny. For example, the exemptions given to religious institutions for
employment discrimination are highly suspect.3

31. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
No. 7 (1785), in ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 104 (1990) ("[E]cclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and
efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation."). Madison may have been influenced by
Roger Williams who argued that the separation of church and state is a means of protecting religion from the corruption of the government. See GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND

AMERCAN POLITICS 341-53 (1990); Marshall, supra note 28, at 68.
32. Hence, Thomas Jefferson opposed the Virginia bill to establish religious teachers in part
because it "assumed dominion over the faith of others... and . ..destroys religious liberty."
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785), in ADAMS & EMMERICH,
supra note 31, at 110.
33. For example, Madison wrote: "Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by
vain attempts of the secular arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in
Religious opinion." James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
No. 11 (1785), in ADAMs & EMMERICH, supra note 31, at 108.
34. "A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but
the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against
any danger from that source." THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious
rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the
multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of
interests and sects.
Id. No. 51, at 324 (James Madison).
35. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785), in ADAMs &
EMMERICH, supra note 31, at 111.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
37. For discussions of the problem of religious institutions that discriminate in employment,
see Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of
Discriminationby Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514 (1979); Joanne C. Brant,
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The combined power of church and state also raises Establishment Clause
concerns even when those affected are not members of disfavored groups. For
instance, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,"
establishment problems arose because a state university forced students who
did not share the religious perspective of a Christian group to pay to publish
the avowedly Christian texts. Objecting students may not be part of any
disfavored minority, and because they are a diffuse population with no
common cohesive group, they may have had difficulty organizing. In this
sense, these students had relatively little cooperative power available compared
to the well-organized Christian group.
So far we have been looking at conditions that might offend the
Establishment Clause. Sometimes, free exercise concerns cause us to worry
about the exercise of government power as well. It is especially troubling
when those excluded from benefits on the basis of the religion clauses are also
members of other groups with a history of discrimination. For example, in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,39 the Court
held that Native Americans could be denied unemployment benefits when they
were fired for sacramental use of peyote. This case is troubling not only
because a government benefit was conditioned on the surrender of a free
exercise right, but also because the targeted religion was one well outside the
mainstream.
Indeed, Native Americans often lose religion clause cases.' Tribes may
be less powerful for several reasons. First, although individual tribes may
constitute cohesive groups with common goals, Native Americans have
different religious views and perspectives. Thus, the degree of cooperative
power is somewhat minimized. Moreover, Native Americans lack access to
some of the resources that would help them use their cooperative skills.
Because they are near the bottom of the economic scale, they have difficulty
fund-raising from their ranks. Hence, they lack the kind of hierarchial power
that some other faiths have acquired. Religions more familiar to the ruling
classes are more likely to be protected both because their religious views are
more easily recognized and because the religious adherents have more access
to hierarchial power.4

"Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275 (1994); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of the Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions:
The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987); Jane Rutherford, Equality
as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Law to
Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming January 1996).
38. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
39. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
40. See, e.g., id. (permitting a state to interfere with Native American sacred ceremonies
involving peyote); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(permitting the federal government to build a road through territory sacred to Native Americans);
see also Kristen L. Boyles, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed Amendment to the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1117 (1991); Colloquy, The Native American
Struggle: Conquering the Rule of Law, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 199 (1993).
41. Kenneth L. Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections on Lukumi, 69
TUL. L. REv. 335, 359 (1994).
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By concentrating on individual free exercise questions, rather than the
larger issue of the balance of power between a marginalized faith and the
state, the Court missed one of the central purposes of the religion clauses: to
disperse power. Hence, Smith was decided on the wrong grounds. The Court
should have been concerned about whether the government was using its
superior power to place Native American religious adherents at a disadvantage.
Other individuals had been permitted to collect unemployment insurance
claims when they lost jobs because of compliance with religious duties.4'
Similarly, during prohibition, Christians and Jews were permitted sacramental
use of wine.43
Thus, the question in Smith should have been whether the law treated
substance abuse in Native American religions (sacramental peyote use)
differently than substance abuse in mainstream Christian religions (sacramental
alcohol consumption by minors)." Viewed as a targeting case, Smith would
have come out the other way. Under my power-based analysis, these cases
raise more concerns because Native Americans share inborn immutable traits,
are relatively powerless, and share a history of discrimination. By concentrating on the balance of power, we avoid the fruitless debate over the level of
scrutiny applied and recast the dialogue in more principled terms.
Most constitutional rights protect individuals. The dialogue on
unconstitutional conditions focuses on the deals government offers individuals.
As a result, the doctrine tends to concentrate on issues of coercion. However,
constitutional rights also have a communal element as well.45 They are
designed as part of a structure that limits government power for the common
good. For purposes of limiting power, whether a particular individual is
coerced may be less important than how the transaction affects the balance of
power.' When individuals relinquish their rights, the rights are asserted less
frequently, and the value of the rights in general diminishes for all of us.
The founders designed the Constitution to limit power by dividing it
among different power bases. Hence, they balanced state and national power
by creating a complex federal system,47 and divided national power among
the branches of government.' Similarly, the framers were concerned with
limiting government power over religion and religious power over government.
The First Amendment was designed to constrain the power of government to
limit religious freedom or to establish religion.49

42. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a Seventh Day Adventist could
not be denied unemployment benefits for refusing to be available to work on Saturdays).
43. Smith, 494 U.S. at 913 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. See Karst, supra note 41.
45. See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1990).
46. See Sullivan, supra note 13.
47.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).

48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1; THE
FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although this rule originally was meant to apply to federal
government, some of the framers already were engaged in opposing state establishments of
religion. For example, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson actively opposed a bill to use state
funds to hire religious teachers in Virginia. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 31. By the time that the
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The modem doctrine of unconstitutional conditions confines the power to
manipulate government benefits. When we think of unconstitutional conditions
in the context of religion, we tend to think of the unemployment compensation
cases, 50 or limits on government funding of religious enterprises." In these
cases, the government is allocating a benefit and conditioning it in ways that
may intrude on the free exercise of religion. Thus far, the analysis is much
like that of any other unconstitutional conditions case. In the case of religion,
however, the Establishment Clause may present a further constraint. If the
government refuses the benefit, it may intrude on free exercise, or discriminate
against religion. If the government provides the benefit, it may subsidize
religion and violate the Establishment Clause. Generally, the unconstitutional
conditions cases have ruled that the government is free to choose what to
subsidize, but that it cannot penalize a constitutional right. As the
welfare/regulatory state grows, the tension between the religion clauses
expands.52 The religion clauses are interesting because the tension between
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause seems to
constitutionalize the distinction between penalties and non-subsidies.
Under the Free Exercise Clause it may be unconstitutional to penalize
religious activity." Under the Establishment Clause, it may be

Fourteenth Amendment was adopted after the Civil War, virtually all states had disestablished any
state churches. In 1947, the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause was incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947). Hence, the strictures of the Establishment Clause now apply to both the state and federal
governments.
50. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
51. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
52. See Karst,supra note 41.
53. The Court's standard for free exercise violations has vacillated between deference to
religion and deference to state regulation. Hence, a few cases claim to apply strict scrutiny to
government rules or conditions that interfere with the free exercise of religion, requiring a
compelling state interest to justify the rules. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vetoer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(applying strict scrutiny to invalidate an unemployment statute). However, the compelling interest
test has never been as strict as that applied in the equal protection cases, nor has it been applied as
uniformly.
More recent cases have deferred to state regulations of religion, applying a "neutrality" test.
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993); Board of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). In these cases, the Court held that
government should act neutrally toward religion, creating general rules not designed to benefit or
burden particular faiths. Neutrality can be a troublesome concept. In one sense, no "neutral"
position exists. All laws necessarily either apply to or exempt religion. Hence, neutrality in that
sense is impossible. The Court defines neutral rules to be: (1) generally applicable, and (2) not
targeted at particular faiths. In Smith, the Court veered so far toward neutrality that it seemingly
overruled the compelling state interest test altogether. There, the Court ruled that Native American
free exercise rights could not protect believers from a "valid neutral law of general applicability"
that prohibited the use of peyote even for sacramental purposes. Few free exercise claims could
survive this test. In order to meet it, a claimant would have to demonstrate that the government
intended to target a given religion. Consequently, Smith swung the pendulum away from deference
to religious authority, back toward government neutrality to religion.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993),
restored the compelling state interest test. It remains unclear, however, how stringently the
compelling interest test will be applied. RFRA may merely reinstate the weak form of the test
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unconstitutional to subsidize religion. 4 Arguably, therefore, it is only
constitutional to impose a condition if it is neither a penalty nor a subsidy.
Because most conditions can be construed to be one or both, we would expect
almost all conditions that affect religions to be unconstitutional. In fact,
however, the cases are divided and apparently inconsistent."s The problem is
that we cannot coherently distinguish a penalty from a non-subsidy.56
Consequently, the cases seem in disarray.
The same conduct can be considered either a penalty, or a refusal to
subsidize. For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University
of Virginia,57 the issue was whether a state university must provide student
activity fees for a religious publication. The petitioner argued that providing
such fees to other publications that discuss the same issues from a secular
perspective, but denying them to a religious publication, amounts to a penalty
for a religious viewpoint. In contrast, the respondent argued that funding
student activities is a direct state subsidy that would violate the Establishment
Clause if provided to a religious group. Merely changing the formal label from
"penalty" to "subsidy" does not help decide which bargains offend the Constitution.
Individuals denied a subsidy that everyone else receives are penalized.
The Free Exercise Clause suggests that the government should not be able to
use its power to exclude religious individuals from benefits available to all
others. Thus, Rosenberger is consistent with prior cases that prohibited
conditions that discriminated on the basis of religion. For example, in
McDaniel v. Paty,6 the Court held that a state could not exclude members of
the clergy from the opportunity to hold political office. Arguably, the plaintiff
was not precluded from running for office because he had a "choice" to be
either a candidate or a member of the clergy. The Court rejected the idea that

used by courts prior to Smith. The Supreme Court seems to continue to support the neutrality
principle of Smith and cites it approvingly in dicta in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye and more
openly in Grumet. Even under the neutrality principle of Smith, it still would be unconstitutional

to penalize a free exercise right under some circumstances.
54. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (special education teachers in
sectarian schools amount to a subsidy); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (buses for
fieldtrips are an unconstitutional subsidy); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (maps, charts,
and special education teachers supplied to parochial schools are unconstitutional subsidies). But
see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (student activity

fees for a religious magazine is not a subsidy); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(buses for transportation to sectarian schools are not an unconstitutional subsidy).
55. Compare School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (special education teachers in
sectarian schools amount to a subsidy) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (buses for
fieldtrips are an unconstitutional subsidy) and Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (maps,
charts, and special education teachers supplied to parochial schools is an unconstitutional subsidy)

with Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (permitting a sign language
interpreter in a parochial school) and Muller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (permitting tax
deductions for parochial school tuition) and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(permitting school buses to transport children to and from parochial schools).
56. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271
(1990); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); Sullivan, supra note 13.
57. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).

58.

435 U.S. 618 (1978).
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a government could condition political office on relinquishing the
constitutional right to freely exercise religion as a member of the clergy.
Although McDaniel v. Paty seems a particularly strong case both because the
right to hold office was constitutionally guaranteed, and because it did not
involve the payment of state funds, the Court has extended the reasoning of
McDaniel to other government financial benefits that are not constitutionally
mandated. For instance, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for
the Blind, 9 the Court held that a state program for the benefit of the blind
could not be denied to an individual studying to become a minister. Therefore,
it would seem that the government cannot condition a state benefit on
surrendering free exercise rights.
However, the Court has not applied this standard consistently. The aid to
parochial school cases serve as prime examples. These cases vary dramatically
and seem to turn on nearly impossible distinctions. For example, in three cases
the Court held that the state could provide benefits including vocational
help, 6' sign language interpreters, 6 or diagnostic speech and language
tests62 to handicapped students enrolled in religious schools. In three other
cases, the Court denied benefits for special education students including maps,
charts, tape recorders,63 or special education teachers' in parochial schools.
Similarly, in one case the Court held that the state could finance bus transportation for parochial students to and from school,' while in another it held
that the state could not finance buses for field trips.'
Part of the problem in these cases is the tension between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. One view of parochial aid sees
it as a benefit conditioned on waiving religious education, much like Witters.
That creates a free exercise issue. Refusing to provide aid to religious
education penalizes those who choose it. They have to pay twice, once for
public schools they don't use, and again for parochial schools. Others view aid
to sectarian schools as a subsidy that allows religions to divert funds they
otherwise would spend on education to other religious purposes. That creates
an Establishment Clause issue. Those who view the aid as a subsidy note that
religious children have the same right to a free education as everyone else. As
a number of scholars have suggested, no principled analysis can distinguish
between penalties and subsidies, 6 so there is no coherent way to decide
which conditions on religion are permissible.
The hard cases involve aid for sectarian education of disabled students.
Although the facile answer would distinguish this group from more suspect
classes by noting that they do not currently merit strict scrutiny,' they are

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
Bandes, supra note 56; Kreimer, supra note 56; Sullivan, supra note 13.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that
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doubly disadvantaged when they are excluded from services unless they forfeit
their religious options.' They are excluded because their handicap requires
expensive assistance not available to unsubsidized parochial schools. Hence,
they are excluded both on the basis of ability to pay and on the basis of
handicap.
Consider, for example, the Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet, ° where the issue was whether a community of
Orthodox Jews called the Satmar could create their own public school district
for their special education students. Satmar children were eligible to attend
special education classes in existing public school districts and some Satmar
children had attended these schools. Those children had been ostracized. Most
Satmar children attended private, religiously affiliated, sex segregated schools,
but those schools did not offer help for children with special needs.
The Court did not treat the case as one involving unconstitutional
conditions. The town of Kiryas Joel, the boundaries of which had been drawn
to include only Satmars, went to the New York legislature and negotiated for
their own school district. The issue seemed a straightforward question of
establishment. Could a religious community create and control a political
subdivision of the state, in this instance a school district, in order to avoid
being included in a more diverse school district? The question centered around
the delegation of government authority to a religious group. However, the case
could be construed as an unconstitutional conditions case. The original state
statute implicitly conditioned state funding for special education on religious
integration.
At first glance, it seems like the least powerful in this situation are the
disabled Satmar children. If they attend the public schools available to them,
they are likely to be isolated and harassed both for their disabilities and their
religious minority status. For small children, it would be difficult enough to
dress differently and have different dietary habits and rules about social
interactions, without also having to struggle with intolerance for handicaps."
Justice Stevens' response is to stress that it is the duty of the public
schools to protect students from such harassment.72 Although Justice Stevens
may be overly optimistic about the ability of the public schools to control
student ostracism, he makes an important point. His view is remarkedly
consistent with civic republican ideals that stress the duty of the polity to
inculcate public virtues like tolerance and inclusion. According to this view,
the presence of the Satmar children in public schools offers a benefit to all
children from all the relevant communities. They provide the opportunity for
practical lessons about tolerance and multi-culturalism.

disability did not trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
69. For a fuller discussion of this problem of double exclusion on the basis of being both a
disfavored class and a religious minority, see Rutherford, supra note 37; see also Martha Minow,
Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, 28 OSGOODE HALL U. 409 (1990).
70. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
71. For an excellent description of the Satmar perspective, see Martha Minow, The
Constitution and the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. U. (forthcoming Winter 1995).
72. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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In almost any context children have the least power, but they may be
protected by their parents and their communities. In contrast to the Satmar
children, their parents and the community seem much more powerful. The
community is relatively wealthy because it is largely composed of diamond
merchants and importers. 3 The community is also well-organized and
politically connected enough to get the law changed in their favor.74 The fact
that the Satmars had been able to create their own municipality is evidence of
their cooperative power and access to political clout. Other similarly situated
religious groups may have found it far more difficult to do the same.75 As a
result, the statute enabling the Satmars to create their school looks like special
interest legislation.
The question of whether to focus on the children or their parents in
religious disputes over education previously was addressed in Wisconsin v.
Yoder. 76 There, the issue was whether the Amish should be required to stay
in school until the age of sixteen. The majority held that Wisconsin had to
grant a free exercise exemption to the Amish from the mandatory attendance
rule. In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the Court should focus on the
impact on the children, rather than the parents' religious preferences.77
Yoder is different from Grumet, however. In Yoder, Douglas was arguing
for including the children in a wider world than their own: "[T]he child will
be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of
diversity...78 In Grumet, those who focus on the children are arguing for
excluding them from the perspectives of the broader world.79 The Satmar
children who are educated in their own public school district are not only
segregated from other cultural, religious, and racial groups, they are also
effectively segregated from other Satmar children who do not require special
education, since virtually all the other children attend private sectarian schools.
In Yoder, the Court sustained the Amish community's right to keep itself
separate from the mainstream culture, but the separation was maintained
without government participation or financial support. In contrast, in Grumet,
the Court refused to let the Satmar community use public schools to enforce
its isolation. Thus, one of the crucial differences is that Yoder was not even
implicitly an unconstitutional conditions case. Grumet involved a state benefit
at least implicitly conditioned on integration.
Because the parents in Yoder were not receiving a state benefit, the case
more clearly involves coercion. They were forced to send their children to

73. See Minow, supra note 71.
74. The Satmar were not only able to create their own municipality and school district, they
were able to convince the New York legislature to amend the statute to try to comply with the
Supreme Court opinion in Grumet. Id.
75. Professor Kenneth Karst has suggested that some religious groups like Catholics and
Jews that previously had diminished political power have gradually acquired legislative clout,
while other groups such as the Krishnas, Seventh Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses still
must rely on courts instead of legislatures to protect their interests. Karst, supra note 41, at 353.
76. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
77. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 245.
78. Id.
79. See Minow, supra note 71.
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high school under threat of criminal prosecution. Unlike the forced integration
of Yoder, the Satmar were free to send their children either to separate
parochial schools, or integrated public schools. The Satmar parents either did
not want to pay the cost of segregated special education for their children, or
were unable to do so.
Consequently, if we measure the balance of power in terms of disadvantage, it is difficult to distinguish merely poor children who cannot afford
parochial school, from middle class disabled children who cannot afford such
schools if they have to pay for enabling services. One distinction is that
poverty is not an immutable characteristic. However, it is certainly beyond the
power of the children to change. Although the Court never has held that
poverty triggers strict scrutiny, it has ruled that the government cannot impose
burdens on indigents that preclude them from exercising fundamental rights. 0
In ruling on the aid to parochial education, the Court rarely discusses the
fact that the refusal to fund sectarian schools most adversely affects poor and
disabled children. At least six of the Supreme Court cases concerning the
constitutionality of aid to parochial schools involve funding for special needs
students.8" The Court's analysis of these cases often focuses on the form the
benefit takes. If governmental power is delegated to a religious group, then an
establishment occurs, as in Grumet."2 If the money is given to the students or
their parents, then religion is not subsidized." If the government pays the
printer rather than the religious entity for the religious tracts, then it is not a
subsidy. 4 If, however, the state skips the families or suppliers as intermediaries, then it is likely to be an illegal subsidy." Moreover, the government

80. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that the state could not
prevent indigents from marrying by imposing a burden on the right to marry); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (exempting indigents from filing fees in divorce cases where the
fee would prevent the poor from getting access to court); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (holding that states could not impose residency requirements on welfare recipients that
would burden the fundamental right of indigents to travel).
Professor Lynn Baker relies on these cases to argue that, despite the formalistic rhetoric
about penalties and subsidies, the Court only invalidates conditions imposed on those at or below
subsistence level incomes to raise the price of fundamental rights beyond their reach. Lynn A.
Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990). Unfortunately, the Court does not invalidate all such financial
burdens. For example, the Court has been willing to let impoverished women be priced out of the
market for their fundamental right to abort. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Recently, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine only seems to protect
the relatively wealthy from regulatory takings of their property. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114
S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
81. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (permitting a sign
language interpreter in a parochial school); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (holding that state funded
special education teachers in parochial schools subsidized religion); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (maps, charts, and special education teachers
supplied to parochial schools are unconstitutional subsidies); Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402
(1974).
82. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
83. See Muller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a state tax deduction for tuition at
parochial schools).
84. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
85. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that direct aid to parochial
schools violates the Establishment Clause).
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cannot condition the money on being used in secular settings." This formal
set of distinctions makes little sense. The real issue ought to turn on who is
excluded and why.
Once government decides to spend money on education, it must either
make it available to religious schools or not. It has only three choices: (1)
spend it solely on religious education; (2) spend it solely on secular public
education; or (3) spend it on both. All three choices significantly impact both
religious education and public schools. The first choice is precluded by the
Establishment Clause that prevents the government from preferring religion to
non-religion.87 The second choice seems to be permissible, but raises the cost
of religious education. The third choice remains controversial, but arguably
constitutional."8
Aid to religious schools seems to treat different religions and secular
interests equally, but it ultimately may decrease diversity in ways that are most
costly to the least powerful. If sufficient numbers of average and above
average students leave the public schools to attend religious schools that can
be more selective, only those students at greatest academic risk remain.
Because these students are more expensive to educate, they need to be
included in schools that can partially pay for their costs with the savings from
educating more easily educated students. Moreover, as the public schools
decline in quality, the pressure on secular students to select a religious school
in order to obtain a quality education mounts.
Once again, either providing a subsidy or denying it will pressure
individuals to act contrary to their religious interests. Subsidized religious
schools pressure secular students, while unsubsidized ones pressure religious
students. In both instances, the costs will be borne by those with the least
financial and academic power.
Religious persecution and governmentally established churches were the
problems of the day at the time the First Amendment was drafted. The same
problems of inclusion and exclusion now get played out in a subtler way. The
current question is not limited to direct persecution or formally established
churches, but also includes the incentives the government creates for
individuals or institutions to modify their religious beliefs or behavior.
Strict separationists might argue that the state should not have any
influence over religion at all. However, where the state allocates substantial
resources, its decision to include or exclude religion necessarily must have an

86. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
87. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating a preference
for religious publications); Toasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating a requirement
that state officials declare a belief in God as imposing religious belief on nonbelievers).
88. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980);
Mark J. Beutler, Public Funding of Sectarian Education and the Free Exercise Clause
Implications 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 7 (1993); Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 28 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 423 (1995); Peter J. Weishaar, School
Choice Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REv. 543 (1994); James B. Egle,
Comment, The ConstitutionalImplications of School Choice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 495.
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impact. A better analysis would look at the particular balance of power that
results from the imposition of the condition.
Consider, for example, Bob Jones University v. United States.' There,
the Internal Revenue Service imposed a condition that in order to receive tax
exempt status, an institution could not racially discriminate. The university
was affiliated with a -fundamentalist Christian faith that believed that AfricanAmericans carried the mark of Cain. As a result, the university prohibited
interracial dating. The IRS denied the university tax exempt status because it
refused to change its dating rules. The Supreme Court upheld the IRS position,
emphasizing that the government had a compelling state interest in eradicating
racial discrimination that outweighed the university's free exercise claims.
Bob Jones seems to be the classic unconstitutional conditions case. Using
the traditional analysis, the tax exemption could be considered a subsidy for
religion. If tax exemptions are viewed as subsidies, then the exemptions may
violate the Establishment Clause. In Walz v. Tax Commission,9° the Court
upheld the constitutionality of tax exemptions without considering whether the
exemption amounted to a subsidy. Instead, the Court relied on the longstanding historical practice of tax exemptions for churches. Professor William
Nelson reads cases like Walz that privilege institutional religion as judicial
attempts to foster equality. According to Nelson, the equality sought in these
cases is defined not in terms of individual entitlement, but rather in terms of
group empowerment. 9' Justice Brennan's concurrence expressly mentions a
multi-cultural purpose, noting that such exemptions "uniquely contribute to the
pluralism of American society. ' This goal of expanding diversity hints at a
power-based analysis. Those subsidies that encourage diversity help to
diminish the power of any single institution and are therefore permissible. This
view is remarkably consistent with Madison's desire to create a multitude of
sects.
If the government had denied the tax exemption in Walz, the religion
could have claimed that it was being penalized for its religious practice.
Accordingly, in Bob Jones, the question of whether the condition penalized
religion remains. The government conditioned a benefit (tax exempt status) on
following a norm inconsistent with a particular faith. That seems like a free
exercise violation. The Court could have ruled, as it later did in Smith, that the
government could create neutral rules of general applicability so long as it did
not purposely target a given religion. Although that narrows the scope of free
exercise claims dramatically, it solves the unconstitutional conditions problem
nicely. A condition is only unconstitutional if the religion can show that it was
purposely targeted for discriminatory treatment. Since that kind of proof is
difficult, most conditions would be permitted.

89. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
90. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
91. William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth Century
ConstitutionalLaws, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (1995).
92. Walz, 397 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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The Court did not take that tack, however. Instead, it held that the
intrusion on free exercise rights was justified because the state's interest in
eliminating racial discrimination was compelling.93 As Professor Marci
Hamilton has suggested, it is dangerous to permit the government to decide
whether religious conduct is more or less compelling than any particular state
interest.9 4 In contrast, a power-based set of norms serves the purpose of
cabining power without judging the relative merits of religious doctrine and
secular goals.
According to my thesis, whether a governmentally imposed condition is
constitutional depends on the relative power of the groups affected. The
condition in Bob Jones is justified because of the need to protect AfricanAmericans from subordination by other more powerful groups. Implicit is the
conclusion that fundamentalist Christians are relatively more powerful than
African-Americans in this context. That view may be supported in three ways.
First, the institutional power the university has over students supports this
assumption. Second, the history of slavery and racial discrimination makes
racial groups particularly susceptible to subordination. Third, religious groups
are by their nature more cohesive, better organized, and less diffuse than racial
groups, and hence, are able to build a nucleus of cooperative power more
easily. If the Court had ruled the other way, it would have selectively
endorsed discrimination by religious institutions. Such a ruling would not only
have given religions greater power to discriminate, it would also have
disadvantaged other disfavored groups by reinforcing subordination. Because
the condition in this context was used to diminish existing power disparities, it
is a constitutional application of the doctrine.
Unlike more recent unconstitutional condition cases where the Court has
held that conditions must be closely related to the government purpose,95 the
Court in Bob Jones seemed completely unconcerned that the condition
imposed was unrelated to the exemption being granted. Nondiscrimination is
not necessarily connected to tax exemptions, except to the extent such
exemptions are granted for diversity purposes. Consequently, the notion that
the condition must be "germane" to the purpose of the regulation or subsidy
never arose.' Although it is always risky to posit why a particular line of
analysis is missing from a case, at least three explanations are possible. First,
the Court may not have thought too much about the need for a sufficient
nexus between the conditions and the purposes served. Second, the Court may
have viewed the need for a nexus as limited to Takings Clause conditions.
There, germaneness may be an instrument to limit state power because

93. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). At least one scholar has
criticized even the compelling state interest test for free exercise claims, arguing that balancing
state interests against religious views is inappropriate. See Marci A. Hamilton, The First
Amendment's Challenge Function and the Confusion in the Supreme Court's Contemporary Free
Exercise Jurisprudence,29 GA. L. REV. 81 (1994). In essence, Hamilton defines free exercise as
completely free from all coercion or influence. Accordingly, even the rules of the Establishment
Clause prohibiting discrimination among religions should not apply to free exercise claims.
94. See Hamilton, supra note 93.
95. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
96. Id.
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diversity issues are less apposite. Third, germaneness may be less relevant
under the religion clauses where the preservation of diversity is a stated goal.
Applying my power-based theory of unconstitutional conditions to religion
does not make Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia97 an easy case. Rosenberger, like Bob Jones, involves conditions
imposed on government largesse (use of student activities fees). Similarly, the
decision to include or exclude religious groups affects the interests of
competing secular groups. Unlike Bob Jones, however, those groups do not
necessarily have any greater claim to protection, other than that provided by
the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, the student fees are mandatory so the
non-Christian students are coerced into supporting faiths they find repugnant.
Moreover, Rosenberger is more problematic because it involves a cash
subsidy, something the Establishment Clause has prohibited for some time. 98
Nevertheless, the fact that Rosenberger involves a cash subsidy is not a
sufficient reason to distinguish Bob Jones. At most, the difference between the
subsidy in Rosenberger and the exemption in Bob Jones is a formal one. The
actual amount of the subsidy is vastly smaller than the value of tax exempt
status for a university.
Among other reasons, subsidies are considered invidious because they
seem to "endorse" religion. However, as Justice O'Connor noted in
Rosenberger, the university attached a disclaimer reading: "Although this
organization has members who are University of Virginia students (faculty)
(employees), the organization is independent of the corporation which is the
University and which is not responsible for organization's contracts, acts, or
omissions."
A subsidy available to all offers few problems of endorsement, but
subsidies are unlikely to be equally available. Only three possibilities exist: (1)
the money will be given equally to all; (2) it will be distributed differentially;
or (3) no money will be available. Under the first scenario, the subsidy will
have diminished impact, because the amounts will be so small. In a world of
finite resources, even division often results in minuscule benefits. If the money
is selectively distributed, the amounts may be more significant but the chance
of discrimination is also greater. Even seemingly neutral rules can be
manipulated. For example, a "first come-first served" rule could be
orchestrated with inside information as to the time and place to apply. If the
information is provided equally to all, then all may apply at once, and the
matter collapses into the first option of a de minimis resource. Finally, in the
third scenario, although all groups are treated equally, no one benefits because
no funds are disbursed.
A more fundamental problem is that subsidies increase the power of
fringe groups, while simultaneously marginalizing larger, less organized
groups like secular individuals. Small cohesive groups can organize

97. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
98. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (invalidating a direct subsidy to
parochial schools).
99. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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efficiently." These groups can increase their power by block voting to
assure more benefits. In contrast, more diffuse groups are less likely to
organize, and, therefore, are less likely to vote as a block or obtain the
subsidy. Hence, a system of subsidized speech is likely to over-represent the
ideas of small cohesive groups in the marketplace of ideas. Often, religious
groups are more cohesive than larger, isolated, and more disorganized groups
of individuals defined by race, gender, disability, or secular views. Thus,
religious institutions may have more cooperative power.
This problem is exacerbated when the small groups have been given other
advantages in the marketplace of ideas. Religions, unlike other groups, are
permitted to get tax deductible contributions for lobbying. In contrast, other
groups must segregate their lobbying functions, and can only get deductions
for contributions for their charitable activities. Therefore, religions already
have greater access to the public fora than other groups.
If Rosenberger is viewed as an equal access case, it may seem difficult to
distinguish it from Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,'° and Widmar v. Vincent," which held that schools that opened
their classrooms to other, outside activities were limited public fora that could
not exclude groups based on the religious nature of their speech. Like those
cases, the amount of the public expenditures is minimal and excluding the
religious group can be construed to discriminate against a religious
viewpoint."'
Some might argue that a cash subsidy cannot be considered a forum. This
argument arises not from the fact that the benefit is a subsidy, but rather, from
the problem of equal access to a limited public forum. Defining government
benefits as fora may open all government subsidies to question. The Court is
on very shaky ground here. Once the Court acknowledges that a speaker may
need a subsidy to place her ideas in the marketplace, the very notion of an
open unregulated marketplace is subject to question." If the powerless need
subsidies to participate in the market, then arguably, the government is
constitutionally compelled to evaluate which speakers need help, and provide
the means. Such a system would pose an enormous risk of government
favoritism for particular ideas.
This problem highlights another difficulty with the Rosenberger case.
Although the Establishment Clause analysis may justify balancing power to
prevent the combined power of church and state, or to protect the free exercise

100. For an excellent discussion of these principles of political organization and the strength
that comes with small, cohesive groups, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARv. L. REv. 713, 718-28 (1985).
101. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
102. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
103. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2519-20

(1995).
104. For arguments that inequality of access vitiates the notion of a marketplace of ideas, see
CATHARINE MAcKINNON, THE WORD (1994); CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:

DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAw 155-56 (1987); Judith Baat-Ada (Reisman), Freedom of Speech as
Mythology or Quill Pen and Parchment in an Electronic Environment, 8 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 271, 275-79 (1979).
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of the religion, the free speech principles may disfavor any such balancing.
Indeed, in the context of speech, more speech is deemed to be inherently
better, regardless of the source or the impact on the balance of power. For
example, although government is admittedly the most powerful speaker, it still
has the right to speak. Similarly, fear of cohesive, well-organized groups being
over-represented should be met by more speech, not by limits on speech.
Otherwise, limits on cohesive groups undoubtedly will be directed at
disfavored political groups like Communists or Nazis.
Although the Christian group did not get its funding, it was able to
publish its magazine anyway. Thus, its views were available in the
marketplace of ideas. In this sense, this case is not much different from the
parochial school cases in which affluent parents must choose between a free
public school and a tuition-driven sectarian school. The parents can take
advantage of the free education and merely pay for religious training on the
side. Hence, they are not excluded from either their religion or from the
benefits of public education. It would be a much harder case if the religious
group had been unable to raise the money to publish their magazine. Then
they might claim not only that their right to freely exercise their faith had
been threatened by the condition, but also that the ideas were stifled.
The marketplace of ideas is supposed to determine the value of a
particular idea. The problem is that the marketplace of ideas is inefficient. Bad
ideas may be well-funded, and good ideas may be underfunded. However,
some might argue that the ability to raise money is a rough measure of the
value of an idea. If "the test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market,"' 5 then good ideas will be able to
attract funding. This view of the market assumes that the market is trying to
establish "truth."
If, instead, the market of ideas is seen as a mechanism to increase
participation, then speech is valuable because it is a form of participation that
operates in favor of inclusiveness and diversity. Under this theory, the real
issue should be who is included or excluded. That issue returns to the powerbased model of unconstitutional conditions.
In this instance, the Christian students may claim to be the less powerful
and excluded group. Whether they are less powerful is a question of fact that
depends on how power is defined. Christians may outnumber non-Christians
on campus. They already have formed an organization and identified
themselves, so they may hold more cooperative power, albeit less hierarchial
power. Nevertheless, they are the ones excluded from participation and in
some communities they are discriminated against. If the Christian group is the
least powerful, providing benefits to them on an equal basis with all others
enhances diversity and helps to balance power. Although the Court should be
skeptical about whether funds really will be disbursed equally, that risk should
not disadvantage the minority religion or its speech until an unequal division is
established. The best the Court can hope to do is focus on the more limited

105.

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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question of equality among religions, although it is unclear why equal
protection of religions is entitled to any greater protection than equal
protection of other disfavored groups."°
A few caveats are in order. Even though the Christian coalition might be
less powerful in this context, in another setting it might be an advantaged
group. Hence, applying a power-based theory of unconstitutional conditions
will have to be an individualized process with a great deal of attention paid to
the facts of each case. For example, the outcome suggested for the
Rosenberger case should not start the slippery slope towards generalized aid to
parochial schools.
The disadvantage of a power-based theory of unconstitutional conditions
is that it requires detailed trials on constitutional issues. Some scholars, like
Kenneth Karst, would welcome such careful investigation into the history and
context of challenged legislation. 7 Only by carefully considering such
history and context can judges understand what is at stake for the individuals
and groups involved. The theory is less predictive than principled. The powerbased theory of unconstitutional conditions returns to the purpose of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments: assuring a balance of power that enables
individuals to participate both in the polity and their religious communities.
CONCLUSION

Constitutional law must be concerned with the power of government and
how the government is authorized to use its power. One of the central purposes of the First and Fourteenth Amendments was to foster equal participation
by all citizens. Hence, constitutional conditions should be evaluated in light of
their impact on the balance of power. Because the greatest risks arise from the
largest power disparities, the more a condition entrenches or expands power
disparities, the more likely it is to be unconstitutional. Therefore, conditions
that expand diversity and participation of less empowered groups are constitutional, and those that limit diversity and participation are unconstitutional.

106. See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An
Update, 75 CAL. L. REv. 5 (1987).
107. See Karst, supra note 41.

THE ONLY GOOD POOR WOMAN:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND WELFARE
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS*

The goal of some welfare reform proposals is to discourage poor women
from having children. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides a
ready device for challenging these proposals in court. Such challenges, however, invoke a particular tension in the use of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in the context of welfare-the tension between seeking to protect the
private decisions of welfare recipients while at the same time seeking to obtain public assistance for exercising those decisions. This tension stems partly
from the doctrine's attempt to preserve poor people's liberty within a constitutional framework designed to protect only property owners.'
The Supreme Court has often resolved this tension by failing to find a
constitutional violation when the government conditions welfare benefits on
the waiver of privacy rights.2 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine may
nevertheless appear to be the indispensable cornerstone of claims that new
welfare regulations violate recipients' right to reproductive autonomy. 3 I argue

* Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. B.A., Yale University, 1977; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1980. This article benefitted from conversations with Marion Smiley and
Lucie White; from comments of participants at the symposium on the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions at the University of Denver College of Law, the Class and Reproductive Control panel
at the Crit Networks Conference on Class & Identity, and the symposium on Welfare As We'd
Like It To Be at Princeton University; and from discussions with Lucie White's Social Welfare
Law class at Harvard Law School and the Harvard University Program in Ethics and the Professions seminar. I am grateful to the Program in Ethics and the Professions for its research support.
1. Thus, this tension does not arise in the Supreme Court's application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in cases involving property rights, which may explain why property
owners appear to prevail more often than welfare recipients. Compare, e.g., Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (extending the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invalidate,
under the Takings Clause, a city's attempt to condition the grant of a discretionary building permit
on the donation of property to the government) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(holding that the denial of unemployment benefits to persons who refuse to work on Saturdays for
religious reasons violates the First Amendment) with Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S.
360 (1988) (holding denial of food stamps to strikers does not violate the First Amendment) and
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding denial of medical benefits for abortion but not
childbirth). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: ConstitutionalRights as Public
Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 859 (1995) (using a model of constitutional rights as public goods to
explain the Court's holding in Dolan). Merrill suggests that the Court rejected Medicaid
recipients' unconstitutional conditions claim in the abortion funding cases because "the judiciary
views the right to abortion, which after all is grounded in the 'right to privacy,' as a uniquely private right whose primary significance is to the individual exercising that right." Id. at 875.
2. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Laurence C. Nolan, The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and Mandating
NorplantforWomen on Welfare Discourse, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 15 (1994); David S. Coale,
Note, Norplant Bonuses and The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 71 TEX. L. REV. 189
(1992). In the face of conservative proposals to abandon the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
in order to allow the state greater power to require citizens to trade their constitutional rights for
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in this article that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine offers an impaired
defense against welfare policies that regulate poor women's reproduction.
Although these policies reflect an unjust understanding of the reproductive
liberties of women on welfare, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot
adequately explain why. We should replace it with a vision of welfare that
more affirmatively reconciles the protection of poor women's privacy with the
demand for public support.4
I.

CONTRACEPTIVE WELFARE PROPOSALS

Welfare reform measures designed to discourage reproduction by recipients (I will call them contraceptive welfare proposals or laws) are based on the
belief that welfare encourages poor women to bear children, combined with
taxpayer resentment for having to pay to support them. As Representative
Marge Roukema asked during the congressional debate on the Family Support
Act, "how much longer do you think the two-worker couple will tolerate the
welfare state and its cost to them in taxes to support that welfare mother?...
The answer is that they should not have to."' Welfare mothers' procreation is
also considered morally irresponsible according to the premise that people
should only have children they can afford to support.6 Welfare reform rhetoric
describes childbearing by the poor as fueling a cycle of poverty by producing
children who will inevitably depend on the government for sustenance
Sometimes reproduction by particular poor mothers, such as those who are
unmarried or teenagers, is singled out as the target for deterrence

public benefits, it is understandable that liberals and progressives would seek to shore up the
doctrine. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993) (arguing that abolishing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would promote economic efficiency).
4. This article expands my critique of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the context
of public assistance and First Amendment rights. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the
Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587 (1993).
5. 113 CONG. REC. H1i1,515 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1987) (statement of Rep. Roukema).
6.

See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE

UNDERCLASS 189-90 (1992) (discussing middle-class American norms about childbearing that the
"reproductive underclass" violates).
7. See, e.g., MICKEY KAus, THE END OF EQUALITY 121 (1992); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE
NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA (1992); CHARLES MURRAY,

LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 154-66 (1984). I discuss the fallacy of all
of these premises elsewhere. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Irrationalityand Sacrifice in the Welfare
Reform Consensus, 81 U. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
8. The House Republicans' Personal Responsibility Act, for example, contains measures
designed to discourage unwed teenagers from becoming mothers. It prohibits mothers under the
age of 18 from receiving AFDC benefits for children born out of wedlock, regardless of when aid
is sought for the child, unless the mother marries the child's father or someone who adopts the
child. Personal Responsibility Act, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1995) [hereinafter Personal Responsibility Act]. (An amendment to the House bill would allow teenage mothers to receive Medicaid, food stamps, and vouchers to pay for items "suitable for the care of the child."
Mireya Navarro, Threat of a Benefits Cutoff: Will It Deter Pregnancies?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1995.) The Act also denies aid for children whose paternity is not established and requires states
to warn a pregnant, unmarried woman of her ineligibility for government aid unless she informs
the state of the prospective father's identity and cooperates in establishing the child's paternity.
Personal Responsibility Act, supra, §§ 101, 103. Although this provision is aimed at establishing
paternity as early as possible, it might also provide an incentive to poor pregnant women to get an
abortion. See Steve Daley & Carol Jouzaitis, House Votes to Ease Welfare Cuts; Abortion Foes
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This perception of procreation by the poor as costly and pathological was
most notably promoted by Charles Murray, who, in 1984, argued that welfare
induces poor women to have babies;9 in 1993, declared that "illegitimacy is
the single most important social problem of our time;""0 and in 1994, claimed
that the higher fertility rates of groups with lower average intelligence, who
fall at the bottom of the economic ladder, help to perpetuate welfare dependency." While his views were once considered on the political fringe,
Murray now "has a platform in respectable publications and is welcomed as a
savant by Republicans in Congress."' 2 These themes run throughout the
House Republicans' proposed Personal Responsibility Act. 3 The bottom line
of this thinking is that, since reproduction by the poor perpetuates poverty,
policies designed to stem their reproduction are an efficient means of at once
reducing poverty and cutting welfare costs.
The government can take several avenues to achieve the goal of reducing
the number of children born to women on welfare. The most benign is to
make contraceptives freely available to welfare recipients. Every state now
makes Norplant available to poor women through Medicaid." This approach
might be combined with the added incentive of offering a cash bonus to women on welfare for using Norplant. Several state legislatures have considered
implementing such a bonus program. 5 A third option is to deny additional
benefits for children born to women who are already receiving public assistance. If the belief that welfare encourages childbirth were accurate, denying
benefits would remove the incentive for women to become pregnant, or at
least make childbearing more burdensome. Children born despite the elimination of incentives would be the unfortunate casualties of this deterrence
rationale. Several states already have enacted so-called welfare "family caps,"
and others are considering such legislation. 6

Win Concession, CH. TRIB., Mar. 23, 1995, at 1 (discussing Roman Catholics' and anti-abortion
Republicans' concern that the Act's provisions designed to reduce out-of-wedlock births will encourage pregnant women to obtain abortions); Robert Pear, Catholic Bishops Challenge Pieces of
Welfare Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, at I (same).
9. See MURRAY, supra note 7, at 154-66.
10. See Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at A14.
11.
See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURvE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).

12. Paul Starr, Who Owns the Future?, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Spring 1995, at 6.
13. The preamble of the Personal Responsibility Act states that the Act's purpose is to "restore the American family, reduce illegitimacy, control welfare spending and reduce welfare dependence." See Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 8.
14. Tom Bethell, Norplant is Welfare State's New Opiate: Contraceptive Doesn't Address
Causes of Illegitimate Births, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1993, at M5; see also Tamar Lewin, 5-Year
Contraceptive Implant Seems Headed for Wide Use, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1991, at Al. This
policy is not devoid of compulsion, however, if the state provides Norplant but not other types of
contraception.
15. See KAN. H.B. 2089, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991) (providing women receiving AFDC a
$500 cash bonus for inserting Norplant, as well as an additional $50 each year for continued use);
LA. H.B. 1584, 17th R. Sess. S l(a) (1991) (awarding women on welfare $100 per year for using
Norplant); TENN. H.B. 1860, 97th Leg., 2d Sess. (1992) (same).
16. See Mike Doming, Welfare Caps Try to Put Lid on Size of Families, CHi. TRIB., Mar.
12, 1995, at 1; Melinda Henneberger, Rethinking Welfare: Deterring New Births-A Special Report; State Aid Is Capped, but to what Effect?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1995, at Al. The Personal
Responsibility Act denies AFDC benefits for additional children born to AFDC recipients or to
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A fourth possibility is to use more coercive means to ensure that women
receiving government aid remain infertile. Mandating sterilization of women
on welfare, a strategy used in many states during the first half of the twentieth
century, now seems to be politically unacceptable." But the public might be
willing to impose less permanent methods of regulating poor women's fertility.
Norplant serves this purpose adeptly because it acts on a long term basis and
is reversible. At the same time, since removal requires a minor surgical procedure, it is possible for government authorities to monitor its use. Unlike most
other contraceptives, Norplant's effectiveness does not depend on a woman's
constant cooperation. At least two states have proposed legislation to mandate
the use of Norplant as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. 8 Denying
benefits for children born to women on welfare has been condemned by many
as cruel to the innocent children who are punished for their mothers' behavior. 9 A rule requiring Norplant as a condition of receiving welfare avoids
this discomfort, since its objective is to prevent the birth of the children in the
first place. (Of course, children whose mothers refuse to accept the condition
will lose their benefits.) Americans are predisposed to be less concerned about
protecting the reproductive decisions of poor women than the welfare of their
children. As policymakers become increasingly hostile towards poor mothers
on welfare, it is likely that these more coercive proposals will proliferate and
may even prevail.2'
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS PROBLEM

It is clear at the outset that contraceptive welfare laws present an unconstitutional conditions problem. They raise the classic unconstitutional condi-

anyone who received AFDC at any time during the 10-month period ending with the birth of the
child. Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 8, § 106. Supreme Court precedents impose no
obligation on the government to pay women on welfare benefits to support their additional children. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that a state AFDC program provision imposing a maximum monthly grant per family did not violate the Equal Protection Clause);
see also Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291 (1995) (holding that federal AFDC regulations do
not prohibit states from grouping into a single "assistance unit" all needy children living in the
same household under the care of one relative even though this rule results in a decrease in maximum per capita AFDC benefits).
17. On the other hand, the popularity of tubal ligation and vasectomy as a method of family
planning may have diminished the public's concern about the brutality of coercing these procedures. PHILIP P. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION
INTHE UNITrrSTATES 161 (1991). In 1980, the chairman of the Texas Board of Resources proposed sterilizing welfare recipients in the state. Official Urges Sterilization of Texas Welfare Recipients, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1980; see also Jim Simon, Heavy Hand of Welfare Reform Legislators Planning to Get Tough, SEATTLE Tims, Jan. 31, 1992, at BI (discussing Washington state
senator Scott Barr's proposal to offer $10,000 bonuses to welfare mothers who agree to sterilization after the birth of their first child).
18. See S.B. 2895, Miss. (1992); H.B. 3207, S.C. (1993).
19. Jason DeParle, Despising Welfare, Pitying Its Young, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at 5.
20. A Newsweek article reported in 1993 that "legislators in 13 states have proposed nearly
two dozen bills that aim to use Norplant as an instrument of social policy." Barbara Kantrowitz &
Pat Wingert, The Norplant Debate, NEwsWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 36; see generally Madeline
Henley, Comment, The Creation and Perpetuationof the MotherlBody Myth: Judicialand Legislative Enlistment of Norplant, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 731-58 (1993) (surveying legislative initiatives tying welfare to Norplant).
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tions question whether the government may condition the conferral of welfare
benefits on the beneficiary's surrender of her constitutional right to reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity, although the government might choose not
to provide welfare benefits altogether. The government is plainly doing indirectly what it could not do directly.
Few would dispute that it would be unconstitutional-at least under current conditions-for a state to pass a law requiring women to use contraceptives.2 The concept of decisional privacy, which seeks to protect intimate or
personal affairs that are fundamental to an individual's identity and moral
personhood from unjustified government intrusion, is firmly established. 2
Freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life has been at
the forefront of the development of the right of privacy. 3 Considerable support exists for the conclusion that the decision to procreate is Dart of the right
of privacy. The decision to bear children is universally acknowledged in the
privacy cases as being "at the very heart" of these constitutionally protected
choices.25 The Court expressed the constitutional importance of the right to
procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma, declaring the right to bear children "one of
the basic civil rights of man." 26
The right of privacy, then, protects both the choice to bear children and
the choice to refrain from bearing them. Unjustifiably burdening either choice
violates a woman's personhood by denying her autonomy over the self-defining decision of whether she will bring another being into the world. Requiring
women to use contraceptives is, in this sense, just as pernicious as forced maternity at the behest of the state. In addition, mandating such an invasive procedure as Norplant insertion would violate women's due process rights to
bodily integrity and to refuse medical treatment.27 Since states could not constitutionally pass laws directly mandating that women use Norplant, the argu-

21. Nevertheless, Larry Alexander did dispute this assertion at the symposium, arguing that
there is no absolute right to procreate. Although the Constitution does not protect the right to
procreate absolutely, in that the right might be overcome by a compelling state interest, it does
safeguard individuals' procreative decisions from government interference. Alexander proposed a
limited right to procreate if one is financially able to support one's children. A hypothetical law
directly limiting procreation on the basis of wealth illustrates that this conception of the right to
procreate is too narrow. A criminal statute punishing individuals for having children without economic means to support them or a legislative scheme granting parenting licenses only to individuals who met financial standards would at least raise constitutional concern.
22. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10 (2d ed.
1988); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989).
23. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose whether to terminate a
pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to decide whether to use contraceptives).
24. See generally JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994).

25. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
26. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 541, 541 (1942).
27. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). This essay focuses
on reproductive liberty associated with the right of privacy. For an argument that programs tying
welfare to Norplant use violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, see Coale, supra
note 3, at 206-08.
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ment goes, they cannot achieve this end indirectly by conditioning welfare
payments on Norplant use.
This articulation of the unconstitutional conditions argument does not
guarantee the invalidation of contraceptive welfare laws. The Supreme Court
has avoided the unconstitutional conditions problem by distinguishing between
direct state interference with a protected activity and the state's mere refusal to
subsidize a protected activity. The former, the Court concedes, raises a constitutional issue because it involves state action, whereas it characterizes the
latter as a constitutionally insignificant failure to act. Embedded in this distinction is the prevalent understanding of constitutional protections that extends
only to the individual's negative right to be free from unjustified state intrusion and that measures state action from a baseline of the current arrangements
of wealth and privilege.28 Under this reasoning, it is possible to characterize a
condition on benefits as a constitutional nonsubsidy rather than an unconstitutional penalty.
The Court's most developed articulation of this doctrinal sleight of hand
can be found in a series of cases concerning the government's obligation to
subsidize the reproductive decisions of poor women. In these cases, the Court
refused to require the state or federal government to pay for the cost of abortion services for poor women, even though the government pays for the expenses incident to childbirth.29 The abortion funding cases raise an unconstitutional conditions problem when the government's refusal to pay for abortions is viewed as a condition on the receipt of Medicaid funds-pregnant
women may receive medical benefits as long as they do not use them to exercise their right to obtain an abortion. The Court nevertheless upheld this condition, reasoning,
[allthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's choice, it need not remove those not of its own cre[I]t simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of
ation ....
choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.30
Can the government claim, as it did successfully in the abortion-funding
cases, that by conditioning welfare payments on birth control it is not preventing welfare recipients from exercising their reproductive rights? The answer
may depend on which type of contraceptive law is at issue. Unlike the laws in
the abortion-funding cases, Norplant mandates impose more than the requirement that welfare funds be spent on the purpose for which they were intended-child care and not child bearing. They do not just fail to provide funds for
an activity; rather, they require that welfare recipients undergo an affirmative-and invasive-procedure. Women who agree to the condition in order to
receive AFDC payments do not have the option of exercising their constitu-

28. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITIrON (1993); David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 53.
29. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
30. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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tional right to procreate through private means. The government's condition of
Norplant insertion completely forecloses their reproductive choice. Conversely,
women who wish to exercise their right to procreate, and therefore refuse to
use Norplant, must pay the high price of losing their benefits.3
In contrast, it would be more plausible for the state to claim that offering
cash bonuses for Norplant use implements a legitimate decision to fund birth
control and not childbirth. Recipients might counter that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine forbids bonus programs because they make indigent women pay more than wealthier women-the cost of forgoing the bonus-to exercise their right not to use Norplant.32 Still, it is hard to make a convincing
argument that offering poor women free Norplant, as well as bonuses to use it,
leaves them worse off than if the program did not exist at all. These women
are not forced to choose between starvation and Norplant use, but only between accepting the bonus and its condition, or not. Norplant bonus programs
arguably increase poor women's reproductive options more than the laws
denying abortion funding, which the Supreme Court upheld in Maher and
McRae.
III. THE RESPONSE TO THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDrrIONs DOCTRiNE

The concept of welfare entitlements, which welfare rights activists successfully advocated in the 1960s and 1970s, is quickly eroding.33 Conservative politicians and resentful taxpayers disclaim any obligation to support
welfare recipients' decision to have children. Legislators promote their contraceptive welfare proposals in terms of savings to hard working citizens. For
example, the sponsor of the Kansas bill offering cash bonuses for Norplant use
claimed that, "[b]y any set of objective criteria, the creation of the program
has the potential to save the taxpayers millions of their hard-earned dollars."34
The response to the unconstitutional conditions claim, then, is likely to be,
"sure, poor women have a right to make reproductive decisions, but why
should I have to pay for them?"3

31. See Lynn A. Baker, The Price of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990) (presenting a positive theory of unconstitutional
conditions that "asks whether the effect of the challenged condition is to require persons unable to
earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible for the pertinent benefit, to pay a higher price to
engage in that constitutionally protected activity than similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income").
32. See Coale, supra note 3, at 214 (proposing a rule "limiting states to the power to selectively reimburse a percentage of the market price of Norplant"); see also John R. Hand, Note,
Buying Fertility: The Constitutionalityof Welfare Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who Submit to
Norplant Insertion, 46 VAND. L. REV. 715, 719-20 (1993) (presenting an "ideal" unconstitutional
conditions argument against Norplant bonuses, but predicting that it is likely to fail).
33. The proposed Personal Responsibility Act replaces federal entitlements to AFDC and
other welfare programs with block grants to the states. Elizabeth Shogren, House OKs Welfare
Overhaul That Cuts Off Aid Guarantees,L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1995, at AI.
34. Tamar Lewin, A Plan to Pay Welfare Mothers for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1991, at A9.
35. Roland Coming, the author of the South Carolina bill mandating Norplant insertion,
expressed this sentiment on national television: "They can have all the children they want. They
just have to pay for them." Primetime Live: End of Innocence (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 9,
1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. He argued that his bill, if enacted, would
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As these comments reveal, many legislators and their constituents will
have a hard time seeing contraceptive welfare laws as exacting from women
on welfare a higher price for exercising their rights. In their mind the proposals do not charge poor women for having children; they simply decline to
subsidize this activity. Thus, although some contraceptive welfare measures
may in one sense affirmatively impose a deterrent "above and beyond those
economic deterrents that are a natural concomitant of a market economy,"36
their proponents see them as replacing the constraints on poor women's reproductive decisions that would exist but for the state's generosity. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot adequately explain why the state should
nevertheless support the private decisions of welfare recipients.
IV. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE

A. The Doctrine's Functions
By asserting the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, claimants accept the
premise that the government is under no obligation to subsidize poor women's
reproductive decisions. They must renounce any claim to redistribution of
resources necessary for reproductive liberty. The briefs of litigants who use
the doctrine as a shield against government regulation begin with the partial
surrender, "of course, we would never suggest that the government is affirmatively required to give us any support at all." 37 This concession explains the
need for the doctrine.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves as a method for identifying
"a characteristic technique by which the government appears not to, but in fact
does burden ...liberties."38 It is needed only to explain how a government
condition on funding could possibly be unconstitutional when the government
has no obligation to provide funding in the first place. If the government may
constitutionally deny the grant altogether, why should recipients be heard to
complain about a restriction? The doctrine reveals that, despite the logic of
this question, the government nevertheless may be violating a constitutional
right. Thus, under the prevalent understanding of privacy rights, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine appears to be an indispensable first step of arguments challenging the constitutionality of contraceptive welfare laws.39

save taxpayers in his state $36 million in welfare and medical costs in the first year. Id.
36. Baker, supra note 31, at 1219.
37. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 11, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No. 89-1391)
("No one has a right to a subsidy for the exercise of rights to speech and privacy."); Brief of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Center for Constitutional Rights et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 14, Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392) ("[A]mici do not suggest
that the government is affirmatively required to provide women with information regarding their
post-pregnancy reproductive options.").
38. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419
(1989).
39. This is why welfare rights advocates may be reluctant to repudiate the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. Without it, they may not even be able to articulate a constitutional violation
when the government conditions welfare benefits. I concur in Frederick Schauer's view that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves only this limited purpose and does not support a grander theory of analysis. See Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and The
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine functions like a pair of eyeglasses
that enables us to see the infringement of liberty obscured by our faulty constitutional vision. Why do we need this corrective device in order to understand the harm of requiring poor women to use Norplant in order to survive?
If the government were required to subsidize the activities at issue, and if
reliance on public assistance therefore did not constitute a waiver of privacy,
there would be no place for a special doctrine to prohibit government conditions that threaten these activities. It is our inability to defend poor women's
reproductive liberty in terms of traditional constitutional discourse that forces
us the rely on this weak-kneed doctrine. Moreover, because the doctrine focusses on the violation of individual rights, rather than on the government's conditional spending as a system of power, it often permits individuals to barter
away their rights in exchange for benefits.4
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine also functions like a bandage to
patch up the gaping hole in our constitutional framework designed to protect
the liberties of economically independent citizens. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is conceived as a way of preserving, within the baseline of
present economic inequality, "spheres of private ordering from government
domination." 4 It maintains the boundary between the private realm and state
power stemming from the government's largesse. (This is part of the overall
liberal project of preserving a sphere of individual privacy from government
interference.) The unconstitutional conditions doctrine tries to fill the gap,
created by the dependence of the poor, in the theory that "[a] right to private
property, free from government interference, is ... a necessary basis for a
democracy."'42 It gives to propertyless citizens a dollop of the protection ordi-

Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995). Nevertheless, I argue
that the doctrine obscures more constitutional violation than it illuminates. Professor Schauer
suggested to me at the symposium that the difference in our views of the doctrine may lie in the
plausible reach of judicial power. Schauer believes that judges are constrained to act within the
limits of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, while I advocate that judges apply a more positive understanding of rights.
40. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 185 (1995). Thomas Merrill notes that, according to this view

of rights, "a doctrine that forbids individuals to sell their constitutional rights smacks of paternalism, and seems to deny the moral autonomy of the individual." Merrill, supra note 1, at 869 (advocating a model of constitutional rights as public goods that rejects their conception as valuable
entitlements belonging to individuals); see also Marion Smiley, Private Lives and Public Welfare:
A Critical Reconstruction of the Concept of State Paternalism 8 (unpublished manuscript on file
with author) (criticizing the definition of state paternalism as a violation of individual liberty).
41. Sullivan, supra note 38, at 1506; Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions and
the Distributionof Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 327, 330 (1989); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with ParticularReference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 601 (1990) ("[Ihe current constitutional
mainstream[] sees the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as an effort to preserve legal requirements of governmental neutrality under different social and economic conditions."). Another way
of putting it is that the doctrine sets a limit on economic inequality by prohibiting the
government's power to impose a surcharge on the poor for exercising their constitutional rights.
Professor Baker argues that the core of the doctrine's consistency in the context of public assistance lies in "the Court's tacit attempt to ensure a certain non-wealth-dependent equality of constitutional rights within the constraints of our market economy." Baker, supra note 31, at 1188.
42. Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 915
(1993).
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narily provided by ownership of private property so that they may, in a limited
way, belong to the democratic polity. As Cass Sunstein explains,
the creation of property rights should be seen as an unconstitutional
conditions doctrine writ very large. The idea is that government may
not use its power over property to pressure rights in general; the
existence of property rights generates a strong barrier against this
form of pressure, just as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
provides a degree of insulation in narrower settings.43
Sunstein's comparison helpfully highlights the relationship between property, liberty, and unconstitutional conditions, but I would stress even more
than Sunstein the inferiority of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
property rights. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine tries to squeeze the
propertyless into a constitutional framework designed to include only property
owners.
In short, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine accepts the current unequal distribution of wealth, as well as the view of liberty as protection against
state interference in that unequal arrangement." It attempts to minimize the
harm to those who fall at the bottom (or completely out of bounds), without
changing the basic order of things.
B. The Doctrine's Paradox
This view of unconstitutional conditions is paradoxical because it seeks to
immunize a private sphere from state interference while at the same time
requesting public assistance. It seeks to disconnect the demand for privacy
from government intrusion and the demand for government intervention
through financial support. It relies on the liberal resistance to government
while hoping for the illiberal assistance of government. In order to determine
the constitutionality of the condition, the doctrine requires us to close our eyes
for a moment and pretend that poor women are not dependent on government
assistance; then we may open our eyes the next moment and plead for government support for their decision to have children.45

43. Id. at 916.
44. Sunstein notes that his defense of property rights is not inconsistent with redistributive
programs. See id. at 917 (proposing redistributive programs designed "to bring about at least
rough equality of opportunity and, even more important, freedom from desperate conditions, or
from circumstances that impede basic human functioning"); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at
138-40 (also proposing redistributive programs). The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, however, serves to avoid the need for such redistribution. For an argument that the Framers' view of
property, upon which Sunstein relies, would justify a more expansive redistribution of wealth than
Sunstein proposes, see William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other
Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1788
(1994) (book review).
45. Marion Smiley notes a similar dilemma posed by the libertarian approach to state paternalism-the state's making of personal choices for individuals. Smiley argues that the concept of
state paternalism as a violation of an individual's right to free choice in the private sphere forces
us to choose between accepting state paternalism in the interests of providing welfare and letting
individuals suffer in the interests of preserving their autonomy. See Smiley, supra note 40, at 5.
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine inevitably crumbles as a device
for maintaining the boundaries between private and public spheres because it
fails to justify the affinmative demand for public support for private decisions.
This does not mean that making these private and public demands is necessarily inconsistent. My point is that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does
not help us to reconcile them. The growing conservative assault on welfare
spending may finally compel us to abandon the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in this context and confront directly the social and political implications of citizens' reliance on government welfare. Instead of seeking indeterminate answers through unconstitutional conditions analysis, we would inquire
directly into the substantive constitutional values at issue-the boundaries of
women's right to reproductive autonomy and of poor citizens' right to participate in the political community.
C. Dependence as a Waiver of Privacy
Because the unconstitutional conditions doctrine maintains the liberal
boundary between public and private realms, it fails even to address most
government interference in the private lives of welfare recipients. The sphere
of privacy protected by liberal rights largely evaporates once the individual
invites in state assistance. An individual's acceptance of government benefits
is deemed to constitute a waiver of privacy. The Court has routinely allowed
the state to regulate poor families by conditioning benefits on conformance to
various mandates. Since families are not entitled to government support, the
Court reasons, the government may force them to break up, rearrange, shrink
and open up for inspection in order to qualify for benefits.' Although the
Court might find an egregious invasion of poor families' privacy to be unconstitutional, most of the day-to-day decisions of family life remain vulnerable to
state regulation.4' This use of the government's spending power to supervise
the everyday lives of poor families is not even analyzable as an unconstitutional conditions problem because the government has not interfered with any
constitutionally protected activity by the recipients.'
This loss of privacy often entails state intrusion in welfare recipients'
reproductive decisionmaking. From the inception of welfare programs in
America, states conditioned payments on mothers' compliance with standards
of sexual and reproductive behavior.49 The Social Security Act, for example,

46. See Lucy Billings, The Choice Between Living with Family Members and Eligibilityfor
Government Benefits Based on Need: A Constitutional Dilemma, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 695; Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of
Childrenfrom Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination
of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987) (upholding AFDC regulation determining families' eligibility for benefits despite its negative effects on families' chosen living arrangements); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (rejecting constitutional challenge to a provision in federal Food Stamps program that determined
eligibility based on households); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (rejecting welfare
mother's right to resist state home inspection as a condition of welfare eligibility).
47. See FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 185.
48. See Lynn A. Baker, Bargainingfor Public Assistance, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 949 (1995).
49. For historical accounts of welfare policy's regulation of women and their families, see
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allowed states to condition eligibility for Aid to Dependent Children upon
mothers' sexual morality through suitable-home or "man-in-the-house"
rules.50 More recently, women on welfare have been required, as a condition
of receiving benefits, to undergo mandatory paternity proceedings that include
state scrutiny of their intimate lives." Under the Family Support Act of 1988,
the states are required to meet federal standards to establish the paternity of
children born out of wedlock as a means of procuring child support from the
absent fathers.52 The House Republicans' Personal Responsibility Act contains more coercive measures: it denies AFDC benefits for a child whose paternity has not been established and directs states to warn unmarried pregnant
women of their ineligibility for state aid unless they cooperate in establishing
the child's paternity.53
In her recent book, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other
Twentieth Century Tragedies, Martha Fineman argues that the law confers
privacy only on the "traditional" family, composed of a husband, a wife, and
their children.54 Privacy doctrine does not shield from state intrusion single
mothers, including women who have children outside of marriage and divorced mothers:
If nonintervention is the norm, bureaucratic decisions are burdened,
and the institution of family can be set up practically and theoretically
as a construct to mediate against the power of the state. The private
family enjoys the noninterventionist norm; the expectations and
claims these favored units have vis-A-vis the larger society are unavailable to single mother families.55
Fineman also notes that "private" traditional families receive huge public
subsidies through government and other programs, such as tax breaks, government-backed mortgages, and employer-subsidized health and life insurance.56
Unlike "public" families, however, their reliance on government support does
not entail a loss of privacy. Although Fineman is correct that the denial of

MIMI ABROMoVrTz, REGULATING THE LivEs OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1988); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MoTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994).

50. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 723-24 (1992).
51. FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 186; see Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975) (approving
requirement of welfare mothers' assistance in paternity actions); Allen v. Eichler, No. 89A-FE-4,
1990 WL 58223 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (order denying benefits to a woman who refused to submit
a calendar on which she had allegedly written the names of her sexual partners).
52. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, 2344 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
53. Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 8, §§ 101, 103.
54. FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 177-93.
55. Id. at 180; see also Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REV.
329, 339-40 (noting that the Court's protection of parental decisionmaking depends on parents'
success "in bringing obedient social conformance from their children"); Martha Minow, The Free
Exercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 925, 944 ("The state can defend many burdens on
individual choice in the name of a state interest in preserving or supporting the 'traditional' family.").
56. FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 191; see also GORDON, supra note 49, at 1-13 (describing
the stratification of the United States welfare system).
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single mothers' privacy is based on patriarchal definitions of family, it is also
true that dependence on government aid provides an additional rationale, as
well as the opportunity, for state regulation. 7 Wealth can help to' buy the
presumption of privacy.
V. WHAT'S WRONG WITH GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON PROCREATION?

An alternative approach to government's conditional spending focusses on
its systemic political impact instead of its infringement of individual women's
(waivable) rights.58 We might examine how this use of government largesse
perpetuates unjust relationships of power in our society. Contraceptive welfare
laws degrade the dignity and equal status of poor citizens. This political dimension is revealed by comparing welfare proposals with eugenic policies that
proliferated in America during the first half of the twentieth century. 9 Contraceptive welfare laws do not implement eugenic policy; they do not seek to
improve the nation's stock through genetic selection. Nevertheless, we can
understand the injustice of conditioning welfare on relinquishing reproductive
autonomy by examining what these proposals share in common with eugenic
programs.
The salient feature of both eugenic sterilization laws and contraceptive
welfare proposals is their imposition of society's restrictive norms of procreation. Denying someone the right to bear children deprives her of a basic part
of her humanity; it constitutes a denial of her human dignity and equal status
in society.' ° It is grounded on the premise that people who depart from social
norms do not deserve to procreate. Carrie Buck, the nineteen-year-old whose
involuntary sterilization was held constitutional by the United States Supreme
Court,6 was punished by sterilization not because of any mental disability,
but because of her deviance from society's social and sexual norms.62 Indeed,
the state's reasons for sterilizing Carrie Buck in 1924-because she was poor

57. 1 discuss elsewhere how racism interacts with patriarchy in limiting the privacy of poor,
single mothers. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, in
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 224 (Mar-

tha A. Fineman & Isabelle Karpin eds., 1995). I note that "the state has always considered Black
mothers, whether married or single, to need public supervision and not to be entitled to privacy.
Thus, the 'public' single mother has never had a Black counterpart in the 'private' family." Id. at
248 n.6.
58. Kathleen Sullivan's interpretation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a technique for contesting the "systemic effect of conditions on distribution of rights in the polity as a
whole" offers another systemic approach to conditional government spending. She describes one
invidious effect as the creation of a constitutional caste as a result of discriminating among rightholders on the basis of their relative dependency on a government benefit. See Sullivan, supra
note 38, at 1421, 1489-99.
59. See generally MARK H. HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATITrUDES IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT (1963); REILLY, supra note 17 (discussing involuntary sterilization).
60. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1419, 1472 (1991).
61. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
62. See Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter,2 CONsT. COMMENTARY 331, 336 (1985)
("Her case never was about mental deficiency; it was always a matter of sexual morality and
social deviance ....
Two generations of bastards are enough.").
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and had become pregnant out of wedlock-were precisely the same as the
state's reasons for enacting contraceptive welfare laws today.63
Eugenicists framed their arguments not only in terms of improving the
race, but also in terms of reducing the cost of subsidizing the unfit. In his
celebrated study of a degenerate family, The Jukes, Richard L. Dugdale included detailed calculations of the amounts the Jukes had cost New York state
by 1877. He estimated the family's financial burden to society at
over a million and a quarter dollars of loss in 75 years, caused by a
single family 1,200 strong, without reckoning the cash paid for whiskey, or taking into account the entailments of pauperism and crime of
the survivors in succeeding generations, and the incurable disease,
idiocy, and insanity growing out of this debauchery, and reaching
further than we can calculate.'
Later, the country's leading eugenicist, Charles Davenport, asserted,
[i]t is a reproach to our intelligence that we as a people, proud in
other respects of our control of nature, should have to support about
half a million insane, feeble-minded, epileptic, blind and deaf, 80,000
prisoners and 100,000 paupers at a cost of over 100 million dollars
per year.65
Government control of reproduction in the name of science, social policy,
or fiscal restraint masks racist and classist judgments about who deserves to
bear children. The contraceptive welfare proposals implement a belief that
poor people, especially Blacks, are less entitled to be parents. The debate
about Norplant and welfare was initiated by an editorial in the Philadelphia
Inquirer that proposed Norplant as a solution for the high poverty rate of
Black children.' After the public outcry, which led to a printed apology,67
few policymakers have explicitly directed their proposals at Black women.'
Yet welfare reform remains closely tied to racial politics. Although most
families who receive AFDC are not Black, Black women disproportionately
rely on this form of government aid to support their children.'

63. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations,No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 51 (1985).
64.
65.

RICHARD L. DUGDALE, THE JuKEs 167 (1891).
CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, HEREDITY IN RELATION TO EUGENICS (1911).

66. See Donald Kimelman, Poverty and Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the
Underclass, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at A18.
67. See An Apology: The Editorial on Norplant and Poverty Was Misguided and
Wrongheaded, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 23, 1990, at C4.
68. David Duke is a notable exception. During his successful campaign for election to the
Louisiana legislature, Duke, a former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, ran on a platform of
"concrete proposals to reduce the illegitimate birthrate and break the cycle of poverty that truly
enslaves and harms the black race." WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL
RESEARCH 294 (1994) (citation omitted). These programs included making welfare contingent on
sterilization and offering cash bonuses to women on welfare who consented to the procedure.
Duke was the sponsor of the Louisiana bill offering cash bonuses for Norplant insertion. Duke is
also an outspoken proponent of eugenics. See Craig Floumey, Duke Says He's Proud of Years as
Klan Chief, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 1992, at Al (quoting Duke as saying in 1985 that
the "'real answer to the world's problems' is 'promoting the best strains, the best individuals,'-ideas he defined as Nazism").
69. See COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OVERVIEW
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Moreover, the American public associates welfare given to single mothers
with the image of the mythical Black "welfare queen" or teenager who deliberately becomes pregnant in order to increase the amount of her monthly
check.70 It is fair to say, then, that welfare policies designed to discourage
childbearing will disproportionately affect Black women and may be targeted
at these very women.
During the eugenic movement's heyday in America, many poor women
were judged mentally deficient and were briefly institutionalized in order to
undergo sterilization.7 A 1928 Wisconsin study of women who were discharged after being sterilized in institutions for the feeble-minded found:
"Many mentally deficient persons by consenting to the operation are permitted
to return, under supervision, to society where they become self-supporting
social units and acceptable citizens. Those inmates unwilling to consent to the
operation remain segregated for social protection as well as individual welfare." 72 These poor women's social acceptability was contingent on their consent to sterilization. Women who agreed to the procedure were rewarded with
permission to enter society. Those who refused were punished with social
segregation.
This restriction on "feeble-minded" women's ability to participate in society inflicts the same injury as the contraceptive welfare proposals. The harm
of unconstitutional conditions is not to be found solely in the conditions they
place on government benefits (seen as the violation of individual rights), but in
the conditions they place on poor women's acceptability for citizenship. Poor
women are entitled to the benefits of society only if they agree not to reproduce. According to these policies, an acceptable poor woman is one who consents to use birth control: the only good poor woman is an infertile poor woman.
VI. EXPLAINING PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR "PRIVATE" DECISIONS
If we reject the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the context of
welfare, we are left to make an affirmative claim to public assistance for "private" decisions. Such a claim is incomprehensible under current constitutional
doctrine because of the barrier it has erected between public and private domains. In order to claim government assistance, then, we must challenge this
wall of constitutional thinking.
Americans' resentment at paying for poor women's reproductive decisions
stems from the particular unfairness associated with taxation for the purpose of
providing public assistance to the poor, as well as with public support of pri-

OF ENTrrLEMENT PROGRAMS 1994 GREEN BOOK 444 (1994); Teresa L. Amott, Black Women and
AFDC: Making Entitlement Out of Necessity, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 280 (Linda
Gordon ed., 1990).
70. See PATRICIA H. COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 77 (1991); Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical
Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REv. 879, 891-92 (1994).
71. REILLY, supra note 17, at 95-100.
72. Id. at 101-02 (emphasis added).
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vate matters. 3 The law circumscribes property rights in a number of ways,
and the government confiscates citizens' property in the form of taxes for a
variety of purposes. Tax money even goes to many redistributive programs,
such as social security, farm subsidies, and corporate bail outs. Nevertheless,
citizens reserve a special condemnation for welfare that redistributes income to
the poor. Lee Anne Fennell locates this unique sense of offense to property
rights in welfare's violation of norms connecting property to work:
This added element of distaste relates to the perceived unfairness of
confiscating money-money by and large earned through work-for
the purpose of providing an income to able-bodied, working-aged
persons who have failed to earn their own living through work. It is a
short step to the assertion that the more well-off are being forced to
work for the benefit of others (and rather undeserving others, at that),
at which point analogies to "forced labor" spring readily to mind. 4
This sentiment about welfare's unfairness has long been buttressed by the
vilification of welfare recipients as undeserving and morally blameworthy. 5
Added to this source of unfairness is the view that public remedies should
be reserved for publicly-caused problems; citizens must rely on private means
to solve problems of their own making. If citizens request public assistance for
private matters, according to this view, that assistance justifies state regulation
of their private decisions. This is why receiving welfare is seen to deprive
poor people of privacy. The critical foundation of this understanding of welfare is the premise that both the poor and the nonpoor are responsible for their
economic positions, that both poverty and property are derived from individual
merit.
Claims to public assistance for private decisions must refute this view of
welfare's unfairness. They might be based on notions of reparations for past
injustice or collective responsibility for current inequalities. To begin with, our
current market system benefits decently employed or otherwise wealthy citizens at the expense of others who work for poverty wages or cannot find jobs.
Free market capitalism, as well as American fiscal policy, guarantees that a
portion of the population will be unemployed at any given time. As Christopher Jencks explained,
America's economic history since 1945 suggests that we need what
Marx called a "reserve army of the unemployed." Without it, workers
will push up their wages faster than their productivity, inflation will
accelerate, and the Federal Reserve Board will throw the economy
into a recession in order to restore price stability. 6

73. Lee A. Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 235, 295.
74.
75.

Id.

(citing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 27 (1974)).
See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POV-

(1991); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR:
FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of
Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
76. JENCKS, supra note 6, at 128; see Starr, supra note 12, at 9 (noting that "[t]he anti-inflation policies pursued by the Federal Reserve and applauded by Gingrich and most other conserERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA
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This flaw in market economics was exacerbated by the transformation of
the American economy after World War II that diminished the demand for
blue-collar and unskilled workers and particularly marginalized Black workers.77 Moreover, institutional barriers have prevented disempowered citizens
from fully participating in the political process and the economy." As Loic
Wacquant and William Julius Wilson conclude, "[t]he growth of welfare in the
inner city is but a surface manifestation of deeper social-structural and economic changes, including deindustrialization, skyrocketing rates of joblessness,
the increasing concentration of poverty, and racial polarization. '79
Women are disadvantaged in the labor market by sex discrimination and
by workplace rules that assume workers have no child care obligations."0
Black single mothers-who make up a disproportionate share of the AFDC
rolls-are frustrated by all of these structural impediments. While other industrialized countries structure their markets and social programs to reduce poverty and wage inequality, American social policies and legal rules actively encourage these conditions."
So far, these arguments refute the absolute rejection of public assistance
for the poor as undeserved. But why should the state provide more than the
minimal means of survival to needy citizens and why does the Constitution
require this? It is beyond the scope of this essay on unconstitutional conditions
to elaborate these redistributive constitutional arguments. I will suggest, however, two arguments elaborated by others that warrant further exploration and
advocacy.
First, we might replace the concept of privacy as a purely negative right
with the concept of liberty as human flourishing that affirmatively guarantees
the needs of human personhood.1 2 Guided by a substantive vision of human
flourishing, this interpretation of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
requires the government to eliminate illegitimate social coercion based on race,
gender, and class, as well as to provide the prerequisites for meaningful par-

vatives assume that unemployment much below 6 percent is an unacceptable risk"); see also Paul
Davidson, Fighting Inflation Without Designated Paupers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995 (letter to
editor) (criticizing policies that "require a permanent army of unemployed paupers to achieve a
prosperous, inflation-free economy").
77.
See BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNErT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY

(1982).
78.

See generally MILDRED REIN, DILEMMAS OF WELFARE POLICY: WHY WORK STRATEGIES HAVEN'T WORKED (1982); Karl E. Klare, Toward New Strategiesfor Low-Wage Workers, 1
PUB. INTEREST LJ. 1, 15-22 (1995); Loic J. D. Wacquant & William J. Wilson, Poverty, Joblessness, and the Social Transformation of the Inner City, in WELFARE POLICY FOR THE 1990s 70

(Phoebe H.Cottinghan & David T. Ellwood eds., 1989).
79. See Wacquant & Wilson, supra note 78, at 97.
80. See Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 CONN. L.
REv. 817, 831-38 (1994); see also Diana Pearce, Welfare Is Not for Women: Why the War on
Poverty Cannot Conquer the Feminization of Poverty, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 265,
267-69 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990) (describing the uniqueness of female poverty).
81. Klare, supra note 78, at 15.
82. See TRIBE, supra note 22, § 15-2, at 1305; Robin West, Progressive and Conservative
Constitutionalism,88 MICH. L. REv. 641 (1990).
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ticipation in the national community. According to Robin West, "[t]he goal is
an affirmatively autonomous existence: a meaningfully flourishing, independent, enriched individual life."83
Second, claims to public assistance might also be based on the requirements of democracy. A truly democratic society has the obligation to provide
its members with the prerequisites of political participation. 4 William
Forbath, for example, draws upon an ideal of equality embodied in the Civil
War Amendments "in which racial and economic justice are entwined." 5 The
Reconstruction-era radicals' solution to the problem that poverty poses for
democracy was not the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, but redistribution
of wealth and resources. According to Forbath, "they thought, in Akhil Amar's
apt phrase, that 'property is such a good thing ... so constitutive, so essential
for both individual and collective self-governance,' that 'every citizen should
have some."' 86 Forbath finds historical support for a positive constitutional
vision that offers more than state provision of the bare minimum necessary for
subsistence. Instead of focusing on welfare entitlements, Forbath argues, every
previous generation of reformers "sought more complex and autonomy-enhancing institutional reforms to secure the constitutional norms of decent live87
lihoods, independence, responsibility, and remunerative work.
CONCLUSION

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine maintains the liberal connection
between property and privacy and the liberal separation between public intrusion and private decisions. A progressive vision of economic and political
justice challenges both. This general vision leaves open a number of questions
about the claim to government assistance. Should we see it as a right to government funding of particular activities, or to broad economic redistribution
that ensures all citizens the property necessary for private autonomy and democratic participation? Should we prefer universal programs that might garner
broad-based support and blur distinctions between the poor and nonpoor or
means-tested and race-based programs strategically directed at dismantling
institutional inequalities? Should we direct our efforts to the courts, legislatures, or both? Moreover, establishing a collective obligation to support the
prerequisites for democracy or human flourishing will not necessarily deprive
the government of any power to regulate these activities. But it will force the
government to justify its regulation on more legitimate terms. There are numerous tasks to pursue in constructing a more dignified and egalitarian welfare
system. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, however, points us in the
wrong direction.

83. West, supra note 82, at 707.
84. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 138-40; Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a
ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659.
85. Forbath, supra note 44, at 1782.
86. Id. at 1795 (quoting Akhil R. Anar, Forty Acres and A Mule: A Republican Theory of
Minimal Entitlements, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1990)).
87. Id. at 1799.
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What conditions may the government constitutionally impose on the receipt of "public assistance"?' The Supreme Court first considered this question in 1963 in Sherbert v. Verner,2 and by 1989 had decided twenty-three
such "unconstitutional conditions" cases.3 No pattern was readily visible in the
results of these cases,4 however, and commentators' attempts to make sense of
them yielded only expressions of despair and normative proposals.'
In 1990, I offered a positive theory of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in those twenty-three Supreme Court decisions.6 The theory proposed
that the Court invalidated only those challenged conditions that required persons unable to earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible for the perti-
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This essay was prepared for the symposium on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
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providing a stimulating and enjoyable environment for revisiting the unconstitutional conditions
paradox, and to Julie Nice for her thoughtful commentary. I presented a preliminary version of
some of the arguments contained in this essay at a conference on "Bargaining with the State,"
held at the Law and Economics Center of the George Mason University Law School in March
1994, and I am grateful to Richard Epstein for his comments on that occasion. My colleagues,
Toni Massaro and Ted Schneyer, as always, provided insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1. By "public assistance" I mean all government-provided "necessities of life," whether in
the form of a cash grant or in-kind aid. Such benefits include food stamps, medical care, and cash
grants to those unable for various reasons to earn a subsistence income. I mean, therefore, to
include not only "welfare," but also non-need-based income maintenance insurance schemes such
as Unemployment Compensation and Social Security, which provide cash grants to the unemployed, some of whom might have savings and other assets sufficient to provide them a subsistence income even in the absence of paid employment.
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. For a complete list of these cases, see Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a
Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1185, 1200 n.49 (1985).
4. See id. at 1201-02.
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A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,State Power,
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The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); and
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413 (1989).
Some of the earlier unconstitutional conditions scholarship also discussed the (then-existent) public assistance cases, but similarly failed to provide a positive theory of the Court's holdings. See, e.g., Frederick Davis, Veterans' Benefits, JudicialReview, and the Constitutional Problems of "Positive" Government, 39 IND. LJ. 183 (1964); Hans Linde, ConstitutionalRights in the
Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10 (1964);
Robert M. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL.
L. REv. 443 (1966); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
6. See Baker, supra note 3.
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nent benefit, to pay a higher price to exercise their constitutional rights than
similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income.'
Since the publication of my positive theory, the Court has decided two
important unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance benefits: Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,' and
Rust v. Sullivan.9 In addition, Professor Richard Epstein has published Bargaining with the State, the most comprehensive normative theory and detailed
examination of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine ever presented by a
legal scholar.
In this Essay, I revisit my positive theory of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine with two major goals. First, I seek to determine whether the
Court's decisions in Smith and Rust are consistent with my positive theory
and, therefore, also with the Court's previous decisions in unconstitutional
conditions cases involving public assistance benefits. Second, I undertake a
critical examination of Epstein's normative theory, as he has applied it to
Smith and Rust and as it might be applied to other public assistance cases, in
an attempt to ascertain whether overall social welfare would be increased if
the Court were to employ Epstein's proposed test rather than the test my positive theory suggests the Court has implicitly applied in these cases since 1963.
Part I sets out the two-prong test that I contend the Court, sub silentio,
has applied in unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance
benefits, and discusses the test's normative underpinnings. It then describes the
test that Epstein would have the Court employ in these cases and in all other
unconstitutional conditions cases regardless of the government benefit at issue.
Parts II and III examine the Court's decisions in Smith and Rust, respectively, first in light of my positive theory and then as Epstein has applied his
normative theory to each. Part IV applies Epstein's theory to two public assistance cases that he does not discuss, United States Department of Agriculture
v. Moreno 0 and Dandridge v. Williams," and compares the result reached
and the analytic path taken under his normative theory with their counterparts
under my positive theory.
The Essay concludes by explaining why it is hard to know whether overall social welfare would be increased if the Court either began to employ, or
had always employed, Epstein's proposed test in unconstitutional conditions
cases involving public assistance benefits rather than the test my positive
theory suggests the Court has always implicitly applied in these cases.

I. A TALE OF TWO THEORIES
Under my positive theory, the Court, sub silentio, employs a straightforward two-prong test in deciding unconstitutional conditions cases involving

7. Id. at 1188, 1213-20.
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
10. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
11. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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public assistance benefits. The first prong asks whether the challenged condition impinges on a constitutionally protected activity. If not, the condition is
sustained. If so, however, the second prong then asks whether the effect of the
challenged condition is to require persons unable to earn a subsistence income
and otherwise eligible for the pertinent benefit to pay a higher price to engage
in that constitutionally protected activity than similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income. Only if the answer to this question is also affirmative will the Court overturn the challenged condition. My examination of the
twenty-three challenges to conditions on public assistance benefits that the
Court heard between 1963 and 1989 revealed this two-prong test to be both
easily applied and a consistently good predictor of outcome, notwithstanding
the fact that the decisions spanned the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist
3
Courts.1
Implicit in this test is a baseline not previously considered by commentators: the Court compares the position of individuals unable to earn a subsistence income and otherwise eligible for the pertinent benefit, with the position
of other, similarly situated individuals whose source of a subsistence income is
employment.' 4 And the Court conducts this comparison with reference to the
price the two groups are required to pay to exercise their constitutional rights.
The baselines traditionally discussed in the unconstitutional conditions context,
in contrast, would have the Court compare the position of individuals otherwise eligible for a conditioned public assistance benefit with their own position in either a world in which that benefit is made available without the attached condition or a world in which that benefit is not made available at
all. 5
Underlying this positive theory is an appreciation that the equality in the
Constitution's allocation of rights is merely a formal one. 6 Although we indeed share equally in the protection from various types of government interference which the Constitution promises, the exercise of many constitutional
rights carries a price for the individual. And ours is fundamentally a market
economy. Within our economy, we each have in equal measure the freedom to
spend our (vastly unequal) resources as we choose. But the notion of "price,"
so central to both our economy and my positive theory, simultaneously perpetuates an unspoken inequality of costs: the same price is always a smaller proportion of the total resources of a wealthy person than of a poor one. Thus, by
ensuring that persons unable to earn a subsistence income and otherwise eligible for the pertinent benefit are not required to pay a higher price to exercise
their constitutional rights than persons earning such an income, the Court
guarantees a certain non-wealth-dependent equality of constitutional rights
within the constraints of our essentially market economy."
Richard Epstein, in contrast, has claimed an inability to see any desirable,

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Baker, supra note 3, at 1217.
Id. at 1187-88, 1220-46.
Id. at 1217.
See id. at 1190-93 and sources cited therein; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 6-16.
Baker, supra note 3, at 1188, 1246-55.
Id. at 1197.
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large patterns in the Court's decisions in cases involving unconstitutional
conditions," and has therefore offered a normative proposal for deciding all
of these cases regardless of the government benefit at issue. 9 He would have
the Court review challenged conditions on public assistance benefits (and
seemingly any other enactments) with the single goal of maximizing KaldorHicks efficiency.20 Unlike the Pareto test of efficiency, which requires that
any social change make at least one person better off and leave no one worse
off regardless of the relative sizes of any gains and losses, the Kaldor-Hicks
measure requires only that "the winners could in principle compensate the
losers and still remain better off by their own lights."'" And because this
compensation need not actually be paid, the Kaldor-Hicks test spares society
the "transaction costs drag" of the administrative burdens that would be incurred operating a just compensation requirement.22
Epstein acknowledges that the courts may have difficulty evaluating legislation under the Kaldor-Hicks test: "Social legislation is ordinarily exceedingly
complicated, especially when its indirect effects have to be taken into account,
and the ability to marshall either theoretical or empirical evidence of the overall desirability of a social scheme is usually well beyond the competence of
any court."23 Thus, he proposes that courts use a "disproportionate impact" or
"pro rata" test as an "indirect means to determine whether the targets of legislation have been compensated by the state" and whether the legislation therefore increases aggregate social welfare.24 Where there is no "clean market
solution" and government action is therefore necessary, the pro rata test enables the courts, first, to "choose that allocation of the surplus [from collective
action] that maximizes the likelihood that the beneficial social change will be
brought about by the legislature in the first place ' 25 and, second, to "minimize the administrative costs associated with the operation of the system. '26
In the context of challenges to conditions on government benefits, Epstein
would have the courts sustain only those conditions that (1) advance the wel-

18. EPsTEIN, supra note 5, at 17-24.
19. Id. at 98-103.
20. Id. at 81.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 81, 83-84.
23. Id. at 86.
24. Id. at 87, 94-98.
25. Id. at 94-95. Epstein contefids that
Faced with an all-or-nothing choice (of providing the government benefit without the
problematic condition or not providing the benefit at all], all participants [in the legislative process] will prefer to adopt the desirable outcome because they know that there is
no solution available to them which allows them to garner the benefits of the legal
change while simultaneously denying it to their adversaries. Since there is no way to
obtain private gain by defecting from the social solution, there will be widespread support of the measure. In addition there will be no factional efforts to impose conditions
whose effect is to reallocate (and thereby diminish) the surplus created by legislation.
Id. at 97.
26. Id. at 95. Because Epstein's pro-rata test does not ever take into account the subjective
gains obtained by anyone, it may allow legislation that is not Kaldor-Hicks efficient to pass muster in cases where the legislation results in some increase in market value but a larger decrease in
subjective value. Id. at 96-97. But Epstein contends that "[t]he admitted allocative distortion is less
dangerous than the administrative peril that replaces it." Id. at 92.

19951

BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

fare of all affected groups,27 and (2) do so in equal proportions." Thus, the
question is not whether a potential benefit recipient (or even the entire class of
these individuals) prefers the world with the conditioned benefit to a world in
which the benefit is not available at all. Rather, "[t]he question is whether the
condition advances overall social welfare, and there is no guarantee that this
will happen just because it is consented to by the individual actor."29
Epstein would have the courts use as their baseline "not the status quo
ante,"-that is, a world in which the government does not make the benefit
available at all-"but a best achievable state of affairs in which the program is
put forward without the conditions attached."3 When a condition is challenged by a benefit claimant who is "aggrieved relative to the world as it
might have been," Epstein would have the courts first "establish some use of
monopoly power by the state, as with its control of access to public highways." He would then have the court examine the challenged condition to
determine whether it yields pro rata gains and is therefore permissible, or
"reduces the total size of the social surplus [resulting from the government
action] by allowing it to be redistributed through factional intrigue," and is
therefore impermissible.32
In order better to understand how Epstein's proposed test differs from the
test that my positive theory suggests the Court implicitly has applied in unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance benefits, it may be
useful to apply both tests to some actual cases. In the next two sections, I
examine two of the Court's most recent unconstitutional conditions decisions
involving public assistance benefits, Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith33 and Rust v. Sullivan,34 in light of my positive
theory and as Epstein has applied his normative theory to each.
II. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. SMITH

In Smith, two members of the Native American Church (hereinafter "respondents") were fired by their employer, a private drug rehabilitation organization, because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a church
ceremony.35 Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional possession of
any listed "controlled substance," including peyote, unless it has been pre-

27. Id. at 98. Unfortunately, "for the sake of simplicity" Epstein's hypotheticals all involve
only "Group A" and "Group B," and it is therefore never clear how he would determine which
groups or individuals are "affected" by a particular conditional offer of a government benefit. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original).
31. Id.
32. Id. In the end, it is far from clear that Epstein has resolved the problem he identifies of
"fashion[ing a test that can distinguish good conditions from bad ones," given the "complex
inquiry" aimed at "maximiz[ing] the total cooperative surplus from the government action" which
he would have the courts undertake. Id.
33. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
34. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
35. Smith, 494 U.S. at874.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

scribed by a medical practitioner," and the Oregon Supreme Court read this
prohibition to make no exception for the sacramental use of the drug."7 The
respondents' subsequent applications for unemployment compensation were
denied by the State of Oregon under a statutory provision disqualifying from
unemployment benefits anyone discharged for work-related "misconduct."38
Respondents challenged the denial of unemployment benefits on the ground
that it violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.39
The Smith majority understood the case to require a decision only on the
question of whether the Free Exercise Clause "permzts the State of Oregon to
include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal
prohibition on use of that drug."' For if Oregon's prohibition on peyote use,
including religiously motivated use, "'is consistent with the Federal Constitution, there is no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon,' and 'the
State is free to withhold unemployment compensation from respondents for
engaging in work-related misconduct, despite its religious motivation."' 4
The Smith majority explicitly framed the issue precisely as my two-prong
test predicts. If the challenged condition does not impinge on a constitutionally
protected activity-if there is no First Amendment right to use peyote for
sacramental purposes-the condition will be sustained. In the absence of any
"contention that Oregon's drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious
beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children
in those beliefs," the majority declined to hold that "when otherwise
prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the
convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation."'42 That is, "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)."' 43 Failing to find the sacramental use of peyote to
be protected by the First Amendment, the Smith majority, consistent with my
positive theory, readily sustained Oregon's denial of unemployment compensation to the respondents whose dismissal resulted from such use."
Richard Epstein, too, finds Smith an easy case-but in the other direction.45 He appears to agree that the denial of unemployment benefits to respondents must be sustained-that is, that respondents have no unconstitution-

36. id.
37. Id. at 876 (citing Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 763 P.2d 146,
148 (Or. 1988)).
38. Id. at 874.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 876 (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S.
660, 672 (1988)).
42. Id. at 882.
43. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
44. Id. at 890.
45. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 265-68.
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al conditions claim-if the sacramental use of peyote is not constitutionally
protected.' In contrast to the Smith majority, however, Epstein would find
Oregon's criminalization of peyote use in religious services invalid under the
Free Exercise Clause.47 Considering "[t]he troubled line between action and
expression that explains so little in ordinary First Amendment law [to be] of
still less help in this context," Epstein would have the Court "ask for some
special justification for the restriction of the state criminal law in this context,
wholly without regard to government intention or singling out."' And he believes such justification is lacking in Smith: respondents' "use of peyote in
religious observance poses no threat of harm to others" and "is sharply limited
by time, place, and circumstance and carries with it none of the risks normally
associated with general drug use."'49
Thus, Epstein's difficulty with Smith appears to lie not in the Court's
application of the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine," but rather in its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. And this highlights a larger problem with Epstein's own applications of his normative theory. Although he claims to lack interest in declaring the New Deal unconstitutional,"0 and indeed seems willing to accept welfare benefits as a fixture of
the modem state,' the focus of his reformist energies is scarcely limited to a
new theory of the conditions that the state should be permitted to attach to the
various benefits it offers.
Even when Epstein undertakes to apply his theory to an actual case, he
frequently provides no answer to the question of whether the Court, given
existing interpretationsof the pertinent constitutional guarantee, should have
permitted the government to offer the relevant benefit on the condition that
recipients waive that constitutional right. For the Court and many others, this
practice likely diminishes the utility, and ultimately the persuasiveness, of
Epstein's general theory of unconstitutional conditions.

46. Id. at 268. Epstein states that "[i]f the criminal prosecution should fail, so too should the
state's effort to use conduct (now lawful, and indeed protected) to deny unemployment benefits
otherwise required by state law." Id.
47. Id. at 267-68.
48. Id. at 267.
49. Id. at 267-68.
50. Id. at xiv. Epstein devoted an earlier book to that project. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS).

51. Epstein devotes Chapter 17 of Bargainingwith the State to a discussion of welfare benefits, Chapter 16 to unemployment benefits, and a total of 76 pages to "Positive Rights in the Welfare State."
Since his declared intent in Bargaining with the State is "to see that useful projects go
forward in a sensible fashion, not to strike down unwise projects that should not go forward at
all," one might assume that Epstein is even willing to consider these forms of income redistribution to be examples of government "projects that promise some positive gain." EPSTEIN, supra
note 5, at xiv. Indeed, even in Takings, in which Epstein argued that "the eminent domain clause
and parallel clauses in the Constitution render constitutionally infirm or suspect many of the heralded reforms and institutions of the twentieth century," TAKINGS, supra note 50, at x, he expressly did not contend that "the ideal level of (voluntary) welfare support should be zero," id. at 322.
He argued rather that "if the state had never undertaken welfare programs, the demand for them
would be a tiny fraction of what it is today." Id.
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III. RusT v. SULLivAN
Although the regulations at issue in Rust v. Sullivan 2 have been rescinded by the Clinton Administration,5" the unconstitutional conditions question
that they presented remains important, both as a jurisprudential matter and because equivalent regulations might be imposed in the future. In Rust, Title X
grant recipients and doctors who supervise Title X funds (hereinafter "petitioners") challenged, on behalf of themselves and their patient-clients, regulations interpreting a provision of Title X of the Public Health Service Act
which specified that "'[n]one of the funds appropriated [to voluntary family
planning projects] under this subchapter shall be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning."' 54
These regulations imposed three related conditions on any "project" receiving Title X funds: (1) it "'may not provide counseling concerning the use
of abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as
a method of family planning'; 55 (2) it may not engage in "activities that 'encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning ...
;56
and (3) it must be "'physically and financially separate' from prohibited abortion activities."'" Petitioners argued that the regulations violated the First
Amendment free speech rights of Title X projects' clients and health providers
by discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, and the Fifth Amendment right of
the projects' clients to choose whether to terminate their pregnancy."
Before we can apply the test suggested by my positive theory to this case,
we must ascertain what benefit and attached condition are at issue. If one
understands the benefit offered the clients of Title X projects 9 to be free
family planning counseling other than abortion referrals or counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning,' there is no attached
condition. If one instead understands the benefits offered Title X projects'
clients to be free family planning counseling, the attached condition is that
these indigent women forego receiving information concerning abortion during
their meetings with Title X counselors.
Accepting the latter formulation of the conditioned benefit at issue in
Rust, we must now inquire whether there is a First Amendment right to receive information concerning abortion as a method of family planning. Insofar
as the government could not constitutionally prohibit the dissemination of
information concerning a fundamental right such as abortion, there surely is

52. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
53. 58 Fed. Reg. 7,462 (1993) (suspending rules issued at 53 Fed. Reg. 2,922 (1988) and
codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2, 59.7-.10) (1994).
54. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970)).
55. Id. at 179 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989)).
56. Id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989)).
57. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989)).
58. Id. at 181, 192, 201.
59. The analysis under my positive theory focuses solely on the concerns of recipients of
public assistance, not the concerns of its providers.
60. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 179 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989)) (emphasis added).
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such a First Amendment right.6 And the challenged condition therefore arguably impinges on a constitutionally protected activity.
Under the second prong of the test suggested by my positive theory, we
must now ask whether the effect of the challenged condition is to require persons unable to earn a subsistence income and otherwise eligible for the pertinent benefit to pay a higher price to receive family planning information concerning abortion than similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income.
And it seems clear that the condition does not have this effect. As the Rust
majority observed, "a woman's right to receive ... information concerning
abortion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X project
remains unfettered."62 The condition simply leaves clients of Title X projects
to pay the same, unsubsidized price for abortion information that those not eligible for Title X-funded counselling must pay. Thus, my positive theory predicts that the Court would sustain the condition challenged in Rust, as it in
fact did.63
Richard Epstein, in contrast, contends that Rust was wrongly decided, and
he would strike down "either a prohibition or a requirement on [abortion]
counseling." Although he begins by asserting that the answer to the "key
question" of "whether there is any reason to be concerned with a uniform state
position on the subject [of abortion counselling], either way" depends on an
assessment of "the relative strength of the bargaining and takings risks" in this
context, his subsequent inquiry occupies only six sentences."
In appraising the "bargaining risks" posed by the Title X scheme, Epstein
inquires whether "the state wield[s] monopoly power in this area-in which
case both uniform rules, you can't speak or you must speak, should be struck
down." Although he contends that "there are no obvious barriers to entry
that impede setting up rival programs to pick up the slack or to counteract the
impression of the desirable options that government creates," he also speculates that "the menu of alternatives to government programs may be far greater
in New York or San Francisco than it is in Amarillo or Fargo."67 And, apparently considering further investigation (or elaboration) unnecessary, Epstein
6
concludes that the bargaining risks are unacceptably large in this context. 8
Epstein's consideration of the "takings risks" presented by the Title X
scheme is more cursory still. He simply asserts that "the takings risk here is
aggravated if the state takes either extreme position [on abortion counselling]

61.

See, e.g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality decision); see also

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTmONAL LAW § 12-2 to -4, § 15-6 to -7, at 1320-26 (2d

ed. 1988).
62. Rust, 500 U.S. at 203. The Rust majority acknowledged that "lilt would undoubtedly be
easier for a woman seeking an abortion if she could receive information about abortion from a
Title X project, but the Constitution does not require that the Government distort the scope of its
mandated program in order to provide that information." Id.
63. Id.
64. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 300.
65. Id. at 299-300.
66. Id. at 300.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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because some citizens will necessarily be forced to fund programs with which
'
they are in strong philosophical or intellectual disagreement."69
It is informative to compare Epstein's discussion of Rust with his analysis
of Harris v. McRae, ° a related, earlier case whose "irreducible tension" he
believes "carries over to [Rust]."'" At issue in Harris was the Hyde Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which prohibits the use of any federal funds to
reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program except under certain narrowly specified circumstances, although federal Medicaid funds may be
used to provide other medical services, including those incident to pregnancy
and childbirth.72 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the Hyde Amendment under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the religion clauses of the First Amendment.73
The Medicaid Act after the Hyde Amendment can be construed as offering each otherwise eligible pregnant woman free pregnancy-related medical
care on the condition that she not have an abortion and instead carry the pregnancy to term. Under the test suggested by my positive theory, we must first
inquire whether this condition impinges on a constitutionally protected activity.
And it clearly does: under Roe v. Wade, the government cannot constitutionally prohibit a woman from terminating her pregnancy during the first trimester.74
Under the second prong of the test, we must now ask whether the effect
of the challenged condition is to require women unable to earn a subsistence
income and otherwise eligible for Medicaid benefits to pay a higher price to
exercise their constitutional right to an abortion than similarly situated women
whose source of a subsistence income is employment.75 And it seems clear
that the condition does not have this effect. The Hyde Amendment did not, as
it might have, require that all Medicaid, food stamps, or other public assistance be withheld from otherwise eligible women who choose to exercise their
constitutional right to an abortion.76 It simply declined to subsidize the exer-

69. Id. Epstein's preferred solution is not that the condition challenged in Rust be invalidated, but that the government "[g]et out of the counseling and referral business, save by charitable
deduction." Id. at 302. For Epstein, "the combined bargaining and takings risks doom any [government-funded] program that seeks to provide [reproductive] counseling and referral, at least so
long as Roe is on the books." Id. at 301.
70. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
71. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 300.
72. Harris, 448 U.S. at 301-03.
73. Id. at 301.
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163, 164 (1973). The Roe majority held that prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester... the attending physician, in consultation
with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the
judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.
Id. at 163. The majority also held, however, that "[flor the stage subsequent to approximately the
end of the first trimester [but prior to "viability"], the State, in promoting its interest in the health
of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably
related to maternal health." Id. at 164.
75. Whether the women, their spouses, or both are employed is irrelevant to this analysis.
76. Under this hypothetical law, the cost of an abortion to a claimant is the market price for
that service plus the loss of a statutory benefit (e.g., other medical care or food stamps) for which
she would have been eligible had she not exercised the pertinent constitutional right. Thus, the
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cise of that right, leaving Medicaid-eligible women to pay the same market
price that other women must pay if they choose to obtain an abortion. Thus,
my positive theory predicts that the Court would sustain the condition challenged in Harris,as it in fact did."
Epstein, too, would find the Hyde Amendment constitutional,7 but his
view that Harris was correctly decided is difficult to reconcile with his conclusion that Rust was not. 79 At the center of his analysis in both cases appears to be a reading of Roe to require some sort of "government neutrality"
on issues of reproductive choice. 0 Epstein is correct that "Roe works a double transformation at a single leap: abortions move from the status of criminal
acts into 'fundamental rights."'' And in subsequent cases the Court has in
fact invalidated a variety of non-wealth-dependent restrictions on abortion,
other than criminalization, which it found to "unduly burden" that right.82 But
neither in Roe nor in any subsequent case did the Court mandate the sort of
government neutrality on reproductive choice that Epstein seems to envision.
Indeed, the Court in Roe explicitly held that its "decision leaves the State free
to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests." 3 Even during the first trimester, when the State's constitutional authority to regulate abortions is at its nadir, Roe mandates only that "the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."84
That a constitutional right is declared "fundamental" has never meant that
the government must subsidize the exercise of that right either in every instance or whenever it chooses to subsidize the exercise of legitimate alternative activities. The fundamental right of parents to send their children to private schools, recognized in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 5 has never been interpreted to mean that the government must fund those schools if it chooses to

claimant, an individual unable to earn a subsistence income, would be required to pay a higher
price than a similarly situated person earning a subsistence income in order to exercise her constitutional right to an abortion.
In both Harrisand Maher, the Court explicitly discussed this hypothetical:
A substantial constitutional question would arise if Congress had attempted to withhold
all Medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that candidate
had exercised her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy by
abortion.... But the Hyde Amendment, unlike the statute at issue in Sherbert, does not
provide for such a broad disqualification from the receipt of public benefits. Rather, the
Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare provision at issue in Maher, represents
simply a refusal to subsidize certain protected conduct. A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a "penalty" on that activity.
Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 n.8 (1977).
77. Harris, 448 U.S. at 326-27.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
1341-45
83.
84.
85.

EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 285-94.

Compare id. at 285-94 with id. at 297-302.
See id. at 286-90, 299-302.
Id. at 289; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56.
See, e.g.,
Baker, supra note 3, at 1231 n.170; see also TRIBE, supra note 61, § 15-10, at
and cases cited therein.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
Id. at 164.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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provide public schools. Nor has the fundamental right to reproduce, first recognized in Skinner v. Oklahoma,86 ever been construed to require that the
government hand out a voucher good for "one free childbirth" with each free
condom it chooses to distribute.
But Epstein's concern in both Harris and Rust with Roe and the nature of
the abortion right is something of a red herring in any case. For even though
he asserts that Roe requires a type of government neutrality on issues of reproductive choice, which is not present in Harris or Rust,87 he nonetheless finds
Harris (but, intriguingly, not Rust) to have been correctly decided because of
the "takings risks" presented by the challenged condition.8 Observing that
"[tihe free exercise of religion, like the free exercise of speech, can be limited
as much by direct taxation as it can by prohibitions," 9 Epstein contends that
a persuasive free exercise argument in favor of the Hyde Amendment can be
made by those who oppose abortion for religious reasons but who, nonetheless, could be forced in the absence of the Amendment to pay, through their
taxes, for what they consider to be the murder of Medicaid recipients' unborn
children." And this argument suggests to Epstein that the Hyde Amendment
is not only constitutional but "constitutionally mandated."'
Epstein is quick to acknowledge, however, that "there are also establishment clause arguments that can be brought against the Hyde Amendment."
Since "[m]any of those who oppose the funding of abortions do so on religious grounds," taxpayers who support government funding of abortions for
indigent women might argue that when their opponents "turn their preferences
into law, they have [unconstitutionally] established, at least in part, their religious beliefs under the Medicaid statutes."9' 3
One might now expect Epstein to tote up the number of likely claimants
under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses-much as the political process arguably does in the course of enacting legislation such as the
Hyde Amendment-in order to reach the result that yields the greatest aggregate social welfare. Instead, however, Epstein simply states that he finds the
Establishment Clause argument "more strained in this context than ... its free
exercise alternative,'94 and concludes that, although "a very hard call," the
Hyde Amendment
should be sustained "but perhaps only by a bare 5 to 4
5
Vote.9

Unfortunately, Epstein's analysis of Harris rests on a reading of the religion clauses to which the Court has never subscribed. Epstein is correct only
in his (implicit) view that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses both

86.
note 61,
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); TRIBE, supra
§ 15-10.
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 286-90, 299-302.
Id. at 289-91. Compare id. at 297-302.
Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 294.
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create exceptions to the usual rule against taxpayer standing. 96 The Establishment Clause simply grants all taxpayers the right not to subsidize religion; it
affords no taxpayer the right not to subsidize abortion.97 Thus, although the
restrictions on abortion funding at issue in Harris may coincide with the tenets
of the Roman Catholic faith,98 for example, the Court has never held that a
statute violates the Establishment Clause just because it "happens to coincide
or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." If an enactment "has
a secular legislative purpose, if its principal or primary effect neither advances
nor inhibits religion, and if it does not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion," it does not contravene the Establishment Clause. t "
And, as the majority observed in Harris,the Hyde Amendment "is as much a
reflection of 'traditionalist' values towards abortion, as it is an embodiment of
the views of any particular religion."' '
Nor has the Court been sympathetic to individual taxpayers' free exercise
claims for exemptions from generally applicable taxes. Given the federal
government's great interest in both the maintenance of, and uniform participation in, the tax system, the Court has held that the government must accommodate claims for exemptions only if doing so will not "unduly interfere with
fulfillment of the governmental interest."' And fearing that a slippery slope
would result, the Court has been reluctant to require such exemptions:
If, for example, a religious adherent believes war [or abortion] is a
sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified
as devoted to war- [or abortion-] related activities, such individuals
would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that
percentage of the income tax. The tax system could not function.' °3
It is not a coincidence that Epstein finds so much of basic religion clause
doctrine wrongheaded, nor that the unconstitutional conditions cases involving
public assistance benefits that he chooses to discuss are, to a highly disproportionate extent, ones in which he contends the religion clauses are implicated."° In our post-New Deal world, the religion clauses constitute the stron96. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (Establishment Clause); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Free Exercise Clause); see also TRIBE, supra note 61, § 3-16, at 11819, § 14-13, at 1260-62.
97. On this point, compare Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.
CHm.L. REv. 195, 210-11 (1992), with Michael M. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Cam. L. REV. 115, 164, 168-69 (1992), and with Michael M. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REV. 989, 1006-14 (1991).
98. This was in fact a claim raised by the appellees in Harris, and acknowledged by the
Court to be a plausible view of the challenged funding restriction. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 319-20.
99. Id. at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
100. Id. (quoting Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980)).
101. Harris, 448 U.S. at 319; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 138-41.
102. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982); see also TRIBE, supra note 61, § 14-13,
at 1260-63.
103. Lee, 445 U.S. at 260. Epstein, not surprisingly, considers the Court's analysis in Lee to
be "seriously defective," not least because "the Court is surely wrong when it writes as though
there were a slippery slope problem." EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 268, 269-70. Thus, Epstein persists in advocating that the government create separate "risk pools" in various contexts, notwithstanding his awareness that the Court implicitly, but no less clearly, rejected this solution in Lee.
Id. at 262 n.28.
104. Of the 25 unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance benefits which the
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gest-perhaps the only-constitutional barrier to income redistribution that remains. 5 Because Epstein precommitted not to devote Bargaining with the
State to declaring the New Deal unconstitutional," 6 but nonetheless believes
that "a constitutional order that imposed restrictions upon redistribution
7
through taxation and state welfare benefits" has much to recommend it,"1
the religion clauses are his last, best hope. It is therefore not surprising that he
systematically (mis)reads those clauses with an eye toward maximizing their
coverage, or that he is most eager to discuss cases in which his expansive
reading of these clauses could be deployed to curtail redistribution and thereby, he believes, increase aggregate social welfare. Indeed, Epstein himself observes that "[o]nce general takings and public trust arguments are no longer
sufficient to forestall all forms of redistribution, whether covert or overt, between A and B, then additional pressure is placed upon the religion clauses to
forbid redistribution both from or to any religious group.""'5 He might have
added that he, at least, would also comfortably place additional pressure on the
notion of a "religious group."
In the end, Epstein's discussions of Rust and Harris are likely to leave the
reader unsatisfied for at least two reasons. First, he never explains why his
analysis of the takings risks at issue in Rust does not track his decisive analysis of those risks in Harris.Why doesn't Rust, too, come down to the opposing free exercise and establishment claims of taxpayers which so trouble Epstein in Harris? As in Harris, the free exercise argument in Rust would be
made by those who oppose abortion for religious reasons, but who nonetheless
could be forced, in the absence of the challenged Title X regulations, to pay
through their taxes for speech promoting what they consider to be the murder
of unborn children." And taxpayers opposed to the Title X regulations
would, as in Harris, argue that since many who favor the "gag order" imposed
by the regulations do so on religious grounds, when they "turn their preferences into law, they have [unconstitutionally] established, at least in part, their
religious beliefs under [federal law].""' Thus, one would expect Epstein to
sustain the Title X regulations at issue in Rust if, as in Harris, he finds the
Establishment Clause argument in this context "more strained" than its free
exercise alternative.'

Court has heard since 1963, only 11 (44%) implicate the religion clauses, even under Epstein's
expansive reading of those clauses. In Bargaining with the State, Epstein discusses 9 of these 25
cases, 7 (78%) of which he contends implicate the religion clauses.
105. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, nearly all state constitutions include explicit restrictions on
"special legislation," which may preclude some forms of forced redistribution. See Clayton P.
Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L.
REv. 625, 642-57 (1994); see also Lyman H. Cloe & Sumner Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 KY. L.J. 351 (1936).
106. See supra note 51.
107. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 294; see also id. at 300-02.
108. Id. at 260-61. Although Epstein would clearly favor this additional pressure on the religion clauses, he does not demonstrate that the post-New Deal Court shares his preference.
109. Id. at 290.
110. Id.at290-91.
111. Id. at 291.
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Perhaps Epstein does not find the Establishment Clause argument more
strained than its free exercise alternative in the context of Rust. Perhaps, for
purposes of his "takings" analysis under the religion clauses, he considers
government funding of speech promoting abortion (Rust) to be importantly
different from government funding of actual abortions (Harris).Or perhaps he
believes government funding of medical expenses related to childbirth, but not
those related to abortion, to constitute the desired government neutrality on
issues of reproduction in a way that the government funding of pro-life, but
not pro-choice, reproductive counselling conceivably does not. Unfortunately,
Epstein does not say.
Second, in applying his normative theory to Harris and Rust, Epstein
never answers the question of whether the Court, given its existing understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the constitutional right to an abortion, should have sustained the benefit condition at issue
in either case. By basing his discussion of both cases on revisionist readings of
the relevant constitutional guarantees, Epstein, as in his discussion of Smith,
substantially undercuts the usefulness and persuasiveness of that analysis, and
ultimately of his proposed normative theory, for those (surely including the
Court) who do not subscribe to his readings.
IV. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V. MORENO AND
DANDRIDGE V. WILLIAMS

Given his penchant for both constitutional revisionism and unconstitutional conditions cases that lend themselves to analysis under the religion clauses,
Epstein's discussion of cases such as Smith, Rust, and Harris sheds little light
on the many unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance
benefits that he does not discuss. Thus, before passing final judgment on
Epstein's theory, it might be informative to attempt to apply it to cases such as
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno"' and Dandridge v.
Williams,"3 which he does not discuss and which do not involve the religion
clauses, even under Epstein's expansive reading of them.
At issue in Moreno was a federal statutory provision that disqualified for
food stamps any otherwise eligible persons who lived in a household containing any unrelated individuals." 4 This statute arguably required some persons
otherwise eligible for food stamps to choose between receiving that public
assistance or exercising their First Amendment freedom of association." 5

112. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
113. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
114. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
115. Although the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble," this freedom of association has never been
understood to include an absolute right to live with an unrelated person under any and all circumstances. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding village ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings and defining "family" as not more than two
unrelated persons). Beginning with Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926),
reasonable zoning laws bearing a substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare have been held to be valid exercises of the states' police power. See also TRIBE, supra note
61, § 15-17.
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If I read Epstein correctly, he would have us inquire whether this combination of government largesse plus condition maximizes social welfare relative
to other possibilities, including making the benefit available without the challenged condition."6 To begin, it is not clear that anyone gains from this particular condition on the receipt of food stamps. Some persons eligible for food
stamps will likely forego living in households containing any unrelated individuals in order to receive this needed benefit. In doing so, however, they may
give up not only the exercise of their First Amendment freedom of association, but also important economies of scale in their necessary living expenses.
Nor would this condition appear to make the taxpayers who fund the food
stamp program-or anyone else-better off. A small number of otherwise
eligible persons may choose to forego food stamps and live in a household
with unrelated individuals. But the ultimate savings, if any, to taxpayers from
this tiny decrease in the total dollar amount of food stamps distributed will
surely be outweighed many times over by the increased administrative and
monitoring costs that will attend the imposition of this condition." 7
Thus, the condition on food stamp benefits at issue in Moreno appears to
be one of Epstein's "perverse conditions" with no allocative gains."' And I
expect that Epstein applauds the Court's inability to find any rational basis for
this challenged condition under modem equal protection law," 9 at least as
much as he likely marvels at the ability of interest group politics to generate
in the challenged legislation a set 6f outcomes from which no one apparently
benefits. 2 °
An analysis of Moreno under the test suggested by my positive theory
reaches Epstein's result, but by a different route. The challenged condition
clearly involves a constitutionally protected activity insofar as it impinges on
food stamp claimants' First Amendment right to live with persons of their own
choosing.' 2' Thus, we proceed under the second prong to ask whether the
effect of this challenged condition is to require persons unable to earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible for food stamps, to pay a higher price
to exercise their First Amendment freedom of association than similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income.
Anyone choosing to live in a household containing unrelated individuals
might expect to incur certain costs from this choice of living situation and
companions, such as diminished privacy or other inconveniences. The person
whose source of a subsistence income is employment, however, does not typically in addition suffer the loss of that income should he exercise his constitutional freedom of association in this way. Thus, the condition challenged in
Moreno clearly imposes a surcharge on the price individuals eligible for food

116.

EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 98-103.

117. In addition to the increased administrative and monitoring costs, taxpayers may ultimately bear an increase in the cost of providing health care for those whose nutrition suffers as a result
of their decision to forego food stamps.
118. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 99, 101.
119. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
120. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 101.
121. See supra note 115.
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stamps must pay to exercise their First Amendment rights. And my theory
therefore predicts that the Court would invalidate the condition, as it in fact
22
did.
At least in the Moreno context, the analytical path prescribed by Epstein's
theory is not obviously more speculative, less determinate, or more convoluted
than the path prescribed by the test suggested by my positive theory or, therefore, the path implicitly taken by the Court. And, as we have just seen, the
destination reached is the same.
Consider one final case. Dandridge v. Williams concerned a challenge on
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds to a Maryland "maximum
grant regulation" that provided AFDC benefits to most eligible families in full
accord with the state-computed "standard of need," but imposed a ceiling on
the monthly amount of money any one family could receive.' 2' Thus, under
the Maryland regulation, a family of nine with a state-computed need of nearly
$300 per month, and a family of six with a computed need of $250 per month
would each receive the same $250 per month maximum grant.'24 This regulation arguably burdened the claimant parent's'" constitutional right to procreate insofar as it provided the parent a financial incentive to limit the family
to six or fewer persons, the size at which the offered benefits were sufficient
to cover the family's state-computed need.'26
As before, Epstein likely would have us ask whether this combination of
government largesse plus condition will maximize social welfare relative to
other possibilities, including making the benefit available without the challenged condition.' If we assume, consistent with the Court's finding, that
the state of Maryland was willing to devote only a determinate amount of its
total revenue to AFDC benefits, and that this amount was insufficient to meet
the state-computed need of all recipient households, 2 ' the issue becomes one
solely of the optimal allocation of benefits among AFDC-recipient households.
Should all eligible families, regardless of size, receive, say, 95% of their state-

122. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
123. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473-75 (1970).
124. Id. at 490-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125. The pertinent federal statutory provisions do not restrict AFDC benefits to single-parent
families. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)-(c) (1988). The vast majority of claimants, however, have historically been female-headed, single-parent households. See SAR A. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF
THE POOR 30-39 (3d ed. 1976).
126. The fundamental constitutional fight to procreate can be traced to Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
The regulation at issue in Dandridge also arguably burdened the claimant parent's freedom
of association insofar as it provided a financial incentive to limit the resident family to six or
fewer persons. But no more than in the case of the fight to procreate does the challenged condition require those unable to earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible for AFDC benefits,
to pay a higher price to exercise that constitutional fight than similarly situated persons whose
source of a subsistence income is employment- If a family of seven, for example, has one child
live elsewhere in order to reduce the size of its AFDC claimant unit to six, the family does not
thereby increase its total monthly amount of benefits. The family's per capita income may now be
greater than if all seven family members were living at home, but only if the family is not providing the nonresident child financial support. This state of affairs is the same for a family whose
source of a subsistence income is employment rather than AFDC benefits.
127. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 98-103.
128. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473-75.
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computed need? Or should eligible families of six or fewer persons receive
100% of their computed need, while families with seven or more persons
receive only 80% or less of theirs (the exact percentage decreasing as family
size increases)?
Whether, under the latter scheme, the aggregate benefits to the smaller
families exceed the aggregate costs to the larger families will depend on facts
such as the effect of the scheme on both larger and smaller families' incidence
of malnutrition, illness, homelessness, illiteracy, and death, and therefore poses
a seemingly intractable measurement problem. But if I understand Epstein's
general theory correctly, he would find this Maryland scheme unacceptable
even if it were (somehow) determined to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because it
fails his pro rata test.'29 That is, the social gains induced by the Maryland
scheme relative to a scheme that would give all eligible families 95% of their
state-computed need are gains that accrue solely to families of six or fewer
members. Thus, I expect Epstein would conclude that the Burger Court erred
when it upheld the Maryland scheme. 3
My positive theory, in contrast, suggests that the Court's decision in
Dandridge was consistent with its decisions in other unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance benefits and, as in those other cases,
therefore reflects the normative underpinnings of that theory. 3' Under the
Maryland scheme, an eligible parent with a family of six will not receive any
increase in total AFDC benefits if he or she has another child.'32 This means
that the per capita income of the family will be reduced since seven people
will be supported on the same amount of money as six were previously. This
reduction in per capita income, however, does not require AFDC-eligible
parents to pay a higher price to exercise their constitutional right to procreate
than similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income: an analogous
reduction in per capita income upon the birth of a child is typically realized by
those whose source of a subsistence income is employment. 3 3 That is, the
price of exercising one's right to procreate typically includes a reduction in
per capita income, whatever its source, assuming one's total monthly income
is held constant.'34 Because the Maryland scheme simply leaves AFDC-eligible parents to pay the same price to exercise their right to procreate that other,

129. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 96-103.
130. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486-87.
131. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
132. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473-75.
133. The underlying assumption, consistent with current and past law, is that parents are
responsible for the financial support of their minor children in AFDC-recipient families as well as
in families whose sole source of income is the parent(s)'s employment. For discussion of parents'
legal duty to provide support for the maintenance of their children, see, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN
& D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN
AND THE LAW 177-228 (2d ed. 1989).
134. This is a reasonable assumption since the total dollar amount of one's monthly earnings
through employment is, in any case, not usually related to family size. That is, a private employer
is not typically expected to provide an employee a pay increase upon the birth of a child in order
to ensure that the per capita income of the employee's family remains constant.
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non-indigent parents pay, my theory predicts that the Dandridge Court would
sustain the challenged "maximum grant regulation," as it in fact did.'35
Under my positive theory, the Maryland scheme is critically different
from a hypothetical regulation under which the total monthly amount of
AFDC benefits provided an eligible family of seven is less than, rather than
the same as, that for an eligible family of six. This hypothetical scheme would
require AFDC-eligible parents with families of six to pay a higher price to
exercise their right to procreate than other, non-indigent parents pay. For in
addition to the reduction in the family's per capita income that typically attends the birth of another child, these AFDC-eligible parents would also experience a reduction in their family's total AFDC income. Thus, my positive
theory predicts that the Court, in contrast to its holding in Dandridge, would
find this hypothetical scheme unconstitutional.
I expect that Epstein, in contrast, would find this hypothetical scheme
neither better nor worse than the actual Maryland scheme at issue in
Dandridge. For this hypothetical scheme, too, fails Epstein's pro rata test:" 36
the social gains induced by the hypothetical scheme relative to a scheme that
would give all AFDC-eligible families 95% of their state-computed need are
gains that accrue solely to eligible families of six or fewer members.
In the Dandridge context, Epstein's requirement that the Court assess
whether the combination of government largesse plus challenged condition will
maximize social welfare relative to other possibilities seems at first to pose an
intractable measurement problem. It is not that courts are obviously less competent than the state legislature to assess the effect of the Maryland scheme on
both larger and smaller families' incidence of malnutrition, illness,
homelessness, illiteracy, and death. Rather, we doubt that any institution could
accomplish the task.'37 But this potentially fatal weakness in Epstein's proposed standard of judicial review appears largely obviated by its "pro rata"
component. At least in the Dandridge context, it seems remarkably easy to
identify any deviation from formal equality in the allocation of the social gains
that the challenged benefit scheme generates.
Nonetheless, Epstein's pro rata test is problematic here because it yields a
result that some, perhaps even Epstein, will find perverse. By precluding
"maximum grant" limitations such as the challenged Maryland regulation, the
test ensures those eligible for public assistance a different, more robust right to
procreate than the Constitution currently affords those whose source of a subsistence income is employment. At present, neither public nor private employers are required by the Constitution to provide-and typically do not provide-employees a pay increase upon the birth of a child in order to ensure
that the per capita income of the employee's family is not diminished by the
employee's exercise of the constitutional right to procreate. Thus, by implicitly
requiring a proportional increase in the family's total AFDC benefits whenever
a recipient parent gives birth to another child, Epstein's pro rata test perversely

135.
136.
137.

Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486-87.
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 96-103.
I also query how and whether we could assess the accuracy of any proffered results.
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elevates procreation by these indigent parents from the38constitutional right that
all others have to a kind of constitutional entitlement.
V. CONCLUSION

Would social welfare be increased if in unconstitutional conditions cases
involving public assistance benefits the Court employed Epstein's proposed
test rather than the test my positive theory suggests the Court sub silentio has
applied in these cases since 1963? It is hard to know. To compare the tests is
to compare apples and airplanes. The test suggested by my positive theory
holds constant the existing law in all areas other than unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance benefits. In contrast, under Epstein's
test, at least as he has applied it, the only constant is the goal of maximizing
overall social welfare. Thus, as his discussions of Smith, Rust, and Harris
reveal, Epstein's analysis of unconstitutional conditions cases involving public
assistance benefits frequently rests on revisionist readings of the relevant constitutional provisions and precedent, readings that were themselves presumably
mandated by his larger goal of maximizing aggregate social welfare.
Moreover, as Epstein himself has observed in another context, "it is one
thing to identify past errors" (as his normative theory does with great fecundity), "and quite another to remedy them, even if we could summon the will to
do so.""' Just because a different standard of judicial review might in principle be preferable to an existing one of long standing does not mean that a
wholesale shift to that new standard today would be equally preferable. The
dislocation wrought by such a change might be prohibitively costly, even
evil."4 Nonetheless, according to Epstein, "[a] correct theory at the very
least can lead to incremental changes in the proper direction, even though it
consticannot transform the world," particularly given "the present structure of
4
tutional law [which] does admit a high degree of play at the joints. 1
But is Epstein's theory "correct"? This, too, is hard to know. Although
not uncontroversial, his goal of maximizing overall social welfare is surely
attractive to many (including the author of this Essay) and, in any case, not
obviously evil. 42 Moreover, when the task of determining whether a chal-

138. The resulting entitlement is not a pure one, however, since it exists only so long as the
state chooses to provide AFDC at all, and the state has no constitutional obligation to offer this
benefit. For a discussion of the distinction between constitutional rights and entitlements, see
Baker, supra note 3, at 1218-20.
139. TAKINGS, supra note 50, at 306.
140. Epstein observed in Takings for example, that to abolish welfare while keeping the minimum wage in place "should not be done" because it would "deprive individuals of welfare payments at the same time they are blocked from gainful employment." Id. at 326. Epstein continued:
Similarly, many persons have made substantial forced contributions to Social Security
that have already been spent on transfer payments to others. To abolish Social Security
in medias res is worse than foolish; it is evil.... Too many individuals have foregone
the opportunity to accumulate private savings in reliance upon the programs that are
now in place.
Id.
141. Id. at 329.
142. At least one reviewer has expressed frustration, however, that "the reader never learns
why an indeterminate social improvement standard is better, for example, than an indeterminate
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lenged condition on a government benefit advances overall social welfare
relative to other possibilities takes the form of applying Epstein's "pro rata"
test, it does not seem obviously more onerous or beyond the competence of
the courts than established judicial tasks such as ascertaining the "best interests of the child" in custody disputes'43 or deciding when police activity constitutes an "unreasonable search."'" Indeed my attempts above to apply
Epstein's test to Moreno and Dandridge are evidence that the task is often
quite readily performed.'45 Nonetheless, as that analysis of Dandridge also
reveals, his test yields results in some cases which appear perverse, at least
within our current constitutional culture. More study is necessary to determine
whether such results are the product of some larger deficiency in the substance
of Epstein's theory, or merely of easily avoidable errors in its application.
By seeking to apply Epstein's central theory to cases that he has not directly addressed, I hope to have demonstrated my conviction that his approach
to the paradox of unconstitutional conditions at a minimum forces us to consider these cases in a new and interesting way. That reasonable people might
nonetheless disagree with Epstein's selection of baselines,"4 or dispute
whether a unitary standard can or should govern judicial review of cases raising unconstitutional conditions questions," should suggest the difficulty of
the unconstitutional conditions paradox, not the inadequacy of Epstein's ambitious and thoughtful contribution.

system of historically and institutionally respectful criteria." Jonathan D. Hacker, Book Note, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1855, 1860 (1994) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE
(1993)).
143. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 480-81 (1984) ("Today
judges in most states are directed to determine what placement will serve the child's 'best inter-

ests,' a standard that seems wonderfully simple, egalitarian, and flexible.') (footnote omitted).
144.

See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND

SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987) (4 volumes).
145. See supra Part IV.
146. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3; Kreimer, supra note 5; Sullivan, supra note 5.
147. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243 (1989); Frederick
Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency,

72 DENY. U. L. REv. 989 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L.
REV. 593 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 337 (1989).

MAKING CONDITIONS CONSTITUTIONAL
BY ATTACHING THEM TO WELFARE:

THE DANGERS OF
SELECTIVE CONTEXTUAL IGNORANCE
OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
JULIE A. NICE*

Context matters, but it shouldn't. In this essay, I suggest that the context
in which unconstitutional conditions problems arise may determine whether
courts apply or ignore the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The Supreme
Court decisions that I explore reveal the Court's application of heightened
scrutiny to conditions that burden unemployment insurance and building permits-popular government benefits-but mere rationality review to conditions
that burden welfare-an unpopular government benefit. Should courts apply
more lenient standards of review to conditions attached to unpopular benefits?
Or should each provision of the Constitution be applied consistently regardless
of the popularity of the benefit being conditioned? I suggest that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine requires consistent application of the level of scrutiny that the Court normally applies for each constitutional provision, regardless of the type of benefit at issue.
My focus on the issue of context arises from the specific history of this
symposium issue. Several faculty members at the University of Denver College of Law encountered unconstitutional conditions problems within their
particular areas of study. Although these areas of study were quite diverse, we
each reported a similar frustration with the selective application of the doctrine
and the lack of a consensus identifying a coherent theoretical framework underlying the doctrine. We knew that many fine scholars with considerably
more experience had attempted to analyze the doctrine, without reaching con-
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Dennis Lynch for his support of this symposium, the invited symposium participants, and the organizing faculty members of Denver (Nancy Ehrenreich, Roberto Corrada, Alan Chen, Fred
Cheever, and Martha Ertman) who brought considerable teamwork to the task of planning and
coordinating this symposium. I thank Martha Ertman separately for revisiting my ideas in countless conversations.
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sensus.' But we believed that the importance of the doctrine across constitutional law justified further thought on the subject.
Because many of us were studying the doctrine in different contexts, we
planned a round-table symposium 2 to explore whether more could be learned
about the doctrine by carefully examining the similarities and differences in its
cross-context application. The symposium discussion occurred in March of
1995, with provocative participants and thoughtful debate. Several participants
continued their dialogue over the summer, finally resulting in this symposium
issue.
For my part, I focus on challenges to unconstitutional conditions on welfare benefits. I criticize the result that seems nearly preordained for welfare
recipients: when courts encounter arguably unconstitutional conditions attached
to welfare, they tend to uphold those conditions (regardless of the strength of
the constitutional guarantee at issue), although they would apply full review to
a non-welfare condition. I first explore the basic role played by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Part I, then attempt in Part II to reveal how courts
pervert the doctrine, usually by ignoring it, in the context of welfare benefits.
I argue in Part 11 that courts should not selectively ignore or apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine based on the type of government benefit at
issue.
I. THE CONTEXT-NEUTRAL UNCONSTrrUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
We live in a constitutional republic that limits the power of both federal
and state governments. The Constitution generally prohibits the government
from abridging various rights guaranteed to individuals, including the rights to
be free from government interference with the free exercise of one's religion4
and from government taking private property without just compensation.'

1. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1988); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with ParticularReference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593 (1990).
2. Our decision about how to organize this conversation depended primarily on our determination to avoid a colloquium format typified by panelists presenting a canned speech followed
by limited time to respond to questions from an audience too large to allow full participation. Instead, we wanted to structure the event so that all participants enjoyed both the time and the opportunity to participate in a more round-table conversation. Both the organizers and the invited
guests seemed quite pleased with the quality of the dialogue resulting from this approach.
3. I refer to "government" because courts generally have extended the Bill of Rights restrictions that apply to the federal government, applying them to state governments by incorporating
those rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. For example, the First
Amendment restriction that Congress may not abridge the freedom of religion has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to state government action. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Similarly, courts generally have extended restrictions that apply to
state governments to the federal government. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment's restriction that states may not deny equal protection of the laws has been extended to the federal government. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). For the purposes of this essay, I do not distinguish between federal and state governments, but refer to them collectively as "government."
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Government may not directly interfere with these activities unless it proves
that its conduct survives the judicial tests used to interpret the relevant constitutional provision.
In our modem administrative state, direct government action has given
way increasingly to indirect government action, often by government attaching
conditions to benefits. This procedural change presents a substantive problem:
can the government shield itself from judicial scrutiny by acting indirectly
instead of directly? The unconstitutional conditions doctrine answers this
question in the negative. 6 But a review of arguably unconstitutional welfare
conditions suggests the answer is not so clear.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been assailed from at least
three directions. Some commentators argue that the judiciary's obligation to
provide normal scrutiny to indirect government action is obvious, and that the
doctrine serves no actual purpose, so is superfluous.7 But courts continue to
apply the doctrine.8 Other commentators argue that the doctrine fails to advance a meaningful discourse about the substantive aspects of a dispute.9
Courts, however, have not consistently reached this substance without applying
the doctrine. 0° These critics have yet to articulate precisely how they propose
this substantive analysis will occur without the doctrine. Still other commentators criticize the lack of a theoretical framework underlying the doctrine."
My assertion, contrary to those of many in this symposium,' 2 is that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine could serve a two-fold purpose of (1)
prohibiting courts from deeming acquiescence to a condition to be a waiver of
constitutional rights, and (2) requiring courts instead to apply normal doctrinal
tests to both direct and indirect government action.
What happens when courts ignore the doctrine in the context of welfare
benefits reveals the practical need for the doctrine. In those few instances

6. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-5, at 781 (2d ed.
1988) ("The notion that, whenever a privilege or benefit might be withheld altogether, it may be
withheld on whatever conditions government chooses to impose, has been repeatedly repudiated
since the mid-20th century.").
7. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); see also Jan G. Laitos, Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was a
Taking, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 893 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: UnconstitutionalConditions
and Welfare, 72 DENy. U. L. REV. 931 (1995).
10. Cases like Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (ignoring the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and applying only rationality review to the maximum benefit limitation) demonstrate that the Court is less likely to reach the substantive import of the benefit or the harm of
the condition when politically unpopular benefits such as welfare are at issue. Thus, Dorothy
Roberts' argument may leave the very parties she is concerned about-welfare mothers-out in
the cold.
11. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989 (1995); see also Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 1007 (1995).
12. While most commentators in this symposium criticized the doctrine, some attempted to
identify the value of the unconstitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of
Tigard: ConstitutionalRights as Public Goods, 72 DENy. U. L. REv. 859 (1995); see also Roberto
L. Corrada, Justifying a Search for a Unifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 72 DENY.
U. L. REv. 1011 (1995).
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when the Supreme Court recognized the danger of unscrutinized indirect government action through conditions tied to welfare benefits, it engaged in careful scrutiny of the action under the appropriate constitutional doctrines.'3 But
when the Court emphasized the voluntariness of the government providing
welfare benefits and/or the recipient's choice to request and accept welfare
benefits, it either refused to scrutinize the constitutionality of the government
action at any level, 4 or reduced its scrutiny to a level lower than the doctrinal norm. 5 Unfortunately for welfare recipients, the Court typically has
followed the latter approach, holding that because government does not have
to provide any welfare benefits, it may condition those benefits as it desires. 6
Doctrinally speaking, the Court has more frequently ignored the unconstitutional conditions doctrine with regard to welfare conditions, instead adopting
its antithesis: government's greater power to deny welfare benefits includes the
lesser power to grant welfare benefits on any conditions it desires. 7 Such
reasoning has allowed the Court either to refuse to scrutinize the government
action, or to reduce the level of scrutiny it applies to the action.
If benefits are popular, such as building permits, courts tend to apply the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and carefully scrutinize the conditions attached to those benefits. For example, the Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of
Tigard,'" recently struck down the city of Tigard's requirement that Ms.
Dolan provide a greenway on her land before she could expand her business
area. The Court reasoned that the city could not directly force Ms. Dolan to
build a floodplain and bicycle path, so it could not do so indirectly by conditioning her building permit on allowing this environmental protection on her
property.' 9 For my purposes, it is important to note that the Court in Dolan at
least implicitly directed that the doctrine should apply across the Constitution.20 Thus, the Court demanded consistency among various constitutional

13. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applied normal equal protection
strict scrutiny for alleged violations of fundamental rights and invalidated statutory classification
denying welfare benefits to individuals who had not resided in state for one year immediately
preceding application).
14. See, e.g., Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1990) (summarily rejecting claim that welfare work requirement violated the Thirteenth Amendment).
15. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
For a discussion of these cases, see infra parts II.A. and B.
16. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (applying only rationality review
to uphold maximum benefit limitations on AFDC).
17. Justice Holmes deserves credit for the "greater power includes the lesser power" argument. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."); Howard E. Abrams, Economic Analysis and Unconstitutional Conditions: A Reply to
Professor Epstein, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 359, 386 n.109 (1990) (noting attribution to Justice
Holmes). Some refer to the greater-includes-the-lesser argument as taking the bitter with the sweet.
For example, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures that are to be employed in determining
that right, a litigant ...must take the bitter with the sweet." Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
153-54 (1974).
18. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
19. Id. at 2317 (explicitly adopting the "well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional
conditions').
20. Id. at 2320 ("We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as
much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be rele-
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provisions. But it has not demanded similar consistency among different benefit contexts involving the same constitutional provision. Regardless of the constitutional provision at issue, the Court frequently has applied relaxed or no
scrutiny to challenged conditions of welfare. 2
While recognizing its uneven application, I argue that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, when applied, serves as an important procedural mechanism to prevent courts from refusing or reducing scrutiny. Under the doctrine,
courts should apply that level of scrutiny normally used for the relevant constitutional provision. In other words, I propose that courts should fully and
consistently apply the doctrine instead of employing it in the context-selective
way they currently do.
I further suggest that the fact of the judiciary's frequent failure to apply
normal doctrinal scrutiny to benefits attached to welfare should give pause to
those commentators concerned about meaningful justice for poor people who
urge that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine be abandoned.22 I assert
instead that the doctrine's procedural function, namely preventing a court from
refusing or reducing judicial scrutiny, in turn serves the goal of requiring the
court to reach at least the doctrinal merits and to fairly conduct the same substantive evaluation that it would use for direct government actions.
II. CONTEXT MATTERS: WELFARE CONDITIONS AS PRESUMPTIVELY
CONSTITUTIONAL

To explore the importance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, I
focus on what happens when courts ignore the doctrine in their review of
challenged conditions to welfare benefits. By "welfare" I mean need-based
cash assistance, particularly Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") or its state-based equivalent.23
I have chosen, for illustrative purposes, two constitutional provisions not
typically associated with challenges brought by welfare recipients. While many
welfare recipients have raised due process and equal protection claims, fewer
have brought challenges under the Free Exercise or Takings Clauses of the
Constitution. Moreover, the level of importance placed on religious liberty and
property rights tends to correlate conversely with values placed on welfare. In
other words, I assume for purposes of this essay that more conservative thinkers who may disfavor welfare benefits may favor heightened judicial scrutiny

gated to the status of poor relation in these comparable circumstances.").
21. 1 examine here, not whether the Court has been consistent with regard to welfare across
various constitutional provisions, but rather whether the Court has been consistent with regard to
various types of benefits involving the same constitutional provision. For one commentator's view

on the former question, see Lynn Baker's analysis asserting that the Court has applied a consistent
economic approach to conditions attached to welfare. Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990); Lynn
A. Baker, Bargaining for Public Assistance, 72 DENv. U. L. REV. 949 (1995).
22. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 9.
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 1 include the new state-structured
incarnations of AFDC that will result if Congress enacts its current welfare reform proposal to

replace AFDC with block grant funds which states will allocate.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

of government interference with religious liberty or property rights. Similarly,
I assume that more progressive thinkers who favor welfare benefits may favor
heightened judicial scrutiny of any interference with these benefits, regardless
of what level of scrutiny normally applies for the constitutional provision at
issue. Thus, I hope to present several related challenges.
First, for those who might favor strong free exercise or takings scrutiny, I
ask what it is about welfare that justifies jettisoning normal scrutiny. Or, why
should scrutiny be lowered below normal for conditions attached to welfare?
Second, for those who might favor the highest scrutiny for welfare recipients,
I ask what it is about welfare that justifies increasing scrutiny. Or, why should
scrutiny be raised above normal? Third, for those who identify with neither of
these camps, I ask what it is about welfare that justifies any review departing
from normal scrutiny applied for the constitutional provision at issue. Or, why
put any additional thumb on the scale?
A comparison of several Supreme Court decisions in welfare and nonwelfare contexts serves to flesh out these issues. The first set of cases address
free exercise challenges and the second set of cases address takings claims.
A. Free Exercise
The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from directly requiring
or prohibiting religious beliefs or conduct. 4 When the government acts only
indirectly by withholding a benefit because the recipient's religious beliefs
prevented her from satisfying relevant conditions, what analysis do courts
employ to address the challenge that the condition is unconstitutional?
1. Sherbert's Establishment of Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court seemingly answered this question in Sherbert v.
Verner25 when it applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to a condition requiring a Seventh-Day Adventist to work on her Sabbath to be eligible
for unemployment insurance benefits. Sherbert challenged the condition as a
violation of her right to the free exercise of her religion. The Court reasoned
that a law "is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect."26 The Court further held that violations of the

24. Both the Establishment and Free Exercises Clauses occur in the farst phrase of the First
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . .

25. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
26. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)). The
Court continued:
Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives
solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that
practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship.
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Free Exercise Clause would be subject to strict scrutiny," requiring the state
to show that "no alternative forms of regulation" would serve an identified
"compelling state interest."2 South Carolina asserted as its interest the reduction of fraudulent claims filed by claimants feigning religious objections to
Saturday work.' Because the state's condition failed to survive strict scrutiny
(presumably because the state failed to prove that requiring religious objectors
to accept available work was necessary to prevent fraud), the Court held that
the state could not apply its eligibility requirements "so as to constrain a
worker to abandon" her religious convictions."
The Supreme Court repeatedly has reaffirmed Sherbert's use of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to apply full scrutiny to conditions attached
to economic benefits in Thomas v. Review Board,3 Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission,32 and Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security.33 In Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of unemployment
benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who refused to work in a foundry making
military equipment because doing so violated his beliefs.34 Similarly, in
Hobbie, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of unemployment benefits to a
Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays.3" Finally, in
Frazee, the Court reversed the denial of unemployment benefits to a Christian
who refused to work Sundays because doing so violated his beliefs.36 In each
of these cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny, even though the character of
the government action was indirect rather than direct, and struck down the
government conditions because they violated each claimant's religious liber37

ty.

2. Roy's Suggestion of Mere Rationality
In Bowen v. Roy,3" the Supreme Court departed from the well-established
standard of strict scrutiny for conditions attached to economic benefits. The
Court instead split about how the welfare context might alter the level of

27. Id. at 406-07. Prior to this formal announcement that courts should apply strict scrutiny
to free exercise challenges, the Court had decided three cases that appeared to apply the two-part

(least restrictive alternative and compelling interest) strict scrutiny test: Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) (reversed application of permit requirement to Jehovah's Witness who engaged in religious soliciting because less restrictive means were available to prevent fraud and
litter); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversed application of breach of peace
prohibition and religious solicitation certification requirement to Jehovah's Witnesses who engaged
in religious canvassing because less restrictive means were available to limit noise); and Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (reversed application of licensing fee requirement for religious canvassing and soliciting because less restrictive means were available to raise revenue from
solicitors). See generally TRIBE, supra note 6, § 14-13, at 1251-53.
28. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07.
29. Id. at 407.
30. Id. at 410.
31. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
32. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
33. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
34. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
35. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141.
36. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835.
37. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141; Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835.
38. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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review from normal strict scrutiny. Although commentators often categorize
Roy as a case about government freedom to efficiently administer a program," the lively battle within the Court centers on how the nature of welfare benefits should affect the level of scrutiny the Court should apply.
In Roy, the federal government required Native American parents, Stephen
Roy and Karen Miller, to provide a social security number for their daughter,
Little Bird of the Snow, as an eligibility requirement for AFDC and Food
Stamps. Roy and Miller challenged the federal government's requirements (1)
that applicants provide a social security number, and (2) states utilize that
number in their administration of AFDC, on the grounds that assigning a
social security number to their daughter violated their religious beliefs.'
The Court reasoned that because the family's religious liberty could not
"be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs
in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens," their
challenge to the government's use of their daughter's social security number
failed."' But the Court fragmented over whether the government could require
provision of a social security number as a condition of eligibility for AFDC
benefits.42
Three members of the Court, then-Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist ("the Burger Three"), focused on the context of welfare,
emphasizing that the parents made a voluntary choice to seek benefits from
the government:
[The social security number provision requirement] may indeed confront some applicants for benefits with choices, but in no sense does
it affirmatively compel appellees, by threat of sanctions, to refrain
from religiously motivated conduct or to engage in conduct that they
find objectionable for religious reasons. Rather, it is appellees who
seek benefits from the Government and who assert that, because of
certain religious beliefs, they should be excused from compliance
with a condition that is binding on all other persons who seek the
same benefits from the Government.43
Although the Burger Three conceded that the provision requirement involved
some government compulsion," they viewed the denial of benefits by this
"neutral" statute as less intrusive than what they called "affirmative compulsion or prohibition."45 Because the minimal compulsion involved in condi39. Both William Marshall and Jane Rutherford expressed this view of Roy to me during the
symposium.
40. Roy, 476 U.S. at 697. The District Court entered a two-part injunction, restraining the
government from (1) the use of Little Bird of the Snow's social security number and (2) denying
benefits due to her parents' failure to provide a number for her. Id. at 698.
41. Id. at 699-700.
42. Two Justices, Blackmun and Stevens, stayed out of the fray regarding the welfare context, apparently because they found the provision requirement to be either not ripe or moot based
on the court's holding that use of the number was allowed. These two nevertheless agreed to
vacate the injunction against the provision requirement, thus confusing the count about who held
what. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
43. Roy, 476 U.S. at 703.
44. Id. at 704 ("[W]e do not believe that no government compulsion is involved .....
45. id. ("[W]e cannot ignore the reality that denial of such benefits by a uniformly applica-
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tions attached to benefits was different than direct governmental compulsion,
the Burger Three concluded that these different types of regulation could not
be governed by the same constitutional standard.' Thus, they reasoned, the
less intrusive nature of conditions attached to benefits justifies reducing the
level of scrutiny that courts should apply to review them.47
Specifically, the Burger Three would have reduced the Court's review
from normal strict scrutiny to mere rationality." Rather than require the government to prove that no alternative regulation would serve the government's
compelling interest, they merely required the government to prove that the
condition was a reasonable means of serving the government's legitimate
interest.4 In applying this reduced scrutiny, the Burger Three identified the
prevention of fraud as an important government interest. 0 Moreover, they
reasoned that use of a social security number was a reasonable means to prevent fraud because of what they saw as the costly and gratuitous nature of
welfare.
Regarding the nature of welfare, the Burger Three emphasized its "staggering magnitude," noting the number of families and amounts spent on both
AFDC and Food Stamps." They touted the government's use of social security numbers to cross-match welfare applicants and recipients as the most costeffective means to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.52 Returning to their emphasis of the recipients' choice, they concluded that Roy and Miller could not
use the Free Exercise Clause "to demand Government benefits, but only on
their own terms, particularly where that insistence works a demonstrable disadvantage to the Government in the administration of the programs."53
Both Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote separately to explain their
view that no justiciable controversy remained regarding whether the government could require parents to provide the number, because the government
could use the number that already had been assigned.54 Neither concluded,

ble statute neutral on its face is of a wholly different, less intrusive nature than affirmative compulsion or prohibition, by threat of penal sanctions, for conduct that has religious implications.").
46. Id. at 706.
47. Id. at 706-07 ("A governmental burden on religious liberty is not insulated from review
simply because it is indirect, but the nature of the burden is relevant to the standard the government must meet to justify the burden.").
48. Id. at 707-08 ("[T]he Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.").
49. Id.
50. Id. at 709.
51. Id. at 710 ("Each year roughly 3.8 million families receive $7.8 billion through federally
funded AFDC programs and 20 million persons receive $11 billion in food stamps.").
52. ld. at 710-11.
53. Id. at 711-12.
54. Id. at 713 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part), 717 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result). A majority of the Court-the Burger Three combined with Justices
Blackmun and Stevens-agreed that both the injunction against use of a social security number
and the injunction against requiring provision of such a number be vacated. Id. at 712 (Chief
Justice Burger announcing the judgment of the Court vacating the injunctions entered by the District Court), 713 (Justice Blackmun noting that he joins vacating the injunction against use of the
number and agrees to vacate and remand the injunction against requiring provision of the number), 716 (Justice Stevens concurring in the result).
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however, that mere rationality should govern whether requiring a social security number violated the Free Exercise Clause.55 Indeed, Justice Blackmun indicated his approval of strict scrutiny by noting that, when reached, the provision issue required "nothing more than a straightforward application" of the
Sherbert line of cases.56
The real dispute in the case was between the Burger Three and the
O'Connor Three. In a separate opinion for herself and Justices Brennan and
Marshall, Justice O'Connor agreed with the Burger Three that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the government from using a social security number, but argued that Sherbert and its progeny established strict scrutiny as the
proper standard of review57 and that the government here failed to survive
such scrutiny in defending the provision requirement. The O'Connor Three
characterized the goal of preventing welfare fraud as "laudable and compelling," 8 but belittled its application as merely "the unanchored anxieties of the
'
welfare bureaucracy."59
The problem, according to the O'Connor Three, was
the government's failure to prove the requisite fit between the chosen means
of using social security numbers and the desired end of preventing fraud. In
short, the government failed to convince the O'Connor Three that granting a
religious exemption to these Native American applicants would harm its interest in preventing fraud.'
Finally, unlike the Burger Three, the O'Connor Three viewed Sherbert as
controlling, explaining that "[t]he fact that the underlying dispute involves an
award of benefits rather than an exaction of penalties does not grant the Government license to apply a different version of the Constitution."' They also
noted that Sherbert rejected the argument that indirect burdens through conditions attached to benefits could be analyzed any differently than direct burdens.62
In a separate dissent, Justice White argued that Sherbert and Thomas
controlled Roy.6" Thus, five justices' agreed that the Court should apply
strict scrutiny to the social security number provision requirement. Yet the
Court did not apply that strict scrutiny. And while it remanded the case, it did
not clearly direct the lower courts on remand to apply strict scrutiny.65

55. Id. at 713 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part), 716 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result).
56. Id. at 715-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
57. Indeed, five justices would have applied strict scrutiny to the extent that the case was not
moot (Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White). Id. at 731.
58. Id. at 726.
59. Id. at 730.
60. Id. at 732.
61. Id. at 731.
62. Id.
at 731-32.
63. Id. at 733.
64. Id. at 731 (counting Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White).
65. The Court vacated the injunction prohibiting the state from both using and requiring
provision of a social security number, and remanded the case. Id. at 712.
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Comparing Sherbert with Roy

What happened in Roy? Can it be understood by the fact that the parties
discovered quite late that a social security number had been issued for Little
Bird of the Snow, thus creating doubts about whether the government would
still enforce the requirement that her parents cooperate in providing a number
for her? Perhaps. Certainly two justices thought the justiciability questions
were key. But seven justices thought that the matter was justiciable, and that
the debate centered on whether normal free exercise strict scrutiny should be
applied when welfare benefits were at issue. Without this debate, the Court in
Roy should have simply applied Sherbert's strict scrutiny. Indeed, three years
after Roy, a unanimous Court reaffirmed Sherbert's strict scrutiny test in
Frazee. But that case again involved unemployment insurance benefits rather
than AFDC.' Not even Justice Rehnquist filed a dissent in Frazee, as he had
done to criticize Sherbert in Thomas in 1981 and in Hobbie in 1987.67 Why
not?
How is Roy so different from Sherbert? Both involved benefits for which
the recipients voluntarily chose to apply. Both involved neutral conditionsaccepting available work and providing a social security number. Sherbert did
not involve any more "affirmative compulsion" by the government than
Roy.' Both imposed similar administrative burdens, requiring government to
make exceptions for religious objectors. In both cases, the government's justification was the prevention of fraud. Given these similarities, why did the
Court apply strict scrutiny to invalidate the condition in Sherbert, but not in
Roy?
Perhaps the answer lies in evaluating the difference between unemployment insurance benefits and welfare benefits. Both programs are part of our
government safety net to assist people who lack necessary income. But the
former is more like an insurance program, where benefits are drawn from
premiums paid on behalf of a working person and where benefit amounts
correlate to past earnings.' Welfare benefits, such as AFDC and Food
Stamps, are not earnings-based, but are need-based.
The Sherbert-Roy comparison suggests different standards for earningsbased versus need-based benefits. Perhaps the earnings-based and need-based
difference explains the primary political difference: unemployment insurance
benefits are popular and welfare benefits are not. Read with this understanding, Roy suggests that the popularity of a government benefit determines the
level of judicial scrutiny applied to an arguably unconstitutional condition on
the benefit. But nothing in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine supports
such a distinction. The doctrine instead seems designed precisely to ensure that

66. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832, 835 (1989).
67. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987).
68. If anything, Roy involved more compulsion than Sherbert, due to the destitute circumstances of welfare recipients compared to unemployment insurance beneficiaries. See Julie A.
Nice, Welfare Servitude, I GEo. J. FIGHTING POvERTY 340 (1994).
69. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

recipients subjected to popular conditions attached to unpopular benefits receive constitutional protection, particularly since presumably they are more
likely to be burdened with conditions than are recipients of popular benefits.
The popularity difference may also explain the contrast between welfare
and non-welfare benefits in a different constitutional context. The next section
compares the scrutiny applied in takings clause challenges to conditions attached to building permits and welfare benefits.
B. Takings
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prohibits government from taking
private property for public use without just compensation." In recent years,
the Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to regulatory takings made
by the government.7 Specifically, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,72 the Court established heightened scrutiny as the proper standard of review and struck down the government's condition that a homeowner provide a
public access easement along a beach because the
condition bore an insuffi73
cient relation to a legitimate government interest.
1. Nollan's (and Dolan's) Heightened Scrutiny
The Supreme Court in Nollan established heightened scrutiny as the proper standard for reviewing the California Coastal Commission's condition that
the Nollans provide a public easement along their beach-front property in
exchange for a building permit to replace a bungalow with a three-bedroom
home.74 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia invoked the "long recognized" requirement that the government prove that its taking substantially
advances legitimate state interests.75 He acknowledged that the government
held the greater power to prohibit construction of the house, and that it might
have held the lesser power to condition construction upon some concession by
the owner. Justice Scalia's analysis did not end, however, with the "greater
power includes the lesser power" concession. He further required that, in order
for the condition to not constitute extortion, it had to survive his "essential
nexus" test, meaning that the condition must further the same end served by
the outright prohibition.76 Because the Court found that the public access

70. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (requiring proof of a
substantial "nexus" between the government's condition attached to property and the government's
legitimate interest); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994) (requiring proof of
"rough proportionality" between the government's condition attached to property and the
government's interest).
72. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). I focus on Nollan, rather than Dolan, because it was decided in
such close proximity (the day after) to the welfare benefits case I use for comparison, Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
73. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-34.
74. Id. at 828.
75. Id. at 834.
76. Id. at 837.
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easement condition did not serve the same ends as prohibition of construction,
it struck down the easement condition as a violation of the Takings Clause."
Later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court explicitly adopted the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, reaffirmed Nollan's heightened scrutiny for
takings conditions, and required the government to prove that its condition
served its justification with "rough proportionality."78
2.

Gilliard'sMere Rationality

The day before it applied strict scrutiny to strike down a condition on use
79
of real property in Nollan, the Court decided Bowen v. Gilliard.
In Gilliard,
the Court applied mere rationality to uphold against a takings challenge two
related government conditions to welfare benefits. The first condition required
inclusion of a child not in need of welfare into the welfare family unit.s" The
second condition required assignment of that child's parental support payments
to the state to repay the family's welfare benefits.8' The relevant issue in
Gilliard was whether the government's taking of these parental support payments that belonged to the non-needy child violated the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause.82
The majority in Gilliard rejected heightened scrutiny and went to some
lengths to establish mere rationality as the appropriate level of review. They
purportedly invoked rationality review in deference to Congress' authority to
determine how to allocate government benefits enacted pursuant to its plenary
power to make spending decisions. 3 They also reiterated a string-cite from
Dandridge v. Williams that sets out various statements of the rationality standard.8" Applying this rationality review, they concluded that the provision

77. After setting out heightened scrutiny as the proper standard, Justice Scalia implied, however, that the condition here did not survive even rationality review. He specified that the public
access easement condition failed "even the most untailored standards" because public access along
the Nollans' beach in no way served to reduce visual access to the beach from the street, or to
reduce the public's perceived barrier to the beach, or to remedy any additional congestion. Id. at
838.
78. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
79. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
80. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 591-94 (explaining that Congress amended the AFDC statute in
1984 to require families to include in the filing unit children receiving non-custodial parental support payments).
81. Id. at 591 (describing the AFDC requirement that applicants for assistance assign to the
state the right to receive non-custodial parental support payments for any member of the family
filing unit).
82. I do not argue here that welfare benefits themselves constitute private property for purposes of takings analysis. While that argument might be plausible, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's treatment of welfare benefits as property for purposes of due process analysis in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), I do not reach this argument for purposes of this article's
analysis. I focus instead on the court's analysis of child support payments, which constituted the
property at issue in Gilliard.
83. Gilliard,483 U.S. at 596-98. The Court failed to mention that its own spending power
analysis prohibits Congress from violating other constitutional prohibitions. See South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
84. Giliard,483 U.S. at 601 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("If the classification has some
'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."'); Metropolis
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requiring assignment of a child's parental support payments to the government
unquestionably served Congress' goal of decreasing federal expenditures,85
and rationally served the government's interest in allocating benefits among
needy families.86
When the Court examined whether the inclusion of a child's parental
support payments in computing the rest of the family's income constituted a
taking, it adopted a no-benefits baseline," applied the "greater power includes
the lesser power" argument,8 then upheld the inclusion requirement. After
finding that the government's greater power to deny welfare includes the lesser power to condition it, the Court did not subject the inclusion requirement to
any additional scrutiny similar to the heightened scrutiny for regulatory takings
it established in Nollan the following day.
When considering assignment of the child support payments to the government, however, the Court considered the three factors it normally evaluates
for takings analysis: the economic impact of the taking, the expectation in the
property interest, and the character of the government action. First, the Court
minimized the economic impact of the assignment on the child by assuming
that AFDC parents would spread all available income to support the family, no
matter its source.89 Second, the Court minimized the child's expectation of
continued receipt of support payments, reasoning that support payments are
not fixed but may be modified by law.*
In analyzing the third factor, the Court's view of welfare again played the
pivotal role. Regarding the character of the government's action in requiring
assignment of child support payments, the Court opined that welfare requires
government "to make hard choices and to balance various incentives" in allocating funds.9 ' More importantly, the Court again invoked the choice argument, stating,
[tihe law does not require any custodial parent to apply for AFDC
benefits. Surely it is reasonable to presume that a parent who does

Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913) ("The problems of government are
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may be,
and unscientific."); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."))).
85. Gilliard,483 U.S. at 599.
86. Id.
87. The Court explained that it must consider the condition from the baseline of no welfare
benefits:
Had no AFDC program ever existed until 1984, and had Congress then instituted a
program that took into account support payments that a family receives, it is hard to
believe that we would seriously entertain an argument that the new benefit program
constituted a taking. Yet, somehow, once benefits are in place and Congress sees a
need to reduce them in order to save money and to distribute limited resources more
fairly, the "takings" label seems to have a bit more plausibility. For legal purposes
though, the two situations are identical.
Id. at 604.
88. Id. ("Congress is not, by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program, bound to
continue it at all, much less at the same benefit level.").
89. Id. at 606-07.
90. Id. at 607-08.
91. Id. at 608-09.
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make such an application does so because she or he is convinced that
the family as a whole-as well as each child committed to her or his
custody-will be better off with the benefits than without.92
Although the Court appeared to apply takings analysis to the assignment
condition, it jettisoned normal scrutiny midstream, again relying on the nature
of welfare to justify lower scrutiny. The Court then concluded its decision as it
had begun, by reiterating its commitment to mere rationality for conditions
affecting welfare because "the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented
by public welfare assistance programs are not the
93
business of this Court.
3.

Comparing Nollan/Dolan with Gilliard

How are building permits different than welfare benefits for the purpose
of scrutinizing arguably unconstitutional conditions? First, the government has
the greater power to deny both building permits and welfare benefits, so neither benefit is an absolute right.94 In both instances, government acts indirectly, rather than directly. Second, both applicants have a choice of whether
to request the benefit or not. Third, both conditions are neutral insofar as they
do not target any subset of applicants, but apply to all. Fourth, Nollan and
Dolan did not involve any more affirmative compulsion by the government
than did Gilliard.Fifth, courts typically give great deference to the legislatures
in both land use regulation and welfare administration. Finally, both involve
legitimate government interests: environmental protection and cost-saving.
Thus, they seem to present similar unconstitutional conditions problems. Yet
the Court treated them differently. Again, perhaps the reason is that building
permits are popular and welfare benefits are not.
The votes in Nollan and Gilliard turned on whether (popular) property
rights, or (unpopular) welfare benefits were at issue. Now-Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia applied heightened scrutiny to invalidate the public access easement condition in Nollan."
These same justices applied only rationality review to uphold the parental
96
support assignment condition in Gilliard.
Similarly, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun would have applied rationality review and would have
upheld the public access easement condition in Nollan.97 These same justices
would have applied heightened scrutiny and would have invalidated the parental support assignment condition in Gilliard.9s

92. Id.
93. Id. at 609.
94. But see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987) (implying
owners have a right to build on property but children have no right to parental support payments).
95. Id. at 834.
96. Gilliard,483 U.S. at 603.
97. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. at 865
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. Gilliard,483 U.S. at 610 (Brennan, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting), at 633 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Only Justice Stevens remained consistent in result, voting to uphold both conditions,
but switching from writing for the majority, which included Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia in Gilliard, to dissenting along with Justices Brennan, Mar-

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

The primary differences between Nollan and Gilliardwere (1) the property at issue-real property as compared to child support payments, and (2) the
benefit at issue-building permits as compared to welfare grants. The Court's
analyses in the two cases, however, turned not on the difference in the property at issue, but rather on the difference in benefits at issue. Building permit
conditions received strict scrutiny while welfare benefit conditions received
mere rationality review. But both involved takings challenges, so the same test
should have applied.
Comparing Nollan and Gilliardreveals the Court's context-driven dichotomy that disadvantages welfare benefits but not other government benefits. In
Nollan, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to a building permit condition
and determined that it was invalid. But when reviewing a condition attached to
welfare, the Court refused to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine (as
it was urged to do, in effect, by Justice Brennan in dissent)," and instead
invoked its antithesis, the "greater power includes the lesser power" argument,
to first circumvent and then dispose of normal takings analysis."r The Court
insisted, both at the beginning and at the end of Gilliard, that, for welfare
benefits, the context necessarily limits judicial scrutiny to mere rationality, regardless of the constitutional doctrine at issue.
III. CONTEXT SHOULD NOT MATTER
I do not argue here, though I believe it plausible, that courts might have a
duty to heighten their scrutiny of conditions attached to welfare-perhaps even
a duty to scrutinize welfare conditions at a higher level than conditions attached to unemployment benefits or building permits, because a greater danger
of legislative oppression threatens unpopular people and causes.' ' I do suggest, at the very least, that conditions attached to welfare deserve no less scrutiny than those attached to unemployment benefits or building permits.
As discussed above, both the welfare and non-welfare benefits challenged
pursuant to the Free Exercise and Takings Clauses involved quite similar characteristics. The government had the greater power to deny the benefit in each
case; all applicants voluntarily chose to apply for the benefit; all conditions
were neutral; the invalidated conditions did not involve any more affirmative
compulsion by the government than the allowed conditions; and all involved
legitimate government interests. No comparative difference justifies the inconsistent treatment of the welfare and non-welfare conditions. Moreover, selec-

shall, and Blackmun in Nollan. See id. at 589; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. The Court circumvented takings analysis with regard to the government's condition
requiring inclusion of the child support payments for purposes of computing the rest of the
family's income, by citing legislative deference and applying mere rationality analysis. The Court
rejected the existence of a taking with regard to the government's condition requiring assignment
of the child support payments, in particular by citing deference to legislative welfare decisions and
emphasizing a welfare parents' choice to apply for benefits. Id. at 598-603, 604-09.
101. See Jonathan Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform and the Unconstitutional ConditionsDoctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051 (1995); see also Nice, supra note
68.
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tive ignorance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine transgresses other
principles of constitutional interpretation.
First, we ought not balkanize our constitutional provisions. We have one
Constitution, with one Free Exercise Clause and one Takings Clause, and each
ought to receive consistent interpretation and application across benefit contexts.
Second, we ought not allow a benefit's political popularity to limit the
strength of a recipient's constitutional rights. In other words, courts ought to
be committed to evenhanded' 2 treatment of benefit recipients, regardless
how popular they may or may not be. They all deserve their day in court to
receive similar merit-based analysis.
Third, we ought not allow courts to trump the primary purpose underlying
a constitutional provision with selective loyalty to legislative deference. It is
worse to apply less scrutiny to welfare conditions than to unemployment or
building permit conditions, because doing so works a sort of reverse-strictscrutiny, which hardly seems to comport with the protection of any constitutional provision, let alone with the strong textual protection afforded constitutional guarantees such as the Free Exercise and Takings Clauses. 3
Finally, if any context should matter, it should be that of our modem
administrative state. Because government regulates so many aspects of contemporary life, the danger that exceptions for indirect government regulation
will swallow the normal constitutional rules is truly frightening."° In practical terms then, courts should take a realistic view of regulatory coercion, recognizing that it less frequently takes the form of outright prohibition, but nevertheless presents grave dangers to freedom if left unscrutinized, and thus
unchecked, by the courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is no knight in shining armor on
behalf of poor people. Its application up to now has left much to be desired,
particularly because courts feel free to ignore it or apply it selectively, thereby
weakening its power. Specifically, courts consistently ignore the unconstitu-

102. See Sullivan, supra note 1.
103. Rehnquist seemed to defend this sort of reverse-strict-scrutiny in his dissent in Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1981) ("We concluded [in a previous case] that "[tlo strike
down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the
exercise of religion, i.e. legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself,
would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.") (citation omitted).
104. As Justice Brennan expressed in Gilliard:
The very pervasiveness of modem government, however, creates an unparalleled opportunity for intrusion on personal life. In a society in which most persons receive some
form of government benefit, government has considerable leverage in shaping individual
behavior. In most cases, we acknowledge that government may wield its power even
when its actions likely influence choices involving personal behavior. On certain occasions, however, government intrusion into private life is so direct and substantial that we
must deem it intolerable if we are to be true to our belief that there is a boundary between the public citizen and the private person.
Gilliard,483 U.S. at 610.
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tional conditions doctrine in the welfare context and typically either refuse or
reduce judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, the doctrine is an important procedural
tool that courts ought to use consistently, applying the normal doctrinal analysis for the relevant constitutional provision, regardless of the type of benefit at
issue.
Persuading courts of their duty to apply the doctrine evenhandedly may
save an impoverished person's claim from being summarily rejected based on
a presumed or deemed waiver of constitutional rights. While no doctrine effectively prevents judges from ultimately placing their contempt for welfare on
the scales of judgment and perverting the substance of our constitutional guarantees, it may deter some courts from doing so, and serve to more clearly
reveal when others do.

Too HARD:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
AND THE
CHIMERA OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSISTENCY
FREDERICK SCHAUER*

The Provost of Harvard University, Albert Carnesale, has on his desk
three boxes. One is marked "In." Another is marked "Out." And the third
says, simply, "Too Hard."
The Provost, who ought to know about things being too hard,' is on to
something. He has recognized that not all problems are soluble, that intractable
quandaries are part of the human condition, and that only in the academic's
perpetual fantasy is there necessarily an internally coherent and theoretically
elegant answer to every question the world might throw at us. As Ronald
Dworkin, contemporary legal theory's most prominent proponent of principles,
recognizes, not everything is a matter of principle.2
The lesson of the sign on the Provost's third box is an important one for
constitutionalists, and especially so for constitutional theorists. The sign on the
third box is a challenge to a prevailing mode of constitutional scholarship, one
that supposes that no problems are too hard for the theorist, even though they
may have been too hard for all previous theorists. Under this mode of thinking, there is, theoretically, an approach, an analytical method, a theory, a standard, a principle, or a test that can be applied to any constitutional problem.
This principle or approach may not be easily applied, but that is rarely the
point.
Instead, the point is one of constitutional ontology-about the deep structure of constitutional issues and constitutional doctrine. Under what appears to
be a common view of constitutional ontology, the correct solutions to constitutional problems are like scientific observations. Just as scientific observations
are always explainable in theory, even if we have yet to discover that explanation, so too, according to a common view, are all correct constitutional out* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. This is the written version of a contribution to a symposium on the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine held at the University of Denver College of Law on March
17-18, 1995.
1. As I write this, Carnesale is serving simultaneously as Provost, Dean of the Kennedy
School of Government, and Acting President of Harvard University.
2. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPmE 178-84 (1986) (discussing "checkerboard" laws)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE]; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72-103 (1985) (discussing the distinction between policies and principles) [hereinafter DWORKIN, PRtNCIPLE], RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 22-28, 71-80, 90-100 (1977) (same) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY].
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comes in theory explainable by a constitutional doctrine that will generate
them. Under this view, the development of constitutional doctrines and theories is ultimately a task of discovery.
Yet perhaps that is not so. Perhaps some constitutional problems are irredeemably intractable, and are so precisely because they replicate the deepest,
hardest, and therefore least solvable problems of constitutional government.
And perhaps some constitutional problems appear intractable because we are
looking for coherent principles and usable doctrines in areas of policy where
questions of degree predominate, and where seemingly arbitrary lines are
necessary to settle temporarily, but not to resolve in any deeper sense, intrinsically competing policy objectives. It is my claim that the problem of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is just such an intractable problem. Consequently, my goal here will not be to provide a theory to "solve" the problem
of unconstitutional conditions, but instead to provide an account of why a
solution is so unlikely to exist.3
In choosing this tack for addressing the problem of unconstitutional conditions, I not only depart from much of the conventional wisdom about the
problem of unconstitutional conditions, but also depart from the conventional
mode of constitutional scholarship. My goal is not to prescribe outcomes or
tests to the courts, who appear to listen to such prescriptions far less than most
constitutional scholars imagine. Instead, I will try to explain a phenomenon in
a deliberately non-prescriptive way. If in doing so I am able, if only slightly,
to help to achieve an increase in understanding, then that, far more than any
unheeded prescription, will remain faithful to what I take to be the central
features of the academic enterprise.
I.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has followed a predictable history, one that recurs in numerous comers of constitutional law. Consider first the
question of the reach of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Per-

3. The audience response to the oral presentation of this argument suggests that I would not
go wrong in emphasizing at the outset that I do not claim that all or even most constitutional
problems are doctrinally insoluble, I claim merely that some are, and that it is distinctly possible
that the problem of unconstitutional conditions is one of these. Indeed, it would be something
approaching miraculous were all of the issues that get grouped under some heading like "unconstitutional conditions" ones that could be resolved if only we could locate the correct rule, principle,
or standard. Such a claim would involve placing enormous faith in the processes that have produced these problem-oriented groupings and headings, for the claim would be that these groupings
invariably identify a closely related cluster of issues that could be doctrinally reconciled.
Yet if we think that these groupings may sometimes not track the doctrinally reconcilable
state of the world, we must acknowledge that there is a non-empty set of constitutional problems
for which no doctrinal solution may be available. I claim only that this is the case, and that the
problem of unconstitutional conditions is likely a member of this non-empty set. In making this
claim, however, I recognize that there might be strategic advantages in rejecting the notion of
insoluble constitutional problems. Even if there are insoluble constitutional problems, it might be
better to act as if there were not, for too easy recognition of constitutional insolubility might lead
us to search with insufficient effort for those solutions that do exist. Acting as if there are solutions to all constitutional problems, even if there are not, may be a good strategy for maximizing
the effort of looking for solutions. I reject this strategy here, but I do not dismiss its plausibility.
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haps best characterized by the supposed absolutism of Justices Black and
Douglas,4 for a long time many constitutionalists adopted the "no law means
no law" 5 approach to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. They rejected as disingenuous
the view that there could be a category of
"nonspeech," 6 and widely subscribed to the position that the First
Amendment, at the very least, covered the full range of behavior that could
plausibly be described as "speech" in ordinary language.7
With such a capacious picture of the scope of the First Amendment in
view, it should have come as no surprise that lawyers and scholars began to
take advantage of what was seemingly encompassed by this all-inclusive picture. If the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment permitted a First
Amendment argument in all cases involving behavior that fell under the standard English meaning of "speech," then First Amendment challenges to, for
example, the Securities Act of 1933 could no longer be considered frivolous.'
And if, as a matter of deeper free speech theory, such challenges, including
also hypothetical challenges to such prohibitions on verbal behavior as laws
against price-fixing and consumer fraud, ought to be treated as frivolous, 9

4. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (Douglas &
Black, JJ., concurring); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960); Laurent
Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); William Van Alstyne, A
Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107 (1982).
5. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) ("I read 'no
law abridging' to mean no law abridging .. "); see also Black, supra note 4.
6. E.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1;
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 20,
30 (1975); Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25
UCLA L. REV. 915, 944 (1978).
7. There are (at least) two sides to the debate about the coverage of the First Amendment,
but I will avoid rehashing themes I have written about extensively in the past. See, e.g., Frederick
Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment- New York v. Ferber, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 285 [hereinafter Schauer, Codifying]; Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981).
8. See Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV.
223 (1990).
9. As I think they should be. Consider in this context the fact that the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1994), requiring advance approval of a
government agency (the Securities and Exchange Commission) prior to distributing written materials, and conditioning that approval on the government agency's determination that the materials
are neither "incomplete" nor "inaccurate in any material respect," is a perfect example of what in
other contexts would be called a plainly unconstitutional prior restraint. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
I am unashamed of believing that a big part of the task of designing legal doctrine is one
of designing the doctrine that will, in the hands of the likely array of appliers of that doctrine,
produce the highest proportion of correct results, where the measure of "correctness" is supplied
by the rationales or justifications lying behind the doctrine. So if the rationales for freedom of
speech are, say, fostering democratic deliberation and allowing maximum freedom for individuals
to communicate their opinions, then the best doctrine (which may at times be a crisp rule or set of
rules, and may at times rely more on the less determinate norms that are sometimes called standards and sometimes called principles) is the one that, when applied by its actual appliers, will
maximize the amount of democratic deliberation and maximize the freedom in fact of individuals
to communicate their opinions. The existence of countervailing values will make this task even
more difficult, but the point is only that there is nothing even remotely disingenuous or fishy
about recognizing that legal doctrines must be designed with an eye to producing an optimal set of
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then it turns out that the traditional "no law means no law-speech means
speech" picture-has lost its value.'" The cases that test the picture are ones
that had traditionally been assumed not to be what we were talking about.
Only when those assumptions were exposed and tested did it become clear
that what we said we were talking about involved a large number of what
might best be called embedded exclusions," cases whose exclusion from the
reach of the principle was a function not of explicit exclusion, but of an implicit assumption to the same effect.
This picture of the development of First Amendment thinking as increasingly recognizing the existence of these embedded exclusions is also an apt
characterization of the progress of thinking about the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, for here the problem of embedded exclusions is once more
with us. As with free speech doctrine under the First Amendment, the slogans
that have accompanied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions have been
wildly overinclusive, masking the embedded exclusions without which the
doctrine would be totally unworkable. Indeed, the development of thinking
about unconstitutional conditions tracks in time, as well as in structure, the
parallel development in thinking about the reach of the First Amendment.
Starting in the 1960s, it became apparent to many people that Holmes's
famous statement--"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman"'2-was a mis-

results whose optimality must necessarily be measured by a standard that comes from outside the
doctrine itself.
Relatedly, it is possible that the strongest statement a court can make about the reach of a
rule (including the reach of a constitutional doctrine) is in its opinion to ignore even the possibility that the rule is applicable to the facts presented. For example, in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), the Supreme Court held that for Title VII sexual harassment purposes a
complainant could establish the existence of a discriminatorily abusive work environment even
without a showing of concrete psychological harm. Id. at 370-71. In Harris,most (but not all) of
the conduct complained of was verbal, and the possibility of a First Amendment immunity for the
harasser or the company for which he worked was raised both in the briefs and in oral argument.
Yet in upholding the actionability of the facts alleged, Justice O'Connor's opinion made no mention whatsoever of the First Amendment, possibly a far stronger statement of its inapplicability
than an explicit statement to the same effect.
Given that statements usually presuppose the plausibility of their negation, a corollary is
that the strongest statement of the implausibility of the negation is to make no statement at all. See
JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 143-45 (1969). And that is why the non-statement in Harrisis stronger than the statement "this is not a First Amendment case," which is in turn stronger than the
statement "this is a First Amendment case, but the regulation is constitutional."
10. This is not to suggest that everyone, now or then, refused to recognize the impossibility
of absolutism. Robert Bork noted early on that absolutism was only a "play on words." Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (1971). Thomas
Emerson's conclusory expression-action distinction at least had the virtue of recognizing the need
for some device to allow the restriction of plainly restrictable speech. THOMAS EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17-20 (1970). Alexander Meiklejohn maintained his supposed absolutism only by moving all of the permissible restrictions out of the word "speech" and
into the words "freedom of." ALEXY6NDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOvERNMENT 18 (1948).
11. There is a relationship between my idea of embedded exclusions and what William Van
Alstyne has called the "irresistible counterexamples" of free speech theory. Van Alstyne, supra
note 4, at 121.
12. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892). For a related
Holmes opinion, see Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), affd, 167 U.S. 43
(1897) (relying on the "greater includes the lesser" argument that since Davis could have been
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guided approach to the scope of constitutional protections of individual rights,
especially in the post-New Deal era of large-scale governmental
entitlements. 3 If criticizing the President of the United States, obviously pro-4
tected by the First Amendment against direct criminal and civil liability,1
could disqualify one from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, public housing, state, local, and federal government employment, veterans' benefits, statesupported higher education, use of public streets and parks, drivers' licenses,
and so on ad infinitum, the effect would be massive. Not only are such disqualifications often more consequential than the sanctions that happen to be
denominated as penalties-few people would rather lose their Social Security
benefits or their government job than pay a $25 fine for a misdemeanor-but
the actual effect would also be to diminish dramatically the number of people
in fact willing to engage in criticism of public officials, an activity that is
central to most conceptions of the underlying rationale for the First Amendment.'15
As with the "no law means no law" rhetoric, the necessary rejection of
Holmes's approach in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford was accompanied
by extravagant statements regarding the breadth and strength of what came to
be called the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 6 What the state cannot
do directly 'it cannot do indirectly, it was said, 7 nor could the denial or withdrawal of governmental benefits be conditioned on relinquishing what would
otherwise be constitutional rights. Merely designating governmental
entitlements as privileges could not serve as the excuse for penalizing the
exercise of what would otherwise be constitutionally protected liberties."
Like the "no law means no law" rhetoric, this all sounded good in the
1960s and 1970s, when one of the primary tasks of the development of constitutional doctrine was to build barriers against what had recently been seen

excluded entirely from the Boston Common, entry onto the Common could be conditioned on
what might be with respect to private property a violation of the First Amendment). On this form
of argument, and its relation to the issue of unconstitutional conditions, see Michael Herz, Justice
Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227.
13. See, e.g., Hans Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. L. REv. 4 (1964); William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1429 (1968); Charles A.
Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969).
14. I believe that there are certain doctrinal propositions so self-evident that no citation is
needed. Law review editors, however, tend vehemently to disagree. Therefore, see Schacht v.
United States, 398 U.S. 50 (1970); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see
also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (Court divided on question whether public employee could be punished for applauding assassination attempt on President and not divided on
question whether such speech was protected when uttered by a private citizen).
15. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see generally William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
16. See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960). The phrase itself
has earlier roots. See Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935).
17. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1415
(1989).
18. See Van Alstyne, supra note 13.
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during the McCarthy era-the excesses of official bodies intent on stifling
political opinion that took place outside of the center of the field. Yet, as with
the "no law means no law" rhetoric, the 1960s and 1970s rhetoric of "the
government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly" was poppycock if
taken seriously. The blanket prohibition on indirect restrictions of constitutional rights also contained numerous embedded exclusions that the early development of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine made unnecessary to confront.
Cabinet officials might, as private citizens, say whatever they wished;
however, no one doubted that people expressing constitutionally protected
admiration for Stalin or Hitler would, for that reason, be excluded from consideration for cabinet appointments, and that a sitting cabinet officer could be
instantly and constitutionally dismissed for engaging in the same behavior.
Artists creating insipid pictures of little children with big eyes, or dogs playing
poker, or dramatic images of Elvis Presley on black velvet backgrounds have
obvious First Amendment. rights to engage in those activities. But few would
argue that such "art" would be equally entitled to federal funding or wall
space at the National Gallery, or that the juries of the National Endowment for
the Arts or the curators at the National Gallery would be acting unconstitutionally in drawing obvious content-based distinctions in deciding what to fund
and what to hang. 9
It was only when the existence of such embedded exclusions became
apparent-a process later assisted by the opinions in Rust v. Sullivan2 -that
the problem of unconstitutional problems became a full-blown problem, rather
than a useful slogan or a relatively uncontroversial comer of constitutional
doctrine. For now it was clear that the problem was too hard, that there were
pretheoretical intuitions (and practical realities) about permissible actions-firing the Secretary of State for joining the Communist Party-that could not be
theoretically reconciled with pretheoretical intuitions about impermissible
actions-evicting from public housing those who criticized the housing
board." For some of these examples, the slippery but useful idea of relevance
was a satisfactory resolution." If the imposed conditions were not relevant to
19. In the discussion following the live presentation of this paper, several members of the
audience suggested that I have raised a false problem by implying that a properly constituted
unconstitutional conditions doctrine would have to treat such cases as lying outside the scope of
the doctrine. Relying on what they take to be suggestions in, for example, Seth F. Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
1293 (1994), they argued that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not necessarily render
such actions unconstitutional, but only applies closer scrutiny. Thus, a properly crafted doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions might very well include such cases, even though upon closer scrutiny,
the particular outcomes might be sustained. I do not believe, however, that this approach gets us
very far, since even heightened scrutiny for the kinds of cases I am thinking of would involve the
courts in a much larger domain of supervision of administrative action than most existing understandings of judicial power would tolerate. Now, it is of course possible that these existing understandings are misguided, but it seems important to distinguish the question whether courts should
be involved in a much larger range of issues than is now the case from the question whether within existing understandings of judicial power, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can do the
work that its proponents expect of it.
20. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
21. See Robert M. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L. REv. 443 (1966).
22. Thus, in Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), Justice Frankfurter,
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the particular entitlement at issue, the Constitution was more likely implicated
than if the conditions went directly to the very nature of the task performed or
the privilege granted.
This approach, too, however, has its limitations. It allows the state to
evade, more easily than would be preferred, the premises underlying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine simply by redefining the nature of the activity. To take a hypothetical example based on the factors that plainly influenced
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Rust v. Sullivan, public political utterances might be
irrelevant to performance of a high school Spanish teacher, but if the subject
is redefined as "Linguistic Competence in a Multicultural World" we can
imagine public political utterances that might be thought relevant to hiring or
retaining such a teacher in much the same way that public endorsement of astrology might be thought relevant to hiring or retaining a physics teacher.
Moreover, at times, a focus on relevance might make it too difficult for
the state to pursue what are plainly legitimate policy goals. Just as veterans'
preferences in civil service hiring demonstrate that it is not always necessary
to tie (possibly) legitimate social goals to programs themselves premised on
those goals,23 so too can we imagine circumstances in which a requirement of
relevance to a particular program might be excessively constraining. If, to
continue the example, public denial of the desirability of veterans' preferences
can be grounds for termination from a position as director of a state veterans'
office or a state civil service bureau, is it so clear that it cannot be grounds for
termination from a position as director of some other state agency, and, if so,
then perhaps a less important position in some other state agency?24 The limitations of a standard of "relevance" thus became increasingly apparent, and, as
the problem of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine began to look even
more difficult, the menu of proposed solutions became progressively longer.
Adopting the typical academic approach of identifying theoretically
irreconcilable outcomes and announcing that existing doctrine was incoherent,
theorists stumbled over each other in the race to identify the unifying and
coherent approach. Some saw the solution in the idea of coercion, others

concurring, noted that "Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better life, but if it affords them it cannot make them available in an obviously arbitrary way or exact freedoms unrelated to the purpose of the facilities."Id. at 415 (Frankfurter, I., concurring) (emphasis added). Cases
employing something like the relevance standard include Roberts v. Lake Central Sch. Corp., 317
F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Watts v. Seward Sch. Bd., 454 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970). See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968).
23. That is, the goals of a veterans' preference system are external to the goals of the civil
service system. This distinction is of course artificial if we conceive of all such programs as part
of a unitary category of "government action." But such conflation is unfaithful to the realities of
political life. Different programs have different goals, and as long as this is so we can make sense
of the idea of the goal of one program being appended to the operation of another.
24. The statement in the text implicates the kind of distinction between policymaking and
non-policymaking positions that was at issue in patronage cases such as Rutan v. Republican
Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), and Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S.
347 (1976), but I take this distinction, tenuous at best, as an example of just the kind of problem
that has inspired the urge to come up with a better theory.
25. Particularly noteworthy examples include Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward
a Positive Theory of UnconstitutionalConditions, 75 CoRNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990); David Cole,
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saw it in terms of a distinction between the public and the private, and still
others thought they had found the found the key in the evaluation of the burdens placed on the exercise of existing constitutional rights. Some of the participants in this symposium have offered their own new attacks on the existing
theories as incoherent, and have offered their own improvements on existing
theories or their own totally new theories.
Yet for me the existence of embedded exclusions is often, as here, the
signal that what some theorists see as "doctrinal disarray"" is premised on a
particular point of view about what legal doctrine or legal theory should do. If,
instead of assuming that there is a coherent doctrinal solution to be found, we
recognize that the so-called problems with the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine are but instantiations of the recurring tensions of constitutionalism,
and of equally recurring problems in determining what courts (as opposed to
other policymaking institutions) ought to do, we might be less critical of an
existing approach that is short on elegance but perhaps long on wisdom, and
we might as well be more inclined to redirect our energies away from recommending solutions that, because of the basic tensions of constitutionalism, are
highly likely to remain futile.
II.
Consider for a moment the existing doctrine with respect to the Dormant
Commerce Clause.27 Under that doctrine, state prohibitions on non-state commercial activity that are designed to increase one state's competitive advantage
over another state's violate the Constitution.2" Moreover, state taxes structured to achieve the same effect suffer the same fate. So when Hawaii, in an
effort to increase the competitive posture of Hawaiian pineapple wine and
other indigenous alcoholic beverages, 29 imposed a tax on all alcoholic beverages except fruit wine and a brandy made from a shrub that was native to Hawaii, 0 the Supreme Court easily and unanimously invalidated the tax as just
the kind of protectionism that lies at the core of the Dormant Commerce
Clause.3
It is widely accepted, however, that had Hawaii, for exactly the same
motive, provided a direct subsidy to the pineapple wine producers, the Dormant Commerce Clause would not have been implicated, even though under

Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987
Term--Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1988); Herz, supra note 12; Kreimer, supra note 19; Sullivan, supra note 17, at
1415; Symposium, UnconstitutionalConditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175 (1989).
26. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1417.
27. I recognize that a moment is just about long enough for most people.
28. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
29. The very identity of the product ought to make it apparent why the state of Hawaii was
unwilling to rely on market forces to provide the requisite support for the industry.
30. There was much evidence that the fruit wine exemption was intended expressly to assist
the pineapple wine industry.
31. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
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many circumstances the economic effects would have been identical.3 2 So it
turns out that what might too easily be thought to be an unconstitutional motive-protectionism-is not unconstitutional in all cases, but only when that
motive is implemented by only one out of several commercially and economically indistinguishable methods.
Let us shift now to a different issue, the question of government speech.
If we look at the doctrine and theory of the First Amendment's prohibition on
many forms of content discrimination, we see as a recurring theme a fear of
government manipulation of what is commonly called "the marketplace of
ideas."33 Yet, when government chooses to enter that marketplace of ideas,
with all of its resources and all of its aura of authority, and chooses to enter
for the precise purpose of influencing the outcome, once again the Constitution
is generally taken to be impotent.34 Even though government entry into a
public debate may at times be far more outcome-determinative than minor restrictions on the ways in which certain views can be expressed, the latter is
generally unconstitutional and the former is almost always constitutionally
permissible. Once again, therefore, constitutional power is marshalled against
only a tenuously distinguishable subset of what is quite plausibly seen as a
much larger problem.
Now consider a somewhat broader issue, one suggested by DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.35 In DeShaney, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that state inaction in the face of non-state child
abuse constituted a state deprivation of liberty without due process in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. And although there might be plausible characterizations that could have led this particular case to be characterized as one
involving state action, it was clear that the Court majority was motivated by
its view that the Constitution 'could not plausibly be interpreted as a document
intended to protect positive rights.36

32. Although it is well-settled that protectionist taxes are unconstitutional and protectionist
subsidies constitutional, there are questions at the borderline about whether a particular scheme is
a tax or a subsidy. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
33. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189 (1983).
34. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a
Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free
Speech, 10 Sw. U. L. REV. 237 (1978). There are many who wish the existing doctrine were different, however. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT ExPRESSOiN IN AMERICA (1983); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's
Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980); William Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the
Suppression of Warmongering Propagandain the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 530 (1966).
35. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
36. In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that
the [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. [Its] language cannot fairly be
extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests
do not come to harm through other means.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. On positive rights generally, see LAWRENCE CROCKER, PosmVE
LIBERTY: AN ESSAY IN NORMAnVE POLrrCAL PHILOSOPHY (1980); JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 59-61, 94-96 (1973); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOuR ESSAYS ON LIB-
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Yet if the Constitution protects only negative rights-rights against but
not rights to-the same problems arise. Under a regime in which the state is
prohibited from denying rights but permitted to deny the conditions for their
effective exercise, the state is permitted to do indirectly what it may not do
directly, and cannot be required to do directly what it can be prohibited from
doing indirectly.
If we think of many constitutional rights as being justified by their instrumental tendency to produce certain desirable end-states-frequent public discussion of public affairs, a nation without invidious distinctions drawn on the
basis of race or gender, the existence of the nation as the relevant economic
unit, and so on-then it turns out that the existing picture of constitutional
government is one in which courts have no power to compel governments to
take positive actions that might greatly improve progress towards the constitutionally desirable end-states, but in which courts do have the power to prohibit
state actions the prohibition of which might tend much less towards the realization of the desired end-states.
Again, therefore, the constitutional understanding instantiated by
DeShaney is one in which constitutional power may be directed against only a
part of what might plausibly be seen as a larger and socially undistinguishable
set.
The problem of subsidies under the Dormant Commerce Clause, of government speech under the First Amendment, and of state inaction under the
Due Process Clause, therefore, all resemble the problem of unconstitutional
conditions. Each of these four topics (and we could add more without excess
difficulty) is one in which the problem to which the constitutional doctrine is
aimed-protectionism, distortion of the marketplace of ideas, realization of
certain desirable end-states, and indirect inhibition of constitutional rights-is
far greater than could conceivably be expected to be within the plausible reach
of judicial resolution. And because of that, all of these topics seem to present
problems that are, in Al Carnesale's terminology, too hard.
But hardness is relative to the standards for success. If we are trying to
discover or produce a test or a doctrine that simultaneously satisfies the constraints of theoretical elegance, usability by the courts, consistency with (more
or less) existing understandings of the limits of judicial power, and production
of roughly the correct results in most cases, then we are bound to be dissatisfied. But that is because there is little reason to believe that tests meeting this
multiplicity of criteria are often to be found, or for that matter even should be
found with any frequency. The reason why not, however, is broader than any
of the particular issues within which it arises, and it is to that broader reason
that I now turn.

ERTY 118 (1969); Gerald C. MacCallum Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312

(1967).
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Constitutionalism is in part a formal way of setting the antecedent rules of
government. To oversimplify, setting the rules of play is one characterization
of what is done by the original Articles of the Constitution, and also by
amendments such as the Twenty-Second, limiting the Presidency to two terms,
and the Twenty-Fifth, establishing the procedures for succession in the case of
presidential disability. But constitutionalism is also a mechanism both for
establishing and for enforcing certain side constraints on otherwise permissible
governmental action, and on otherwise permissible policy optimization.37
Yet the broader these side constraints extend, and the deeper they cut, the
more difficult it is to keep the side constraints separate from the very policies
they are supposed to constrain. We think of side constraints as different from
policies because we can make sense of an unconstrained policy. But if the
constraint is so omnipresent that we cannot think of a policy without thinking
of the constraint, then the notion of a side constraint may be hard to hold
onto.
Consider one of the most debated side constraints in the literature of
moral philosophy, the Kantian prohibition on lying. And consider as well three
different variations on the same idea. One variation would prohibit lying and
only lying, where "lying" is defined as knowingly making a literally false
statement. A second variation would prohibit explicit lying and would also
prohibit the making of misleading statements, even if those misleading statements are literally true. And a third variation would impose on a speaker an
affirmative obligation to try to make the listener as fully aware of all relevant
considerations as is the speaker.
Now it is well-known that a characteristic of the Kantian approach is that
its strictures, including the prohibition on lying, apply unconditionally. What
interests me here is the relation between the possibility of unconditional application and the scope of the stricture that is to be applied unconditionally. And
if we look at the example of lying, it seems plausible to suppose that the
possibility of never lying is greater than the possibility of never being misleading which is in turn greater than the possibility of never failing to provide the
maximum amount of information. As any good woodworker knows, the narrower the cut, the deeper it can be on one pass of the saw. Conversely, the
shallower the cut, the wider it can be made. So too with the prohibition on
lying, where the plausibility of an unconditional prohibition increases with the
narrowness of the scope of that prohibition.
If we now return from woodworking and Kantian ethics to American
constitutional law, we can see the same phenomenon at work. Narrowly, it is
well accepted that the stringency of a constitutional norm is likely inversely
proportional to the scope of its application. An understanding of the operation

37. On rights as side constraints, see ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26-33
(1974); JUDITH J. THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990); Judith J. Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS, IN MORAL THEORY 49 (William
Parent ed., 1986). Dworkin's concept of rights as trumps is one I take to be structurally similar to
Nozick's idea of side constraints. See DwORKIN, SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 188-93.
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of the Equal Protection Clause that limits its application to intentional and
explicit discrimination on account of race and gender,38 for example, can be
far more categorical in application than an understanding that applied its strictures to non-explicit and non-intentional discriminatory effects. And a First
Amendment applicable only to, say, explicitly ideological communication
could more plausibly be virtually absolute in strength than a First Amendment
applicable to a much larger subset of the full set of human communication.39
With this as our perspective, consider now some of the examples I noted
in the previous section. Take first the Dormant Commerce Clause. If the background purpose of the Dormant Commerce Clause is, not implausibly, to diminish economic competition among the states, then direct application of that
background purpose-the rationale for the doctrine-would plainly be very
broad, and, given relatively immovable constraints on the operation of judicial
power, almost inevitably quite shallow. If the courts were empowered to examine all cases in which the states took actions tending towards economic
Balkanization, we can scarcely imagine a scenario in which all such actions
would be deemed per se, or even presumptively, unconstitutional.
Existing dormant commerce clause doctrine, therefore, which treats as
presumptively unconstitutional only a much smaller subset of the set of actions
tending towards economic Balkanization, can be seen as an admittedly artificial constriction of the anti-Balkanization background rationale in the service
of increasing the plausibility of its stringency. Insofar as existing dormant
commerce clause doctrine imposes a virtually absolute prohibition on statutorily explicit distinctions between in-state and out-of-state private businesses,
while allowing numerous varieties of state promotion of local economic interests to remain untouched, the doctrine can be said to impose an economically
and pragmatically artificial distinction. But insofar as that doctrine is seen as a
judicially workable way of dealing with part, but not all, of a larger problem,
then the existing approach looks to be somewhat more plausible.
Similarly, the distinction between (crudely) the unconstitutionality of
government prohibitions on speech and the constitutionality of other govemment actions influencing the operation of the marketplace of ideas looks highly problematic if we are searching for a coherent, elegant, philosophically
sound, doctrinally consistent, and pragmatically plausible distinction between
the two. After all, virtually any government action has the potential for influencing the content and character of human communication. Indeed, if we try
to come up with a "coherent" test distinguishing overt restrictions on speech
from the universe of actions that might produce a restriction on speech, communication, or information, there is a considerable likelihood that we will see
the principle of free speech implode before our eyes.

38. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
39. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181 (1988);
Schauer, Codifying, supra note 7.
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But if instead we view the existing free speech principle, and its accompanying doctrines, as but an arbitrarily drawn subset of a larger set of concerns
about communication and information policy,' we will be far less frustrated.
And if we view the subset as being drawn not arbitrarily, but perhaps on the
basis of principles of judicial power orthogonal to the central ideas that lead
us to want to foster communication and the exchange of information, then we
will be even less frustrated.
And consider as well the state action principle, or the public-private distinction, or the distinction between governmental acts and governmental omissions, in the same vein. Once more the distinction between acts and omissions,
as DeShaney well shows, and as theorists like Cass Sunstein have emphasized,4 is at first glance problematic. On numerous occasions the problem towards which a particular constitutional doctrine is addressed turns out to be
much larger than the scope of that doctrine. A common response, and much of
Sunstein's work is exemplary in this regard, is to focus in on the tenuousness
of the distinction (as with the distinction between state action and private
action) as a way of arguing that the scope of constitutional concern ought to
be much greater than has traditionally been supposed.
Yet, once again, this attack collapses if we have a more realistic sense of
the goal served by various constitutional distinctions. It could be that the substantive concerns of the Constitution are in many cases much broader than the
subset of those concerns artificially carved out by doctrines such as the state
action principle.42 But it could also be that the subset is carved out just because of the idea, seemingly no less applicable to courts than to legislatures,
that it is not always possible or desirable to deal with all of a problem or none
of it. If, as cases like Railway Express Agency v. New York43 and Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co." remind us, legislatures might be acting rationally in
seeking to solve only some of a problem, then it is not so surprising to think
that courts might be acting just as rationally in adopting the same approach.45
And if it turns out that the lines drawn have something to do with the ease of
exercise of judicial power, as perhaps in DeShaney, then the rationality of
dealing with only a small part of a larger problem appears even less arbitrary.
IV.
Now let us take this perspective and apply it to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The task of doing so is somewhat trickier than for some of
the doctrines I have just described, since the unconstitutional conditions doc-

40. See Lawrence A. Alexander & Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1319 (1983).
41.

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITrrON (1993).

42.

The argument I only allude to here is developed at greater length in Frederick Schauer,

Acts, Omissions, and Constitutionalism, 105 ETHICS 916 (1995).

43.
44.
45.

336 U.S. 106 (1949).
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
The best sustained defense of what I suggest here is Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the

Press and PublicAccess: Toward a Theory of PartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1976).
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trine is not itself a substantive doctrine, but a metadoctrine applied to a number of different substantive doctrines, such as freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, equal protection, and procedural due process. I will focus on freedom
of speech, but I believe that what I say about freedom of speech applies, mutatis mutandis, to most of the various other applications of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.
Consider two hypothetical cases of the kind ordinarily thought to create
the so-called problem of unconstitutional conditions. One looks like Pickering
v. Board of Education,' in that a teacher in the public schools is subject to
punishment or dismissal for engaging in activity plainly protected by the First
Amendment, yet while doing so on the teacher's own time and without the use
of any public facilities. Indeed, we might imagine a hypothetical Pickering
even purer than the real Pickering by imagining that our hypothetical
Pickering did not publicly criticize the school board, as in the real case, but
instead criticized the President of the United States or American foreign policy.47 This now looks like a paradigmatic unconstitutional conditions case. If a
modem day Holmes were to say that "the petitioner may have a constitutional
right to criticize the President, but he has no constitutional right to be employed by the public schools," the argument would be quickly rejected, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine wheeled into service, the demise of the
right-privilege distinction noted, and Pickering restored to his teaching position.
In itself, this case does not seem overly problematic, nor did it seem
problematic when Pickering and similar cases generated, as noted above, a
flurry of expansive statements about both the breadth and force of the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions. Yet the problems are revealed once we recognize the embedded exclusions within those expansive statements.
If, as the Supreme Court said in the real Pickering, the reasons for allowing public employees to criticize public officials track the reasons highlighted
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan4 for allowing citizens to criticize public
officials, then the progress toward the end-state of robust public debate is less
when public officials hire employees who will agree with them than when
they hire loud and squeaky wheels, less when government agencies fail to
create internal affairs departments than when they do so, less when internal
workplace newsletters are public relations documents than when their pages
are open to all manner of criticism, less when public officials refuse to hold
press conferences then when they do hold them, and less when public agencies

46. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
47. What makes the latter case purer is that it removes the argument from insubordination.
Although the argument that the school board was allowed to discipline insubordinate employees,
even when the insubordination was manifested solely in verbal conduct, was rejected in Pickering
itself, it has not been rejected in all public employee cases. When we are dealing not with teachers, but with soldiers, police officers, and firefighters, for example, courts have more frequently
allowed punishment even when the insubordinate acts were solely linguistic and, at times, even
when the insubordinate acts took place solely on the employee's own time and away from the
workplace. See Donald N. Zillman, Free Speech and Military Command, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 423.
Cf Jannetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974).
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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take a willingness to promote the agency as a condition for employment than
when such a condition is not employed. Moreover, even though our hypothetical Pickering might not be dismissed for criticizing the President on his own
time and without use of the facilities of his employment, we are loathe to
reach the same conclusion for cabinet officials and indeed perhaps even for
more senior officials of a board of education.
When faced with this kind of embedded exclusion,49 the traditional approach has been to look for some kind of distinction that would reconcile the
excluded and included cases." Yet the idea I offer here is the possibility that,
with respect to the kinds of problems grouped under the heading of "unconstitutional conditions," almost any new theory is destined to be unsatisfying.
Sticking still to the Pickering rationale, consider all of the things that would
produce, as New York Times v. Sullivan puts it, "robust" and "wide-open"
debate on matters of public concern. We might start with a better-educated
citizenry, move then to a better-informed citizenry, and then go on from there.
Invariably we will discover that any formulation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine will be unsatisfying for the same reason that the underlying
doctrine, even when correct, is unsatisfying.
Most constitutional doctrines are instrumentally directed towards the production of certain end-states, yet the full arsenal of weapons that might bring
us to those end-states is, in much of its armament, far beyond the plausible
reach of judicial power. As a result, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is unsatisfying just because it is alluring. If we restrict ourselves to the belief
that only direct prohibitions on the conduct protected by a constitutional right
are within judicial purview, then we can deceive ourselves (as we have so successfully done for so many generations) into thinking that there is a closer
relationship between prohibiting governmental restriction and reaching the
desired end-state than there in fact is. But once we open Pandora's Box to the
possibility that all sorts of government actions may less directly influence the
degree of realization of the desired end-state, we are forced to confront the
fact that no crisp or "coherent" principle distinguishes the judicially reviewable
government actions that bear a causal relationship to the realization of the endstate from the non-judicially reviewable actions that bear just as much (and
sometimes more) of a causal relationship to the realization of exactly the same
end-state.
It is not my argument that there is something wrong with this state of
affairs. Rather, it is my central point that we should not let the seeming arbitrariness of some of these distinctions lead us to believe that more is amiss

49. One of my favorites, in this general area, is Justice Fortas's statement for the majority in
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), that "[n]either students [nlor
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." That the Court could not possibly have meant what it said was made clear (to some, too
clear) in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), and then again in Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
50. The typical theorist offers a new standard or principle or theory, and the new theory
generally reaches the same result as in all of the previous cases, with a few (usually about four)
differences to show the novelty of the theory and the extent to which the new theory is more
speech-protective than the Court's existing approach.
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than there really is. "Doctrinal disarray" is the favorite rallying cry of those
about to offer us a new theory (or, even worse, a new paradigm), but in numerous areas of policymaking it is far more acceptable to tolerate the idea of
"about this much" or "a little of this and a little of that." In the non-judicial
world, questions of degree are hardly self-evident signs of disarray, nor are
they messy and inelegant compromises between competing concerns that are
simply opposed to each other.
To this it might be responded, in the fashion of scholars as diverse in
perspective as Ronald Dworkin,5 Mary Ann Glendon,52 and Robert
Nagel," that courts are simply not designed to deal with interests of more
than two parties, that they are not structured to deal effectively with questions
of degree, and that little about their style or culture is cut out to fashion compromises rather than declaring winners and losers. In the face of such
structural differences between courts and other decisionmaking and
policymaking institutions, there is a tendency to look for solutions appropriate
to the tools we have, even if they are not appropriate to the problems we face.
If you have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.
Yet faced with the reality of the situation that many problems are simply
larger and messier than can be dealt with by a coherent principle, or by courts
operating in protypically judicial style, two approaches are plausible. One, an
approach compatible with an expansive understanding of judicial power, would
question the embedded exclusions, and try to take on quite a large segment of
the problem. In many cases, there is nothing wrong with this, but then there
should be no reason to suppose that a simple principle would emerge any
more than we would suppose that one should emerge in the far messier world
of legislative, executive, administrative, and political action. If, when confronted with the full magnitude of what is called the problem of unconstitutional
conditions, we believe that courts ought to take on a much larger range than is
now the case,54 then we, should not be surprised to find no greater internal
coherence than we find for the approach that any other policymaking institution employs when it grapples with a very large problem that it finds under
every rock it overturns.
Alternatively, we might, as I suggested above, imagine that we would just
carve out of the larger problem one with which courts would be more capable
of dealing. This approach would not label as doctrinal disarray the lack of an
elegant principle distinguishing appropriate judicial intervention from appropriate judicial nonintervention, precisely for the same reason we should not excoriate as doctrinal disarray the tension between constitutional subsidies and
unconstitutional taxes, the distinction between unconstitutional government
restrictions on speech and constitutional government speech designed (often

51.
52.

DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY, supra note 2.
MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

(1991).
53.

ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES

OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech
Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302 (1984).
54. Most of the existing "solutions" adopt some variant of this approach.
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effectively) to achieve the exact same purpose, and the distinction between
unconstitutional state actions and constitutional state inactions achieving the
same end.
In each of these cases, the rationale behind the subset is, taken in one
way, the same as the rationale behind the larger set. But there is often a rationale for having a subset, and in those situations, the rationale of "about this
much" may be just about as good as we can or ought to get. It is obviously
my claim that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is of the same variety, a patently artificial line between those cases in which, for theoretically
unsatisfying reasons, it seems appropriate to have the courts police the indirect
inhibition of constitutional rights, and those cases in which, for theoretically
equally unsatisfying reasons, it seems appropriate not to have the courts police
the indirect inhibition of constitutional rights.
Appearances to the contrary, it is not my purpose to suggest that intuitive,
atheoretical, ad hoc, or hunchy approaches to the problem of unconstitutional
conditions (or any other problem) are what ought to be adopted. Indeed, consistent with my self-described descriptive rather than prescriptive goal, it is not
even my purpose to claim that the courts have been proceeding in an ad hoc
fashion. Rather, it is my claim that the distinction between the cases in which
the courts monitor the indirect restriction of constitutional rights and those in
which the courts do not do so are neither explained nor reconciled by looking
for theories of the particular rights involved, nor in looking for theories of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Instead, it is my claim that this distinction is likely from those perspectives to look more arbitrary and ad hoc than it, in fact, is. Only when we look
in a different place, to an account of just "how much" judicial intervention in
state policy is appropriate, and to what courts are good at and what they are
not, might we come up with a better understanding of why intelligent people
sitting on thoughtful deliberative bodies have produced a set of results that are
easily-alas, far too easily--dismissed as a doctrinal disarray simply awaiting
the enlightened guidance of the theorist for whom the problems of "how
much" are neither interesting nor important.

IMPOSSIBLE
LARRY ALEXANDER*

Fred Schauer says that there are domains of constitutional doctrine that
are too hard for theorists to resolve. He's right about that. He identifies the
unconstitutional conditions metadoctrine as one within that "too hard" domain.
He's right about that, too. Moreover, he's right about many of the other "too
hard" doctrines he identifies.
What I intend to do in my comments on Fred's paper then is not to disagree with him in any important way, for I think his analysis is substantially
correct. Rather, I intend to try to provide a theoretical account of why there
cannot be satisfactory theoretical accounts of certain doctrinal areas. I hope
that even if Fred is correct, and the various constitutional doctrines he discusses cannot be justified theoretically, at least there can be a theoretical explanation for why he is correct.
I shall start with the easiest area, the Dormant Commerce Clause. The
Bacchus' case was useful for me for several years-and the West Lynn
Creamery2 case is even better-in raising for my students the question how
can you tell the difference between a discriminatory tax (or regulation) and a
discriminatory subsidy. Orthodox Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has it
that the former is unconstitutional while the latter is constitutionally permissible. If the former were permissible, nothing would be left of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, at least as it applies to state protectionism. If the latter-subsidies-were unconstitutional, little sense would remain of the idea of
separate states with particular concern for their own citizens' welfare.3
But how draw the line between illegitimate tax and regulatory discrimination on the one hand, and legitimate subsidy on the other? What Bacchus and
West Lynn show is that it can't be done. Moreover, all state interferences with
the market designed to benefit local producers or consumers display the same
economic vices: they shift wealth from out-of-staters and the general mass of
in-staters to a smaller and usually better organized group of in-staters, so that
not only are competing states beggared, but so too is the protectionist state
overall. Moreover, in these respects, protectionist state regulations do not
differ from many non-discriminatory state regulations of the economy. A

* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A., Williams College, 1965; LL.B., Yale School of Law, 1968. This is the written version of a contribution to a
symposium on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine held at the University of Denver College of
Law on March 17-18, 1995.
1. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
2. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
3. See Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
487, 490-92, 530-49 (1981).
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desire to reward Minnesota's timber industry by banning plastic milk containers will have the same bad effects on Minnesota whether the plastics industry is largely out-of-state or is exclusively in-state.4
Now I think it is easy to explain why the Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has come a'cropper this way. I think that it has done so because
it is a doctrine that never should have existed. I agree with Justice Scalia and
his academic allies who argue that the Commerce Clause is not a direct limitation on state power.' The Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is a constitutional oxymoron. And if it tries to move beyond the narrow area of state exploitation of geographical location in order to extract rents from interstate
commerce and into the area of state protectionism, it will run headlong into
West Lynn and Bacchus, which it has.
The theoretical explanations of other "too hard" doctrines are different.
Before turning to unconstitutional conditions, I would like to mention a couple
of my favorite examples of "too hard" doctrines: the religion clauses and equal
protection.
The religion clauses are, I think, one of the Constitution's "grim jokes."
One cannot come up with a principled way of granting free exercise exemptions from regulation without at some point engaging in assessing the truth or
falsity of religious doctrine, the very thing the Establishment Clause must
forbid if it forbids anything.6 Although every constitutional theorist alludes to
the "tension" between the religion clauses, in fact the relation is not one of
tension but of outright contradiction. Indeed, at a deep theoretical level, I think
it can be shown that there cannot be a neutral, nonsectarian vantage point from
which to assess sectarian claims.7
(Of course, some constitutional scholars contend the religion clauses were
meant to serve only as statements that the federal government had no power to
regulate in the area of religion! They, like Scalia and others regarding the
Dormant Commerce Clause, believe that the modem, rights-oriented view of
the clauses is illegitimate, and that the doctrinal disarray is traceable to the
misstep of not recognizing this.)
Equal protection is another constitutional grim joke. Again, it would not
be so if it were a narrow rule that perhaps did nothing more than demand the
repeal of the Black Codes. As a general mandate that classifications be "justified," however, it looks outward to some moral theory to give an account of
such justification. And moral theory is imperialistic. By that I mean that moral
theory provides a complete blueprint for governmental action, one that leaves

4. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
5. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569.
6. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CII]. L. REV. 1245, 1254-70

(1994).
Go

7. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEL. REv. 763, 793-94 (1993).
8. See STEvEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 17-26, 119 (1995).
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little if any room for discretion, politics, etc., and no room for treating benefits
as "optional"-that is, capable of being leveled up or leveled down.9 But
equal protection doctrine assumes that the benefits it is concerned with are
optional. And it assumes as well that the justifications for classifications do
not make the rest of the Constitution otiose. Yet, justifications that look beyond the Constitution's text to morality obey no such constraints.
I conclude with the area of unconstitutional conditions. Although some
parts of the metadoctrine may be theoretically explicable-I think, for example, Tom Merrill's "public goods" theory does a nice job in a limited
domain'°--I think Fred Schauer is correct that larger portions of the area, and
particularly large portions of conditions on free speech, cannot be theoretically
rationalized. I focus particularly on the areas of government speech and government employment, or Rust" and Pickering2 for short. The discussion of
these areas of free speech applies more generally, however, to the intersection
of the optional benefits of the modem affirmative state and the classical liberal
rights of speech, religion, and privacy. It is particularly applicable to
Rosenberger 3 and to vouchers and other aid for religious schools.
These areas exhibit a fundamental theoretical contradiction characteristic
of liberalism, at bottom the same one that I mentioned in connection with the
religion clauses. Freedom of speech at its core mandates governmental neutrality with respect to the content of speech. (What would freedom of speech be
without content neutrality?) And the religion clauses are thought to require a
similar governmental neutrality with respect to religion. Darwinism and Creationism, round Earth theories and flat Earth theories, support for Clinton and
opposition to Clinton-all can be expressed without penalty.
On the other hand, government cannot run educational systems-or for
that matter, anything else-without taking sides on such issues.' It cannot
warn of the dangers of AIDS and then turn around and gainsay that warning,
as private citizens arguably have a right to do. It cannot counsel live birth and
abortion. And President Clinton surely has a right to require his aides to keep
any unflattering opinions they have of him to themselves on pain of losing
their jobs, as school boards have a right to refuse to hire exponents of pederasty as school teachers.
In short, the government, whenever it acts, acts in a partisan way. Indeed,
I would assert-to bring the earlier discussion of religion more squarely back
into play-that government, whenever it acts, acts in a sectarian way. The
justifications it provides for infringing liberties are always of the same form:
not impinging these liberties would trample on other people's values, values

9. See Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theory and Constitutionally Optional Benefits and
Burdens, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 287 (1994).
10. See Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard:'ConstitutionalRights as Public Goods,
72 DENy. U. L. REV. 859 (1995).
11. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
12. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
13. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
14. See Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional
Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989).
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which we, the government, believe trump the liberties. That view is inescapably partisan. Therefore, if the Constitution-a liberal document-demands
governmental neutrality with respect to ideas, religious and secular, then the
Constitution is a grim joke as a theoretical manner.
There is another reason why the unconstitutional conditions metadoctrine
is such a mess, a reason that ties into my earlier discussion of equal protection
and, indeed, into many areas of constitutional law. The Constitution has increasingly come to be viewed, not as a list of fixed, determinate rules, but as a
source of heavily moralized "principles." The various terms that our constitutional vocabulary employs--"legitimacy" and "compellingness" of state interest for example-invoke morality. Yet, as I said in connection with equal protection, morality is imperialistic. There is no reason to think that what morality
demands can be severed into distinct principles that correlate with the discrete
provisions of the Constitution, or even that posited norms that constitute what
the Constitution is correspond perfectly with what morality prescribes ought to
be. Indeed, it is probably only our fervent desire that what the Constitution is,
is what, in our opinion, it ought to be, that leads us to view it as a repository
for Dworkinian principles and not as a set of narrower and only partially reconcilable rules. 5
Yet, decide cases we must, and so we shall. Just don't ask for a theoretical justification of our decisions. Not only is that too hard, it's impossible.

15. See generally Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND
INTERPRETAnON 279-327 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).

JUSTIFYING A SEARCH
FOR A UNIFYING THEORY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS
ROBERTO L. CORRADA*

I. INTRODUCTION

The natural course for scholars is to make sense of things. One way of
enhancing understanding is to discover underlying principles or theories that
might be used to explain various otherwise unrelated ideas or occurrences. The
classification of an idea or occurrence within a broader category allows deductions or inferences about the quality of the notion or event.' Despite the progression of knowledge represented by such explanatory principles, unifying
theories have been increasingly attacked in many disciplines, including jurisprudence, as modernistic devices whose validity is no longer unassailable. In a
postmodern world, unification is often seen as an attempt to escape from certain realities of the physical or the conceptual world. The world today, it
would seem, is not unified, but disjointed and complex.2

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., George Washington University, 1982; J.D., Catholic University of America Law School, 1985. I would like to
thank all of the participants in the Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium, and in particular Larry
Alexander, Tom Merrill and Fred Schauer, whose thoughts inspired this essay. I am grateful to the
following people who took the time to make comments on an earlier draft of the essay: David
Barnes, Arthur Best, Burton Brody, Alan Chen, Theresa Corrada, Nancy Ehrenreich, and Steve
Pepper. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the editors of the Denver University Law Review,
particularly Bart Johnson, who provided substantial research assistance, Lisa Banks, who worked
well beyond her term in completing the issue, and Sue Chrisman, for her technical expertise and
leadership. Any errors are sure to be discovered over time, leaving intact only the best ideas contained herein.
1. In law, for example, Langdellian "conceptualism" served to usher in modem jurisprudence and was expressly anchored in "the powers of science and reason to uncover universal
truths." GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MoVEMENTs: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY'S END 13 (1995). There are a variety of reasons why unifying theories are generally
useful in law: they can provide a tool for deciding future cases, and for increasing predictability in
law; they may help society or the legislature understand the underlying significance of a series of
judicial decisions and thus expose those decisions to the controls of the political process; they may
aid in the development of other fields of law; also, understanding a unifying theory may increase
the legitimacy of a series of decisions, since it will protect them from the appearance of randomness or result-orientation.
2.

See

JEAN-FRANcoIs

LYOTARD,

THE

POSTMODERN

CONDITION:

A

REPORT

ON

KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bannington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984), cited in MINDA, supra note 1, at
14 n.11 (1995) ("I define postmodernism as incredulity toward metanarratives."); J.M. Balkin,
What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1971-72 (1992) ("In philosophy, postmodernism is an attack on what are called 'totalizing' theories or 'master narratives' that
seek to explain all or substantially all of society, history, knowledge, the nature of femininity, or
virtually anything else within a comprehensive and articulable theory.").
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In law, and especially in constitutional law, unifying principles, and implicitly even merely the search for them, have been increasingly criticized as
futile and simplistic.3 The arguments of some of the scholars in this symposium resonate with this general criticism of modernist constitutional jurisprudence in arguing against a unified theory of unconstitutional conditions. What
Frederick Schauer has labeled "too hard,"'4 Larry Alexander has deemed "impossible."5 Although Thomas Merrill's contribution to this symposium has attempted to unveil a possible unifying theory of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the contribution contains little discussion of the need or justification for such a metanarrative. 6 Thus, the need to make a comment on, if not
to fully explain, the validity of a search for a metatheory of unconstitutional
conditions has arisen.
To be sure, neither Alexander nor Schauer positions his criticism of a
metadoctrine of unconstitutional conditions within the broader canvas of modernity and postmodemism. Alexander does not expressly draw any comparisons between law and science in arguing against a metatheory of unconstitutional conditions. Neither are Alexander and Schauer as monolithic about
metanarratives in constitutional law as their contributions to this symposium
might suggest, having expressly left open the idea of uniformity in other parts
of constitutional jurisprudence.7 It is only with a metatheory of unconstitutional conditions that they care to quibble. It is precisely that neither scholar has
chosen to explore the greater implications of his methodology and because
each seems to have made some implicit (and in Schauer's case, explicit) assumptions about the differences between science and law that a commentary
about their collective skepticism toward a metatheory of unconstitutional conditions is warranted.
This essay explores why many scholars, including Schauer and Alexander,
feel that an attempt at unification of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is unworthy of scholarly attention. Although the subject of this particular essay
is less ambitious than the many attempts that have been made to unify the

3. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
24-30 (1991) (attacking the search for unifying principles in constitutional law as demonstrative of
the interpretive fallacy known as "hyper-integration"); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and
the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (1988) (collecting authority on the movement
away from grand theories in constitutional law).
4. See Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: UnconstitutionalConditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989 (1995).
5. See Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 1007 (1995) [hereinafter Alexander, Impossible]. A more complete picture of Larry Alexander's reasons for deeming hopeless a
search for a unifying principle of unconstitutional conditions can be found in Larry Alexander,
Constitutional Theory and Constitutionally Optional Benefits and Burdens, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 287 (1994) [hereinafter Alexander, Benefits and Burdens]; Larry Alexander, Understanding
Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines. 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989) [hereinafter Alexander, Optional Baselines].
6. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as
Public Goods, 72 DENy. U. L. REV. 859 (1995).
7. See Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5, at 1007 (explaining that theoretical accounts are
only impossible in "certain doctrinal areas"); Schauer, supra note 4, at 990 n.3 ("I do not claim
that all or even most constitutional problems are doctrinally insoluble. I claim merely that some
are, and that it is distinctly possible that the problem of unconstitutional conditions is one of

these.").
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doctrine of uncons.titutional conditions, and indeed proposes no unifying theory
itself, it nevertheless examines why attempts to explain the doctrine in a unified way might be valid even if no unification is ultimately possible. It also attempts to persuade that a unifying theory of the doctrine may be attainable,
although such a doctrine is yet to be articulated. The essay seeks to justify the
search for metatheories and to diminish skepticism about them by revealing
some strengths of modem conceptualist thinking while at the same time embracing some of the ideas of postmodemism.8
II. JUSTIFYING A SEARCH FOR A UNIFYING THEORY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS

A. Unifying Theories as Beneficial: The Lessons of Science
The search for unifying principles in law is undoubtedly a difficult endeavor, but law has no monopoly on the difficulty of such an enterprise. The
history of science, and in particular physics, has well demonstrated the great
struggle represented by attempts at unification.9 One of the primary reasons
for the difficulty is the indeterminacy of many answers to questions that require resolution prior to uncovering metatheories that can explain all or even
substantially all outcomes in a particular area. In constitutional law, the piecemeal quality and the long history of constitutional interpretation make the
search for a metatheory seem arrogant or even laughable.' ° Nevertheless, despite similar uncertainties in the field of science, the search for unifying principles there has proven useful."

Physics serves as a good example of why the search for unification, even
in an area as seemingly unpromising as unconstitutional conditions, can be

meaningful. 2 One might start with Isaac Newton, who radically changed the

8. My approach more or less fits the view of J.M. Balkin, who has concluded: "I prefer to
see postmodernism as a particular continuation of the Enlightenment, and a reevaluation of what
was good and bad about the Enlightenment project." Balkin, supra note 2, at 1988. Obviously, despite my disclaimer above, the subject of this essay is fairly ambitious. While it attempts to make
a point about the scholarly enterprise in law, it is important to acknowledge that the length of the
essay forces some reductionism and generality. These should not serve, however, to diminish the
overall message.
9. For two more recent descriptions of attempts at unification in science, see JAMES
GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES (1988).
10. Laurence Tribe and Michael Doff have called the notion of a singular vision of the Constitution "an extraordinary intellectual conceit," one at odds with the "character of the
Constitution's various provisions as concrete political enactments that represent historically contingent, and not always wholly coherent, compromises in a document that was made in stages,
incrementally, over a period of two centuries." TRIBE & DORF, supra note 3, at 24.
11. See HAWKING, supra note 9, at 13.
12. I borrow from and have been influenced in this discussion by Laurence H. Tribe, The
Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1989), even though I am using references to Tribe's text in a way that is completely
opposite of what he intended. Tribe does not hold with metatheoretical approaches to constitutional law in general and the analogy in his article is an analogy to the substance of the general theory
of relativity which teaches that the physical world is not as mechanical or simplistic as Newton's
discoveries would suggest. Tribe concludes that the state influences its subjects and is in turn
influenced by its subjects in much the same way that the general theory tells us that everything in
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world of science in the late 1600s when he explained his construction of "the
first modem synthesis of the physical world'" One of Newton's primary
contributions involved his explanation of the law of gravity, suggesting that
gravity was a much larger force in the physical world than previously believed. As great a contribution as Newton made, however, it turned out that
his explanations were merely partial ones, something even Newton apparently
acknowledged. 4
Indeed, a good deal of physics in the second half of the nineteenth century was devoted to attacking Newton's mechanical view of the universe. Scientists like James Maxwell, Gustav Kirchoff, Ernst Mach, and others chipped
away at Newtonian notions of absolute space and time. It is extremely unlikely
that the Ernst Machs and the James Maxwells of the scientific world decried
attempts at a unifying theory as "impossible" or "too hard." And while it is
true that they may not have believed it too hard or impossible to sum up the
universe in one equation, it is doubtful that they would have spent a great deal
of energy debunking attempts at a metatheory if they had. Although these scientists of the late nineteenth century criticized Newton's synthesis and did not
substitute their own syntheses in place of his, they served as stepping stones
for a later scientist, Albert Einstein, who would.
The point has been made that science and law are insufficiently related to
draw any meaning from their comparison. 5 The prevailing wisdom seems to
be that science is undergirded by certain physical principles or constants that
make unifying principles in science discoverable and useful. 6 Law, on the

the physical world acts upon and is acted upon by its surroundings. Although Tribe's point is, of
course, a good one, it is ironic that such an insight is drawn from a theory that is the product of a
search for unification. As Stephen Hawking explains, "the search for the ultimate theory of the
universe seems difficult to justify on practical grounds. (It is worth noting, though, that similar
arguments could have been used against both relativity and quantum mechanics, and these theories
have given us both nuclear energy and the microelectronics revolution!)." HAWKING, supra note 9,
at 13.
13. RONALD W. CLARK, EINsTEIN: TiE LiFE AND TIMES 74 (1971).
14. Laurence Tribe relates that Einstein did not hold with Newton's idea that "space" was
uniquely different from other physical elements. See Tribe, supra note 12, at 7. Einstein himself
wrote that the idea that "space" is somehow uninfluenced by other elements is unsatisfactory, and
that "Newton had been fully aware of this deficiency, but he had also clearly understood that no
other path was open to physics in his time." ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE MEANING OF RELATIVITY 140
(5th ed. 1956).
15. See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, supra note 3, at 87-96 (subchapter entitled "How Law is Unlike Mathematics").
16. Comparing the struggle for constitutional understanding to scientific discovery, Schauer
notes that
[u]nder what appears to be a common view of constitutional ontology, the correct solutions to constitutional problems are like scientific observations. Just as scientific observations are always explainable in theory, even if we have yet to discover that explanation, so too, according to a common view, are all correct constitutional outcomes in
theory explainable by a constitutional doctrine that will generate them. Under this view,
the development of constitutional doctrines and theories is ultimately a task of discovery.
Yet perhaps that is not so. Perhaps some constitutional problems are irredeemably
intractable, and are so precisely because they replicate the deepest, hardest, and therefore
least solvable problems of constitutional government. And perhaps some constitutional
problems appear intractable because we are looking for coherent principles and usable
doctrines in areas of policy, where questions of degree predominate, and where seemingly arbitrarylines are necessary to settle temporarily, but not to resolve in any deeper
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other hand, is subject to the quirks and eccentricities of human emotion, irrationality, and misperception, and therefore cannot possibly develop along the
same uniform and consistent lines used to describe physical events. 7 Science,
however, is not as certain or uniform as the prevailing wisdom would suggest.
As in constitutional law, the modernist notion that unifying principles
abound in science has also been attacked as insufficiently explanatory. The
argument is, fundamentally, that scientific knowledge and advances in physics
can better be explained as resulting from "paradigms" or "models" that together make up a scientific work ethic of sorts rather than as resulting from some
existing common thread of physical principles that merely need be uncovered. 8 Nevertheless, unifying theories that explain physical events have been
promulgated and celebrated in science, and the search for greater unification
continues."
There are, however, three ways in which science resembles law that have
implications for the pursuit of a unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions.
First, the definition of a useful theory in both science and law is roughly the
same, making arguments about theory in both fields similar. Second, science is
gripped by indeterminacy and uncertainty in this century (quantum mechanics
and chaos theory) that resembles the quagmire of constitutional law described
by both Schauer and Alexander. And yet despite these difficulties, unifying
theories are still sought in science and partial theories have proved useful.
Finally, there is much in science, like law, that is simply intuitive, and one of
science's grand theories for explaining the state of the universe rests precisely
on the existence and nature of human beings within it. Such a theory may
suggest that human reasoning might follow certain patterns that simply need to
be discovered. These three similarities are discussed more extensively in the
following sections.

sense, intrinsically competing policy objectives.
Schauer, supra note 4, at 989-90 (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). Gilmore explained:
Man's fate will forever elude the attempts of his intellect to understand it. The accidental variables which hedge us about effectively screen the future from our view. The
quest for the laws which will explain the riddle of human behavior leads us not toward
truth but toward the illusion of certainty, which is our curse.
Id. at 100. Larry Alexander notes:
There is another reason why the unconstitutional conditions metadoctrine is such a
mess.... The Constitution has increasingly come to be viewed, not as a list of fixed,
determinate rules, but as a source of heavily moralized "principles." The various terms
that our constitutional vocabulary employs---"legitimacy" and "compellingness" of state
interest for example-invoke morality.
Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5, at 1010; see also Schauer, supra note 4, at 989-90.
18. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 3, at 1335-36 n.24 (quoting THoMAS S. KUHN, THE STRucTURE OF SCNTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962)).
19. Stephen Hawking comments that
[u]itimately, however, one would hope to find a complete, consistent, unified theory that
would include all these partial theories as approximations and that did not need to be
adjusted to fit the facts by picking the values of certain arbitrary numbers in the theory.
The quest for such a theory is known as "the unification of physics."...
As I shall describe, the prospects for finding such a theory seem to be much
better now because we know so much more about the universe.
HAWKING, supra note 9, at 155-56.
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1. The Definition of Theory
Perhaps the best way to begin thinking about the ways in which law and
science are related is definitionally. How, for example, would we know a
"unifying principle" if one were posited? And, what would be particularly
useful about it? In science, a "unifying principle" or "theory" is good or useful
if it meets two requirements: "It must accurately describe a large class of
observations on the basis of a model that contains only a few arbitrary elements, and it must make definite predictions about the results of future observations."'2 A useful theory cannot be merely descriptive, it must also be predictive. 2
ewton's theory of gravity is a good one, then, because it is descriptive in that it tells us something about the relationship between physical
bodies, and, moreover, it predicts the motions of the planets to a high degree
of accuracy.22
A jurisprudential definition of "unifying principle" or theory would be the
same: descriptive and predictive. The problem so many commentators and
judges encounter with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is not one of
description, but one of prediction.23 Most commentators and judges, for example, are able to identify when a problem of unconstitutional conditions
might arise-any instance in which the government conditions the granting of
a benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right. The rub comes in predicting when such a condition will be struck down as unconstitutional, since not
every instance that implicates the doctrine yields a decision finding the
government's action unconstitutional.
Thomas Merrill's article in this symposium is a good example of how a
unifying principle in law might be approached. Merrill begins by explaining
the weaknesses of other attempts at metatheories of unconstitutional conditions. He explains the weakness of unifying attempts based on coercion,24
government monopoly power,' and the importance of the right to individuals
who choose to waive it.26 The method by which Merrill shows weakness is
by describing important outcomes that are not predicted by the posited unifying notion. Thus, a coercion theory is not predictive because allowing unconstitutional conditions to attach to benefits creates a more optimal, and thus
noncoercive, set of circumstances for individuals than those they would be
confronted with if rights were inalienable. 7 The monopoly theory of uncon-

20. See id. at 9. Albert Einstein felt similarly that, "[a] theory ... is the more impressive the
greater the simplicity of its premises is, the more different kinds of things it relates, and the more
extended is its area of applicability." CLARK, supra note 13, at 109.
21. According to Stephen Hawking, Aristotle's theory that everything is made out of four
elements-earth, air, fire, and water-is not a good or useful theory because it fails to make any
definite predictions about future outcomes. HAWKING, supra note 9, at 9.
22. Id. at 9-10.
23. And it is the predictive problem that motivates both Alexander and Schauer in their
criticism of a unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions. See infra text accompanying notes
42-45.
24. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 859-60.
25. Id. at 860.
26. Id. at 860-61.
27. Id. at 859-60.
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stitutional conditions is not predictive because it does not account for cases
striking down unconstitutional conditions attached to nonmonopolistic government employment.2 The theory seeking to explain the doctrine based on the
importance of the individual right at stake is not sufficiently predictive because the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been applied more robustly to certain First Amendments rights and separation of powers controversies
than it has been applied to arguably more individually important reproductive
or criminal procedural rights.29 Moreover, according to Merrill, none of the
above attempts at unification can state why on occasion the cases applying the
doctrine have required a nexus between the right being waived and some
governmental interest arising from the benefits program under scrutiny. 0 To
Merrill, implicitly, the proposed theories are insufficiently predictive if they
cannot account for the cases involving a nexus requirement.
Into the gap, as it were, Merrill inserts his own unifying theory. He proposes that we might view constitutional rights from a public goods perspective
in analyzing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. According to Merrill,
exercises of certain constitutional rights produce external benefits which serve
to advantage third parties.3 Merrill shows how a ranking of these rights according to the force of their external benefits better predicts the outcomes of
court decisions involving the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
To Merrill, the public goods approach is better than many other past approaches to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions because it can explain
outcomes across a broad range of constitutional doctrines and therefore has
superior predictive capacity. Merrill begins by showing how free speech and
separation of powers, while having private benefits, also redound to the benefit
of the public. Citing to Daniel Farber, Merrill explains the public goods aspect
of information release and through it explains government subsidization of
speech.32 Merrill also explains how separation of powers serves our system of
checks and balances in a public sense, which, in turn, explains why waivers of
these constitutional limits cannot be made by the individual beneficiaries of
them.33
By way of contrast, Merrill explains the lack of external benefits associated with rights raised as a defense to criminal prosecution. The desire to avoid
criminal prosecution will ensure an adequate supply of both public and private
benefits flowing from the right. However, Merrill distinguishes the contextual
exercise of the right from the situation that arises when government seeks to
purchase a waiver of the right in advance.34 Merrill proceeds to show how a
public goods approach to constitutional rights predicts outcomes in a wideranging array of areas of constitutional concern. He tracks the theory by apply-

28. Id. at 860.
29. Id. at 860-61.
30. Id. at 861.
31. Id. at 870.
32. Id. (citing Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REV. 554 (1991)).
33. Merrill, supra note 6, at 871.
34. Id.
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ing it to the right to vote,35 separation of powers, 6 abortion funding," and
the law of jurisdiction.3" Merrill uses the public goods lens to explain the
application of a nexus requirement in certain unconstitutional conditions cases, 39 and he suggests how the public goods approach may be more successful
than other theories in explaining the distinction between "penalties" and
"subsidies."' Finally, Merrill applies his public goods analysis to the Takings
Clause in an attempt to explain the Court's result in Dolan v. City of
41
Tigard.
Just as Merrill critiques earlier unifying attempts, both Schauer and Alexander seek to discredit any possibility of a unifying theory of unconstitutional
conditions by arguing that some doctrinal areas in constitutional jurisprudence
are so chaotic that no single idea could explain case outcomes completely
enough to predict future outcomes. Alexander discusses, for example, "benefits" and "burdens" in analyzing the Supreme Court's Dormant Commerce
Clause cases, which emphasize distinctions between discriminatory taxes and
discriminatory subsidies.42 To Alexander, there is no meaningful way to separate taxes from subsidies under the framework established by the Supreme
Court for Dormant Commerce Clause cases. Accordingly, any attempt to develop a unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions will fail because there is
effectively no way to bring the indeterminacy of Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence into the fold. The upshot is that Alexander believes no unifying
theory is possible because the randomness of Dormant Commerce Clause
interpretation makes any predictability impossible.
Schauer, likewise, begins by assuming the legitimacy of status quo doctrine in starting with the premise that the government cannot fund all art'
and that the state as employer should not necessarily have to put up with
criticism by its employees." And, yet, intuitively these actions or omissions
by government seem to violate at least one strongly accepted view of the First
Amendment, and certainly would violate any cohesive doctrine of unconstitutional conditions that would strive to incorporate within it the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause. As a result, Schauer concludes, there can
be no unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions because the "embedded
exclusions" that exist now in First Amendment free speech doctrine will ensure the existence of unity-destroying exceptions.45 To Schauer, since any
unifying principle would be burdened by various exceptions that must swallow
it, any predictive quality of a unifying theory would be too diluted to be useful.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 873-74.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 875-76.
Id. at 876-77.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 880-87 (discussing Dolan v.City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994)).
Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5, at 1007-08.
Schauer, supra note 4, at 994.
Id. at 1002-03.
Id. at 1002.
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Thus, Merrill, Alexander, and Schauer all test the quality of theories, or
potential theories, about the doctrine by saying something about their predictive nature. They argue for or against unification of the doctrine either positively by highlighting the predictive power of a unifying idea (in the case of
Merrill) or negatively by showing how no single idea can possibly predict certain outcomes, making any theory of unconstitutional conditions useless (as in
the case of Schauer and Alexander). All three commentators use the very
rationalistic and Enlightenment-produced construct of a good theory, which
they all implicitly believe is only useful if predictive. Thus, science and law
are strongly related in a definitional sense. Indeed, if theories are to be judged
by the same criteria in science and law, the two are certainly much more
similar than they at first appear.
2.

The Randomness of Science

Despite Schauer's characterization of science as a task of discovery, "always explainable in theory even if we have yet to discover [the] explanation,"
science, like law, is beset by uncertainties and irregularities-some so discontinuous and erratic as to be called "monstrosities" rather than scientific puzzles.' Two of these areas of uncertainty in science have implications for a
unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions. They are quantum theory (particularly the principle of uncertainty) and chaos theory.
Quantum theory is characterized by uncertainty. The theory was introduced in 1900 by Max Planck who suggested that light and other waves were
emitted in packets called quanta. This theory of energy emission accurately
described observations of radiation emission from stars.47 Using Planck's
theory of quanta, Werner Heisenberg, in 1926, formulated his now famous
principle of uncertainty. According to Heisenberg, the only way to determine
the future position of a particle (like an electron) is to measure its present
position and speed by shining light on it and observing how light is scattered
by the particle. Planck's theory of quanta created a problem for Heisenberg.
Since light is emitted in packets, one cannot use less than one quantum of
light to measure the position and speed of a particle. But a quantum of light is
substantial relative to the particle, meaning that the light will have an effect on
the particle. Thus, the quantum of light used to measure the particle will also
change the particle's velocity in a way that cannot be predicted.' Moreover,
the more one desires to measure the exact position of a particle, the more light
one will be required to emit. But more light has a greater unpredictable effect
on the speed of the particle. "In other words, the more accurately you try to
measure the position of the particle, the less accurately you can measure its
speed, and vice versa."'49
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle presented a substantial barrier to any
unifying theory of physics. While Einstein's theory of relativity unified large

46.
47.
48.
49.

See GLEICK, supra note 9, at 3.
See HAWKING, supra note 9, at 54.
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 55.
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scale physics, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle strongly argues against a
deterministic model of the universe since an exact measurement of the present
state of the universe can never be undertaken. It is interesting to note that a
physicist thinking like Alexander or Schauer might have thrown up his hands
in light of Heisenberg's discovery and maintained that the uncertainty principle
confirms that no unification of all physics is possible. Heisenberg may well
have taken this approach.
Instead, Heisenberg and other physicists in the 1920s created a new physics called quantum mechanics. These physicists worked with what they knew
about the effects of quanta on particles. Thus, quantum mechanics does not
predict a single definite result for an observation.' Rather, the theory predicts
a number of different possible results and tells how likely each of these is."'
Quantum mechanics introduced unpredictability and randomness into science.
Despite its uncertainty, quantum mechanics currently underlies nearly all of
modem science and technology. 2 According to Hawking, a combination of
general relativity and quantum mechanics raises a new possibility not recognized before: "that space and time together might form a finite, four-dimensional space without singularities or boundaries, like the surface of the earth
but with more dimensions."53 Such a principle could serve to explain much of
the universe, including the existence of human beings.54
Another theoretical framework, chaos theory, has been used by scientists
in the latter half of this century to explain the occurrence of events so chaotic
that they had long been relegated to the scientific dustbin of problems "impossible" to crack. Chaos theory explores the nature of systems, particularly dynamic systems like the weather or waterfalls. One cannot, for example, predict
where two bits of foam floating at the top of a waterfall will wind up at the
bottom because the waterfall is subject to so many irregularities that any prediction of an outcome should be "impossible. 55
The seeming impossibility of predicting outcomes from chaotic systems
may resemble the impossibility of deriving an explanatory principle that ties
together the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Many scientists, in a manner similar to that of Schauer and Alexander, abandoned their efforts to understand and predict the results of chaotic systems.56 And yet, in the 1960s scientists began to understand that "simple mathematical equations could model
systems every bit as violent as a waterfall."57 Scientists began to see that wild
differences in output could be attributed to minute differences in input. Indeed,

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 56 ("[Quantum mechanics] governs the behavior of transistors and integrated circuits, which are the essential components of electronic devices such as televisions and computers,
and is also the basis of modem chemistry and biology.").
53. Id. at 173.
54. Id. at 173-74.
55. GLEICK, supra note 9, at 4.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 8.
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"a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can transform storm systems next
month in New York."58
The ideas developed by chaos theorists were met with incomprehension,
resistance, and anger by the scientific community. And who could blame that
community. Chaos theory says that "[slimple systems give rise to complex
behavior. Complex systems give rise to simple behavior. And most important,
the laws of complexity hold universally, caring not at all for the details of a
system's constituent atoms."59 The predictions of chaos theorists that complexity operates in uniform ways have connected systems that were previously
thought entirely unrelated: chaos theory has allowed physiologists to find order
in the chaos that develops in the human heart causing unexplained death;
chaos theory has aided ecologists in understanding the unexplained rise and
fall of gypsy moth populations; chaos theory has led economists to new kinds
of analyses about stock prices. 6' Chaos theory suggests that science, like law,
has its areas of unpredictability that might become explainable despite seemingly large odds against it.
Chaos theory has been applied to law by at least one commentator.6'
Robert Scott makes the point that case outcomes in law resemble the complex
systems that lie at the heart of chaos theory. 62 Even slight differences in the
facts of a case can result in wildly disparate judicial outcomes. 63 This observation has led many legal scholars, particularly adherents of the Critical Legal
Studies movement, to conclude that the search for a just legal order is futile:
chaos is inevitable.' Scott reminds us that the lessons of chaos theory are not
that intuitive or simplistic; chaos theorists have concluded that chaotic processes are more stable than those in equilibrium, and that deep patterns are imbedded in all chaotic processes.65 If Scott is correct, recurring patterns may be
found in unpredictable and irregular human behavior, even in legal systems
and legal decisions. Thus, complexity should not deter legal scholars from
seeking patterns in judicial outcomes despite the irregularity and unpredictability of the justifications used by judges in reasoning toward a particular end
result.
3.

Science and Law as Functions of Human Behavior: The Anthropic
Principle and Intuitionism

Comparing human reasoning and intuition to the natural phenomena modelled in physics or in mathematics at first blush seems foolish. The capricious-

58. Id. The "Butterfly Effect," as it is known, has become symbolic of chaos theory.
59. Id. at 304.
60. Id. at 3-4.
61. See Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
329 (1993).
62. Id. at 348.
63. id.
64. Although Robert Scott singles out the "crits" for their anti-foundationalist tendencies, it
seems obvious that the questioning of master narratives is not exclusively their domain. See TRIBE
& DORF, supra note 3; Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5; Farber, supra note 3; Schauer, supra
note 4.
65. Scott, supra note 61, at 349.

1022

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

ness and whimsy of human judgments seem far removed from the more orderly and predictable physical world. And yet one might ask whether the processes that lead to physical events are really that removed from the processes that
yield results in disputes that are decided in courts of law. A complex set of
physical events after all-the working of the human mind-produces the judicial outcomes that we wish to draw together by a single principle.
Scientists have thought about the connections between human
existence-even human thought-and the state of our universe. The "anthropic
principle" in metaphysics posits that the reason the universe is the way it is
has something to do with the fact that we (humans) are here to see it.' A
different way to state the idea, and one more useful for our purposes, is that
unifying theories describing physical events are discoverable because those
events are related in some way to the mind that seeks their explanation. Hawking strongly implies exactly this kind of determinism when he explains,
[tihe laws of science, as we know them at present, contain many fundamental numbers, like the size of the electric charge of the electron
and the ratio of the masses of the proton and the electron. We cannot,
at the moment at least, predict the values of these numbers from
theory-we have to find them by observation. It may be that one day
we shall discover a complete unified theory that predicts them
all.... The remarkablefact is that the values of these numbers seem
to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of
life.67
If in fact the universe has been fine-tuned to support life and if that life
can evolve in such a way as to allow it ultimately to discover this, then there
may be a unified explanatory principle to draw it all together. The analogy of
anthropism to law may be found in Hawking's explanation of why human
beings could come to discover a unifying principle of the universe. According
to Hawking, Darwin's principle of natural selection says that in any population
of self-reproducing organisms, the differences in the genetic material and
upbringing that different individuals have "will mean that some individuals are
better able than others to draw the right conclusions about the world around
them and to act accordingly." These individuals will ultimately survive and
their pattern of behavior will dominate.' We might ultimately expect that
reasoning abilities honed by natural selection would lead us to a unified theory
of physics, and not to the wrong conclusions."
Applied to decisional law, the argument would be similar. Natural selection has possibly led to Supreme Court decisions that tend to develop towards
an explainable or predictable pattern. Likewise, the state of our law has
evolved by virtue of the increasingly superior minds that have fashioned it. If
the law has evolved in a regular way, then unifying principles that explain it

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See HAWKING, supra note 9, at 124.
Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
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should be discoverable. I understand the many problems with this
nonfalseifiable argument, not the least of which would be the existence of
dissenting opinions." But let's assume the notion is only roughly true. If so,
there would be sufficient rationality across all outcomes of cases to allow
some strong unifications.
Perhaps the parallel to the anthropic principle is not a sufficient argument
to convince most that the human mind would over time and subconsciously
produce case outcomes later capable of unification. Consider, however, what
Albert Einstein wrote about the merger of rationality and intuition. In 1918,
Einstein published an essay entitled, Principles of Research.72 In it he metaphorically described the origin of scientific method and expounded upon the
ultimate ability of human reasoning to find the grand elemental laws. 3 He
noted the direct correlation between the theories devised by the human mind
and the order that is found in nature.74 According to Einstein, the explanation
for this is that our minds are guided by "preestablished harmony."7 Gerald
Holton, writing about Einstein's essay, concludes that "the synthesis of rationality and intuition-rather than their opposition-is the key to answering all
questions of science, as we now understand the term." 7 6 Holton seems to
mean that true understanding will not be achieved until we can couple what is
rational-physics and mathematics, for example-with what is
intuitional-like the mystical or spiritual. Holton's jolting conclusion suggests
that the ultimate coupling of rationality and intuition may have implications
beyond science. If so, science and law may not, indeed, be the polar opposites
some would suggest. For example, law currently is a microcosm of Holton's
suggestion-it is characterized by the rational as well as the intuitionistic.
Some parts of constitutional law, for example, can be explained by underlying
principles while other parts are unexplainable and seem to change on a case
by case basis.
By comparing law to science, I hope to have revealed that science, like
law, is not entirely an orderly system made up of known or discoverable rules.
Science is beset by unpredictability and irregularity just like law despite the
fact that some parts of both science and law are ordered and contain rules that
lead to a high degree of predictability. Yet, whereas in science the unpredict-

71. An argument could be posited that dissenting opinions are opinions that did not prevail,
and are therefore weaker. The argument is hard to make since there are a great deal of very well
reasoned opinions. Another approach to dissenting opinions might be that the reasoning process
that would yield a superior decision tends to break down once a Court majority has formed around
a particular result since only a majority is required to establish law. If unanimity were required the
end result of the Court opinion would be the same under a notion of darwinistic reasoning or
intuitionism, but the reasons underpinning the decision might be more enduring or at least might
more closely explain the result.
72. See Gerald Holton, The Controversy over the End of Science, SCmNTIFIC AMERICAN,
Oct. 1995, at 191. Holton is the Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics and Professor of History of
Science at Harvard University.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Holton ascribes the notion of preestablished harmony to Leibniz, who held "that God
allows productive resonance between the material and spiritual realms." Id.
76. Id.
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ability of the velocity of particles or the irregular nature of weather patterns
has not deterred the search for unification of physics or the search for universal principles of complexity, in law the seeming indeterminacy of some docnines in constitutional jurisprudence has indeed served to stymie the search for
metatheories. The next section explores why irregularity may have scared
scholars away from the search for unifying principles and why that ultimately
may have detrimental implications for the law's continued development.
B. Do Science and Law Resemble Each Other?: Addressing Skepticism
Towards a Unifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions
My analogy of science and law might be criticized by skeptics as unrealistic, naive, or worse, inapt. I will address any possible critiques in the context
of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by focussing on Schauer's and
Alexander's criticisms of a metadoctrine of unconstitutional conditions in this
symposium."
As a general matter, the two positions arguing against the possibility of a
unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions share two common traits. The
first of these is that they both use particular constitutional cases to make their
point.78 I do not disagree with the authors' descriptions of the various cases
they choose to highlight. I agree that each case is complex and that some of
these cases, either alone or in combination with other cases resolving similar
issues, pose a seemingly intractable problem for a unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions.
It is the second common trait of each of these articles with which I take
issue. Both authors assume that the Supreme Court's reasoning in each case
must somehow control the metatheoretical inquiry. I know of no reason why
this should be so. Both Schauer and Alexander articulate their arguments about
the indeterminacy of First Amendment or Commerce Clause cases by relying
on the rationales, rather than the outcomes, of the Court in those cases. To
illustrate the fallacy of this approach with respect to the possibility of fashioning a unified theory of unconstitutional conditions, let me analogize again, but
briefly, to physics. When Newton proposed his law of gravity, there was little
question that it was a good theory because it served to predict the positions of
the planets to a high degree of accuracy.79 His theory, however, also made
certain predictions about the speed of gravity. According to Newton, gravitational effects should travel with infinite velocity."0
Obviously, Albert Einstein was well aware of Newton's theory of gravity
and about the orbit of planets. Einstein's theories of relativity, interestingly,
made the same accurate predictions about the orbits of planets as did

77. See Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5; Schauer, supra note 4.
78. Schauer primarily relies on Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); and Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968). Alexander primarily focuses his attention on Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263 (1984); and West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
79. See HAWKING, supra note 9, at 17.
80. Id. at 29.
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Newton's law; however, in at least one case--the orbit of Mercury-Einstein's
theories were more predictive than Newton's." What was astounding about
this was that Einstein's theories conceived of gravity in a radically different
way than Newton's law. Einstein's special theory of relativity, for example,
predicted that nothing can travel faster than light, a notion inconsistent with
the Newtonian theory of gravity.82 To explain this, Einstein devised his general theory of relativity, which departed extensively from Newtonian principles
in suggesting that "gravity is not a force like other forces, but is a consequence of the fact that space-time is not flat, as had been previously assumed:
it is curved, or "warped," by the distribution of mass and energy in it." 3 Einstein did not build on Newton's law so much as he created a new idea of
gravity. Had Einstein been intent on proceeding from Newton's reasoning,
rather than focusing independently on the outcomes of the physical events
Newton was seeking to describe, we may well not have Einstein's theories of
relativity today.
Schauer maintains that First Amendment doctrine has been characterized
by a historical development that has taken the doctrine from one that tolerated
no law abridging speech to one characterized by so many "embedded exclusions" that a singular theory of the clause is hard to imagine. 4 He argues
further that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, as applied in First Amendment cases, has followed a similar path." Schauer's view of the case law certainly suggests that his conclusions are correct. But is Schauer focusing on the
right things, and is he asking the proper questions? First, by focusing on the
rationales of the decisions he highlights, rather than the outcomes, Schauer
necessarily must conclude that the decisions are so irreconcilable as to strongly suggest no unification is possible. Second, as chaotic as the decisions seem,
Schauer is able, by focusing on results, to make some very definite points
about them as a group. If these cases may be linked by any common notion,
then as disparate as they may seem, chaos theory suggests deep patterns may
be found.
With respect to the former observation-that Schauer's focus on rationale
necessarily leads to the conclusions he reaches-one way in which Schauer
seeks to maintain that no unification is possible for the theory of unconstitutional conditions is by showing that the case law within any given constitutional law doctrine is incapable of being harmonized. Thus, under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, even though it can generally be said that "state prohibitions
on non-state commercial activity that are designed to increase one state's
competitive advantage over another state's violate the Constitution,"86 the
Dormant Commerce Clause has been read by the Court not to apply in some
circumstances when an analysis of economic effects argues that it should have

81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 28-29.
83. Id. at 29.
84. Schauer, supra note 4, at 1004.
85. Id. at 991-92.
86. Schauer, supra note 4, at 996.
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been applied.17 Likewise under the First Amendment, decisions that seek to
produce robust and wide open debate on matters of public concem-the touchstone of free speech cases like Sullivan and Pickering-often do the opposite."8 Similarly, the state action doctrine serves independently to limit pure
application of a theory of unconstitutional conditions because of the Court's
view that the Constitution was not intended to protect positive rights, meaning
that direct and indirect prohibitions cannot be viewed in the same way. 9
Arguing against the notion of unification, Schauer takes the Court's decisions at face value. Thus, the Dormant Commerce Clause inhibits "protectionism," the free speech cases encourage "robust and wide open debate," and the
Constitution only protects "negative rights." By accepting these statements
about the thrust of the various constitutional provisions it becomes quite a
simple exercise to show that the Court does not in every instance live up to
these ideals. But is it possible that other notions or philosophies truly underpin
some of these doctrines? Is Schauer a modem-day Newton whose theories
about these doctrines, while seemingly correct, are, like Newton's theory of
gravity, simply misguided? Although Merrill does not apply his public goods
synthesis to the doctrines Schauer highlights, is it not possible to devise a
different approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause or state action or free
speech which, while not mentioned in any Supreme Court decision, nevertheless explains the outcomes of the cases? Merrill's attempt to unify through the
application of a public goods analysis certainly serves to suggest that a focus
on outcome rather than rationale can be useful.
Although Merrill ends his article with some suggestions about the weaknesses of a public goods approach, it is important to note that in making his
argument he focuses not on the articulated rationale behind government and
Court action within the doctrines he surveys, but rather on the outcomes, their
effects, and a possible, hitherto unarticulated rationale. Indeed, there is scarcely a word quoted from the Supreme Court decisions he analyzes that suggests
a judicial concern about the external benefits of rights. If anything, the opposite is true. Merrill's discussion of Dolan, for example, opens by quoting the
Court's statement that the focus of the Takings Clause is to protect individuals
from being required by government "to bear public burdens which ...should
be borne by the public as a whole." Since Dolan held the Takings Clause
right not to be waivable, a focus on the Court's language yields the conclusion
that a "public goods" notion is not a valid predictive principle in the area of
Takings Clause jurisprudence since the Clause exists to protect individuals.
Merrill goes on to show, however, that despite the Court's statement, there are
external benefits relating to the Takings Clause right that justify the Court's
holding. Other partially explanatory theories of unconstitutional conditions,
like coercion, operate in the same manner. Thus, it would seem that a unifying

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 996-97.
Id. at 1002-03.
Id. at 997.
Merrill, supra note 6, at 880.
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or explanatory theory might well ignore the reasoning, and instead focus only
on the outcomes, of judicial decisions.
Now, with respect to the other observation about Schauer-that despite
his attempts to demonstrate chaos, he in fact is able to make some cogent
points about these cases as a group-chaos theory suggests there may be
deeper relationships between the cases than an analysis of the words written
by the justices in each opinion suggests. Schauer, despite his conclusion that
there is irregularity, and even randomness, in certain areas of constitutional
law, finds quite a few common elements in these irregularities. For example,
he observes that most areas of constitutional law decided by courts are really
only subsets of the full area of constitutional concern.9 Strangely, in addition
to an explanation of Kant's theory about lying which sounds in many ways
like Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty, the discovery of subsets that are
defined by what the Court can take on suggests some uniformity that cuts
across virtually all constitutional doctrines. This notion of uniformity is
strengthened by Schauer's many statements that constitutional theory is characterized by "recurring" and "basic" tensions.92 Chaos theory suggests that
these uniformities may be evidence of deeper patterns that exist beneath the
thick layer of uncertainty that covers the surface. Complexity can ultimately be
explained in a simple manner. Chaos theorists would posit exactly the opposite
of Schauer's proposition that some problems may be intractable because of
"seemingly arbitrary lines" and "intrinsically competing policy objectives."9'
Schauer states that believing that a correct rule, principle or standard
exists for unconstitutional conditions requires "placing enormous faith in the
processes that have produced these problem-oriented groupings and headings."94 This is exactly what chaos theory requires-a faith in the processes
that produce outcomes. But Schauer does not have that faith, and the reason he
does not is revealed later in his article when he states that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine became "too hard" due to "pretheoretical intuitions (and
practical realities) about permissible actions."95 Schauer's implicit assumption
is that intuition belies uniformity.96 And yet, it could be argued that intuition
is precisely the process in which chaos theorists (and Albert Einstein) would
place enormous faith when applying rules of complexity to human reasoning.
In a fashion similar to Schauer's, Alexander points to case law surrounding the Dormant Commerce Clause, particularly Bacchus and West Lynn
Creamery, to show that a rational, predictable approach to taxes versus subsidies cannot exist.97 But in doing so, he implicitly accepts the framing of the
question by the Supreme Court. Is it possible that some other tension, even
within the notion of protectionism, can better describe the different outcomes

91. Schauer, supra note 4, at 994 n.19.
92. Id. at 996.
93. Id. at 990.
94. Id. at 990 n.3.
95. Id. at 994.
96. Schauer is not the frst to suggest this. Intuitionism has been called counterfoundational.
See, e.g., Farber, supra note 3, at 1334.
97. Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5, at 1007-08.
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in those cases? The answer from Alexander may be no, but I would ask him
also to consider the way Merrill has approached his "public goods" notion of a
unifying theory. Although Merrill ignores the Dormant Commerce Clause, he
does use the public goods notion to explain case outcomes that were seemingly irreconcilable, and he does so with an idea that cannot be taken from the
rationales used by the justices to explain their decisions.
Alexander suggests problems with other areas of constitutional law that
create barriers for a workable theory of unconstitutional conditions, including
the religion clauses, equal protection and free speech.98 He asserts that these
areas cannot be rationalized. When demonstrating why, however, he resorts to
the core ideas that have been used by the Court to anchor these doctrines. He
states, for example, that "neutrality" lies at the heart of the religion clauses
and free speech. 9 He does not, however, explore whether neutrality may
merely be a subset of a greater concern that might be gleaned from the outcomes of the cases in these areas, but not highlighted expressly by the Court
in its decisions. Alexander does not address this possibility, and yet, he deems
a unifying principle "impossible." In fairness to Alexander, this essay does not
offer any unifying principle either. Thus, it does not very well serve to negate
his point. There are, however, other scholars who seem intent on showing
unification of First Amendment cases (religion and free speech) without relying on the statements of the Court in those cases."°
Alternatively, what if we assume that Alexander is correct-that the Dormant Commerce Clause, for example, is a "constitutional oxymoron." None of
the earlier analogies to scientific ideas require us to assume that Supreme
Court constitutional jurisprudence has reached a perfect and harmonious endstate. The anthropic principle, and Hawking's Darwinistic analysis of it, states
that we will evolve to a stage at which we will be able to explain outcomes
through application of a single theory. If that is true, then it is possible that
the Supreme Court may reverse itself with respect to its current Dormant
Commerce Clause decisions. The Court has certainly done this in the past.
One could argue, for example, that both Lochner v. New York and Plessy v.
Ferguson are good examples of decisions that were weeded out by the process
of natural selection as applied to judicial decisionmaking.
If we are not in the final, perfect end-state of constitutional jurisprudence,
then it may be "too hard" or "impossible" now to "discover" a unifying theory
of all constitutional law, and even of unconstitutional conditions. However, it
lends credence to the Darwinist view of constitutional jurisprudence that there
exist some partialunifying theories. In the area of unconstitutional conditions,
Alexander has written about a small number of proposed unifying theories that
he has proceeded to show hold no promise, at least in the current state of

98. Id. at 1008-09.
99. Id. at 1009.
100. Professor William Marshall, for example, is currently exploring whether the "search for
truth" may better serve to explain First Amendment decisions involving both religion and free
speech. See William Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a FirstAmendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
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constitutional doctrine, as a single explanatory principle.' But, is it possible
that one of those theories may ultimately prevail as principles that are only
doctrinal pretenders fall by the wayside?
If it is possible that the Darwinist decisionmaking theory is true, then
consider the hazards of abandoning the search for a unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions. Rather than exposing attempts at unifying theories to
criticism that would offer up a better strand of the theory, constitutional
scholars abandon the enterprise, resulting in the stagnation of constitutional
jurisprudence. Of course, if this were to occur I suppose one could simply say
that natural selection would have led to any prevailing system, meaning that it
is superior.
Nonetheless, shouldn't we encourage the growth and development of
constitutional jurisprudence? If the answer is yes, then shouldn't we encourage
the development of metanarratives that can be used to test individual doctrines.
If "public goods" can explain all case outcomes except those under the Dormant Commerce Clause, then which is wrong? Is it Dormant Commerce
Clause decisionmaking to date or the "public goods" approach to constitutional
rights?
The development of law in the area of contracts serves as a good example
of this point. Contract law has evolved over time to yield the rules that now
dominate our system. Interestingly, those rules developed in the same haphazard way that many scholars, including Schauer and Alexander, have ascribed
to the development of constitutional law. However, in this century the development of economics as a science, and specifically its application to contract
law, has shown that rules governing contracts tend to encourage efficiency."° One major exception with respect to this is the American rule regarding attorneys' fees. In the United States, a successful litigant who has been the
victim of a breach may not recover attorneys' fees and court costs even
though logic dictates that, in a system that provides no punitive damages,
recovery of these costs is critical to making the victim whole and encouraging
efficiency. Despite this exception to the notion of efficiency, the development
of these economics theories in contract law have been useful. Possibly also
they will be the vehicle by which the American rule regarding fees and costs
is reversed as an idea that cannot survive the further development of the law.
Alexander concludes his commentary by proposing that the Constitution is
not viewed as a list of fixed rules but as a source of heavily moralized principles." 3 He then questions the fit between morality and the discrete provisions of the Constitution. 4 Alexander's position strongly implies the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. If the Constitution is an objective
document, as it purports facially to be, then morality is incapable of linking
with it. Here, Alexander's argument resonates with Schauer's-rationality is
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not an effective tool to describe what the Constitution has become through
case law. This kind of thinking about rationality at its core is analogous to
modernist, 19th century thinking about science that has been wiped away by
quantum mechanics and chaos theory in this century. To prove it wrong, however, one would have to show that there is something similar about human
reasoning and intuition that would produce case outcomes that are susceptible
to explanation by a common or unifying principle. If there is a uniformity or
rationality attributable to intuition, then Schauer and Alexander are wrong to
focus on the rationales rather than purely the outcomes of the cases they discuss.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to prove anything in any real sense,
but there are a few observations that can be made regarding a link between
rationality and intuition. The first is that the regime of constitutional jurisprudence has indeed evolved from a system of rules to a system of standards.
Many scholars have written about this phenomenon-Schauer and Alexander
among them. Rules have been generally lauded as rational, while standards
have been generally criticized as vague, and the decisionmaking process for
implementing standards has been challenged as requiring too much intuition.
And yet, the system of natural selection I have posited has generally yielded
up an increasingly standard-oriented scheme. This development seems similar
to the shift in metaphysics from the mechanistic world of Newton to the relativistic world of Einstein to the uncertain world of Heisenberg to the chaotic
world of Lorenz.
The second observation is that the shift from the certain to the uncertain is
not necessarily bad and not necessarily subjective. As Gerald Holton, discussing Einstein's essay on "preestablished harmony" has indicated, the key to
answering all questions of "science" lies in the synthesis of rationality and
intuition." 5 Einstein himself wrote in 1918 that from general laws "it should
be possible to obtain by pure deduction the description, that is to say the theory, of every natural process, including those of life."'" Einstein continued by
saying that "the journey toward that goal will be neither fast nor direct" because "to the [grand] elemental laws there leads no logical path, but only intuition." 0° If Holton and Einstein are correct, constitutional scholars should
spend less time criticizing the current chaos in constitutional jurisprudence
while pining away for past certainty and more time attempting to understand
the rationalities that underpin the chaotic veneer of current constitutional doctrines. The best way to do this, it seems to me, is to pursue unifying theories.
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